

## The place of *intellectus* in the theory of signification

by Abelard and *Ars Meliduna*

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The main concern of the present paper is with some theories of *significatio* in the 12<sup>th</sup> century, and how *intellectus* and *imaginatio* play a role in them, but not in others. In the present paper, I shall restrict my attention to Abelard and *Ars meliduna*, hoping to contrast them.

### ABELARD'S THEORY OF SIGNIFICATION

As for Abelard's theory, I will make some comments concerning the present subject, with a summary of the conclusions that I have described elsewhere<sup>1</sup>. In *Glosse super Porphyrium* («*Ingredientibus*»), Abelard's theory of signification bound up with his explanation and revision of the vocalist theory of a universal. He starts with the definition of the universal, which involves the idea of *impositio* and *nominatio*, and so far the theory contains the name-things relationship only. Abelard, however, also shows its difficulties, by raising the two cardinal aspects of signification: the first concerns *nominatio*, or *significatio* in the broader sense, while the second, the *intellectus* that a name produces in the hearer, and this act of a name is *significatio* in the strict sense. Then he tries to solve the difficulties and presents his revision of the theory regarding each of the two aspects<sup>2</sup>.

#### 1. *causa communis* and *status*

Regarding the first aspect, which is concerned with the name-things relationship, the problem is: What is a universal vocal word the name of? Or: How can a name be common to many things? If Abelard admitted the realist theory, he could answer by referring to a universal thing (*res*) that is common to certain singulars. As a vocalist, however, rejects this answer, and tries to find another one.

His reply is that there is something common to those things of which a universal vocal word is the name, and that this something common is the cause of the imposition of a common name, though this something is not a thing (*res*), but a fact such as that each of them is a man. It is in this context that Abelard introduces the term *status*, which is the common cause of a name's imposition. For instance *status hominis* is just *esse hominem* (being a man) and is the common characteristic that can be predicated of all men. By this, he rejects the theory that a *res*, i.e. man, is common to all men<sup>3</sup>.

At this point I should like to add one point in detail concerning the passage in dispute between scholars<sup>4</sup> that is the last sentence of his explanation of the common cause of a name's imposition: «Statum quoque hominis res ipsas in[‘non’ in MS] natura hominis statutas possumus appellare, quarum communem similitudinem ille concipit, qui vocabulum imposuit». John Marenbon, in his comprehensive book on Abelard, translates it thus: «We can also call *status* those things set up [statutas] in the nature of man, the common likeness of which was grasped by the person who imposed the word <man>», meaning by «those things» the particular mortalities, rationalities and so on.

I agree with Geyer and Marenbon's reading of the text as «*in* (instead of ‘non’ in the MS.) *natura hominis*». I cannot agree, however, with Marenbon's explanation of «*res ipsae*». In my view, after explaining *status* as *esse hominem*, Abelard is referring here to another possibility of what we can accept as the *status hominis* (*quoque ... possumus appellare*), i.e., *res ipsae*, which I think are individual human beings themselves, so that the possible referents of «*status*» should be distinguished from the former referent, i.e., *esse hominem*. That is, all individual men as a whole constitute the *status hominis* and it can be said the common cause of the name's imposition, for the person who imposed the word did it on the basis of apprehending the common likeness of those individuals. If so, those individuals were the cause of the name's imposition. This, I believe, is the context in which Abelard refers to the common likeness here.

I would add that the first referent corresponds to the identity theory as a subspecies of indifference theory on the side of realism, and Abelard makes use of the phrase prompted by the identity theory with some revision, when he says, «singuli homines convenient...non in homine, sed in esse hominem»<sup>5</sup>. While the second (possible) referents correspond to another realist theory, i.e., the *collectio* theory. Abelard never admits, however, that the totality of men is the universal thing (*res*), but singular men themselves (*res ipsae*) as a whole can be called the *status*. This interpretation may be confirmed by Abelard's own account of the collection theory<sup>6</sup>, where he refers to «a thinking collected from a substantial likeness of individuals», which is similar to «*res ipsae*..., the common likeness of which was apprehended by the person» in the present context.

It is presumable that Abelard uses the term «*status*» generally with the meaning that which exists on the side of reality and is the cause of the structure of language<sup>7</sup>. He is now trying to explain how a name is common to some things but not to others, so that the common cause Abelard is now referring to should be a fact in the world, i.e., «*status* of X» refers to the fact in the world that is common to everything called «X». I agree

with Marenbon so far as he explains «*status rerum*» as «how things are», «the condition of things», but I hesitate to accept his explanation of common conceptions of God in terms of the *status* of things, which are as a result connected with human conceptions<sup>8</sup>. Thus my claim is concerned with his interpretation of *status* as a whole; I hope to discuss the point in detail elsewhere.

## 2. *significatio intellectus*

Regarding the second aspect, i.e. in respect of *significatio intellectus*, the problem is as follows: when we hear a statement that contains the word «man», it is very often the case that we cannot understand who is referred to by the statement. Thus «man» does not produce an understanding of any individual in the hearer's mind. Understanding, however, cannot be without its object; every understanding is an understanding of something. Therefore, «man» cannot produce any understanding in the hearer.

Replying to this objection, Abelard claims that it produces the understanding which «conceives the common likeness of things» and tries to explain this in detail.

(1) *imaginatio* theory. First he interprets *intellectus* in terms of mental images, saying that the intellection produced by a universal word, e.g., «man», is directed toward an imaginary likeness, or a form, which is common to all men and not peculiar to any man<sup>9</sup>. Thus we can call this the «*imaginatio* theory» of signification.

(2) *formae* in God before creation. Secondly Abelard admits that the form towards which the understanding is directed can be said to be the object of signification as well. In the argument Abelard refers to conceptions in God's mind before creation, interpreting a passage from Priscian<sup>10</sup>.

(3) *abstractio* theory as an addition. Thirdly Abelard introduces a theory of abstraction in addition to the preceding two points. Here, an *intellectus* of a universal is said to result by the act of abstraction, by which for instance «man» is understood as a rational mortal animal<sup>11</sup>.

The difference between *imaginatio* and *abstractio* theory is apparent. Both are concerned with what results when I hear «man», but the former says that a certain figure which is common to all men and not peculiar to any man rises in my mind, while the latter, that I have the conception of a rational mortal animal. Abelard, however, says nothing about the relationship between these two modes of intellect, and thus both modes are only put side by side in the *Glosse*. In addition, at this stage *significatio* is still a temporary act in that it exists only when someone hears a *vox* uttered by someone

else, and correspondingly, also *intellectus* is a temporary act produced in the hearer.

### 3. *sermo* established with respect to *intellectus* as an abstract entity

Abelard's later theory shown in the *Glossule super Porphyrium* is different from that in the *Glosse* not only in that now it is a *sermo*, and not a *vox*, that is a universal, but also in that the *sermo* has been established (*instituta*) with respect to *intellectus*, while in the *Glosse* a *nomen* has been imposed, or invented, with respect to things (*res*)<sup>12</sup>. Also, words and their signification are no longer temporary; he claims that the *sermo* exists even when no one utters it<sup>13</sup>. For it exists in the sense that the relationship between *sermo* and *intellectus* has been established. Thus, although a *sermo* is a vocal entity, nevertheless its existence is independent of the vocal entity. Correspondingly an *intellectus* seems also to exist independently of someone's actual act of understanding. Again, an *intellectus* is not explained in terms of *imaginatio* theory any more, but exclusively in terms of *abstractio* theory.

## ARS MELIDUNA

The second text that I shall examine is from the latter half of the 12<sup>th</sup> century, namely the *Ars Meliduna*<sup>14</sup>, which, in my view, shows a remarkable contrast with Abelard's theory. Its theory of signification has been discussed already by scholars<sup>15</sup>, nevertheless I hope to add a few points to their reports, by putting my focus on the role of *intellectus* around vocal words (*voces*).

### 1. *intellectus* and *causa institutionis vocum*

The anonymous author shows the role of *intellectus* in terms of *causa institutionis vocum*. The reason why vocal language has been instituted is for the sake of being able to manifest a speaker's thinking (*intellectus*) to a hearer, so that the structure of vocal language reflects that of thinking in the mind: as there are «two main parts in *intellectus*, i.e., *suppositum* and that which is said of the *suppositum*», so correspondingly, «two kinds of parts of speech have been invented: names and verbs»<sup>16</sup>. Thus it is the speaker's point of view, and not the hearer's, from which the author argues the subject.

He goes on to insist that the institution of words has been made for the sake of performing *appellatio*, and not *significatio*, and that «names call (*appellant*) those things, and for the sake of placing these things as subjects (*propter quas supponendas*) these names have been instituted»<sup>17</sup>. From these phrases, we can tell that *appellatio* is a name's function of referring to some things and making them the subject of speech, and

that *appellatio* is the function that manifests the *suppositum* in the speaker's thought. Thus *appellatio* is connected to *intellectus*, while *significatio* is cut off from it.

As for the place of *significatio* in this respect, the author adds: «though vocal words have signification besides appellation, they have caused signification by deducing it from appellation, or from the institution made for the sake of appellation»<sup>18</sup>. So far *significatio* seems to be a subordinate or secondary function based on *appellatio*.

## 2. *status* as the object of signification

As for *significatio*, the anonymous author shows theories concerning what vocal words can signify. Three theories are rejected without examination as belonging to ancient or old scholars, and the other two are recognized and examined as those current among modern scholars, «*inter modernos*», of which he admits the second one alone, i.e., the *status* theory.

The theory claims that «words signify common or unique *status*, i.e., being able to be participated by only one or by many». E.g., the name «man» signifies a special *status*, «animal» a general *status*, «Socrates» a *status* unique to one, and «verbs also signify common *status*»<sup>19</sup>. Thus *status* is explained in its relationship to things, i.e., a *status* is something that can be participated (*participabilis*) by singular things or a singular thing. By the term «*participabilis*» we can suppose that it is not necessary for a *status* to be participated by singular things actually. From this we can safely say that a *status*, the object of signification of a word, should be related as *participabilis* to singular things that are the objects of appellation of the word, and thus the realm of *status* and that of singular things are distinguished. The relationship «*participabilis*» also suggests the relationship between signification and appellation, which can be consistent with the preceding claim that signification is subordinate to appellation. According to *rerum natura*, or the order of creation, expressed as «*participabilis*», *status* seem to be prior to things, nevertheless it is the order of words' institution the author is referring to now.

## 3. Priscian grammar as an authority for the *status* theory

In order to confirm the *status* theory, the anonymous author appeals to Priscian's grammar, trying to interpret it in two ways. First, referring to the phrase: «a common name is naturally common to many, which connects one and the same general or special substance, quality, or quantity», and interprets it: «the one and the same substantial *status* signified by the common name ... connects those many things»<sup>20</sup>. Thus there are many kinds of *status*, and not only the one that corresponds to the category of

substance; for instance, there should be a *status* that corresponds to the name «white (thing)».

Also there are *status* that correspond to proper names. Referring to another phrase of Priscian: «a proper name naturally signifies something's unique (*privata*) substance and quality», the anonymous author interprets thus: «this means, someone's unique *status*, whatever it is, determining some certain quality concerning it (*determinando circa illud aliquam certam qualitatem*)»<sup>21</sup>. He seems not to recognize any qualitative *status* that corresponds to a «unique quality», nor a proper name under the category of quality, by contrast to common names so that he needs another explanation for «signifies ... substance and quality». The interpretation, «*determinando ... qualitatem*», apparently reflects a phrase from the anonymous *Glosule* on Priscian from the latter half of the 11<sup>th</sup> century<sup>22</sup>. This interpretation, however, is not compatible with the next interpretation, as will be shown in the following.

The second way of interpreting Priscian is, in the anonymous author's view, in accordance with his contemporary grammarians' interpretation<sup>23</sup>. He introduces their viewpoint as that they accept a name's signification in a broader sense and, admit that a name signifies both substance and quality in the sense that «every name signifies a substance with a quality, for each makes a *suppositum* understood with any property». This also reflects the view of the *Glosule*, according to which, «*significare substantiam*» is the act of *nominatio* based on the name's imposition, while «*significare qualitatem*» is done by representing properties concerning the subject of naming<sup>24</sup>. For instance, «man» names things that are men, and simultaneously represents mortality, rationality, animal, etc.

The anonymous author tries to make this interpretation by the grammarians consistent with his *status* theory: «Perhaps a name can be said to signify a *status* instead of a quality, e.g. 'man' signifies a species, 'animal' a genus, 'Socrates' an individual ». This means that, first, a name signifies a substance: this corresponds to the name's relationship to the subject thing (*suppositum*), and signification is said to be used here in the broader sense. Secondly, the name signifies a *status*, which is a quality, and this is what the author intends to present as *significatio* in the strict sense.

The author, however, shows some evidence of unease with this interpretation. First, though *status* is referred to by the word «quality», it is not a being that belongs to the category of quality. Secondly, according to this interpretation, by one word «*significat*» in Priscian's phrase «a name signifies substance and quality», two kinds of signification are involved, but this should not be accepted in the sense that there is one signification

under one supposition (*sub una suppositione*). This expression is remarkable, for the two types of *suppositio*, namely the act of placing subject things, seem to be recognized, corresponding to the two ways of signification. This means that not only the *suppositum* by *appellatio*, but also the object of signification, namely *status*, can be a *suppositum* depending on the context. Thirdly, the author refuses to say, «this name signifies the quality which exists or does not exist», but says instead, «this name signifies the quality which it signifies». That is, a *status* has no relationship to existence of individual things, so that a *status* is not such an entity that sometimes exists and sometimes does not exist, but rather it always exists as the object of a name's signification.

After thus interpreting and trying to justify it, the author expresses his preference for the first way of interpreting Priscian. This must mean that he thinks it necessary to distinguish clearly between the two kinds of semantic relationship, *appellatio* and *significatio*<sup>25</sup>, but the *Glosule* interprets a word's signification as if the two kinds are mixed, so that he prefers the first interpretation, which interprets Priscian's passage as exclusively concerned with the act of signifying *status*.

#### 4. cutting off *intellectus* from the theory of signification

The three theories referred to as belonging to ancient scholars take *imaginatio, formae* in God before creation, and *intellectus* as the object of signification respectively<sup>26</sup>. It is remarkable that, though the *Ars meliduna* distinguishes these theories as if they belong to different scholars, these three as a whole correspond to Abelard's presentation I have surveyed in the preceding part. Again, the *Ars* refers to the questions falling under the third *intellectus* theory: i.e., whether the vocal word «man» signifies exclusively one understanding, or this thing's or that thing's understanding? Or how *intellectus* should be accepted, as a mental ability, or as an act of understanding, or as a passion in mind of the thing understood, etc.? But Abelard, too, treated these points during his explanation of *significatio intellectus*. Moreover, the *Ars* refers to the possibility of signification of a vocal word when the object thing of its appellation ceases to exist, as belonging to the second theory, which nominates the ideas or forms in God as objects of signification. But how can this reference be appropriate in such context? We can understand the context only when we put Abelard as its background. For Abelard refers to forms in God for the sake of supporting the idea that the object form of our intellection can be taken as an object of signification as well, so that forms in God when nothing existed can correspond to *significatio intellectus* of a name, for instance, «rose» when there is no rose. From these points I conclude that there must be

Abelard in the background and the author expresses his attitude toward Abelard, when he regards these theories as old-fashioned, and puts them aside without examining them.

Since the anonymous author rejects *intellectus* etc. as the object of *significatio*, this should show his attitude towards Aristotle's *De interpretatione*. For it was used as a main authority, when Abelard as well as Anselm introduced *intellectus* and *imaginatio* into the theory of signification<sup>27</sup>. In fact, the author refers to Aristotle's famous passage that explains the relationship between vocal sounds and passions, or *intellectus*, in mind, and also to Boethius' comment on it and tries to make them consistent with his *status* theory<sup>28</sup>. According to him, it is the *causa impositionis*, and not the *significatio*, that Aristotle was concerned with there. That is, «vocal words are imposed on things», but it is «not on account of the things themselves», but «on account of interpreting understandings that are held about the things». This means that, though *impositio* is made in the relationship between vocal word and things, it is *intellectus*, and not the things, that requires words to be imposed.

If it is the *causa impositionis* that Aristotle explains by referring to *intellectus*, we need not explain it in terms of signification. Thus the author goes on to separate *intellectus* from *significatio*: «The vocal words are properly said rather to interpret or to produce understandings than to signify them». Though «*constituere intellectus*» is used by Abelard, as well as by Anselm, to explain *significare*<sup>29</sup>, nevertheless the author of the *Ars meliduna* uses this notion in the reverse sense, that «*constituere intellectus*» is different form «*significare intellectus*» and Aristotle admits the former, but not the latter, «properly», i.e., in the proper use of the terms.

The author presents a similar argument in relation to Boethius' explicit claim that vocal words signify mainly understandings, and secondly things<sup>30</sup>. He explains the former as that «vocal words are imposed for the sake of signifying, or expressing understandings», while the latter as «*appellant*», and the reason why it is said to be «*secundario*» is that «when they signify things, they do so...for the sake of understandings», i.e. «in order that we interpret or expose *intellectus*». Thus also the word «*significare*» explicitly used by Boethius is evaluated as an improper use, and replaced by other terms «*exprimere*», «*appellare*», or explained as an abridged expression of other sentences which do not include any idea of signifying understandings. Thus the author intends to cut off *intellectus* from the context of *significatio* and place it in the context of *causa impositionis*.

## CONCLUSION



In sum, we can contrast Abelard and the *Ars meliduna* as for how *intellectus* are treated with reference to signification. For both of them, a *status* is some thing or some fact in the world, independent of *intellectus*, though it might be an object of *intellectus*, but by no means a mental entity. This is the only point on which both will agree. To begin with, they oppose each other as for what is the *status*. For Abelard, *status* is *causa impositionis*, while for the *Ars meliduna*, it is the object of signification. On the contrary, *intellectus* is the object of signification for Abelard, while it is the *causa impositionis* for the *Ars meliduna*. Abelard thinks of *intellectus* from the hearer's point of view basing himself on Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, so that he attends to the act of producing *intellectus* in the hearer, while the *Ars meliduna* thinks of *intellectus* from the speaker's point of view, basing itself on Priscian's grammar, so that it attends to the vocal words as revealing the speaker's *intellectus*. Thus the *Ars meliduna* insists on the reverse of what Abelard insisted on<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Shimizu, T., «From Vocalism to Nominalism: Progression in Abaelard's Theory of Signification», *Didascalica*, 1,15-46.

<sup>2</sup> Abaelardus, *Glossae super Porphyrium*, hrsg. von Geyer, B., *Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften* I,1933: 16, 25-30; 18,4-19,20.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, *ibid.*, 19,21-22,14

<sup>4</sup> Tweedale, M.M., *Abailard on universals*, 1976, 207. De Rijk, R.M., «Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard. Some criticisms of a fascinating venture», *Vivarium* 23(1985), 94-5. Marenbon, J., *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*, 1997, 192, n.45.

<sup>5</sup> Abaelardus, *ibid.*, 19, 24-25. cf. 14, 2-6; 18-21.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.*, *ibid.*, 14, 7-17.

<sup>7</sup> cf. *Id.*, *ibid.*, 17,14-21:«...quantum quidem ad manifestandum intellectum, non quantum ad ostendendum rei statum... ....ad rerum naturam pertinet et ad veritatem status earum demonstrandam. »

<sup>8</sup> Marenbon, *op.cit.*, 193-5.

<sup>9</sup> Abaelardus, *ibid.*, 20,18-22,24.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.*, *ibid.*, 22,25-24,31. cf. Priscianus, *Inst. Grammat*, XVII, c.44., ed. Keil., III,135.

<sup>11</sup> Abaelardus., *ibid.*, 24,38-27,34.

<sup>12</sup> Abaelardus, *Glossulae super Porphyrium*. Geyer, *op.cit.*,II,1973:513,15-19.

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*,*ibid.*, 524.21-24: «sciendum est genera et species nullo loquente non minus esse. »

<sup>14</sup> De Rijk has analysed it, giving excerpts from the whole work: *Logica modernorum II-1*, Assen,1967, chaps. 6-10. Iwakuma Yukio is now preparing a complete edition of the MS. I express my thanks to him for allowing me to use parts 1 and 2 of his draft, from which I take the readings in this article.

<sup>15</sup> Braakhuis,H.A.G., «Signification, Appellation and Predication in the *Ars Meliduna*», in J.Jolivet *et al.*(ed.), *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains*, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1987, 107-120. Biard,J., «Semantique et Ontologie dans l'*Ars Meliduna*», in *ibid.*121-144. *Id.*, «Le langage et l'incorporel. Quelques réflexions à partir de l'*Ars meliduna*», in *id.*(ed.), *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe Siècle*, Paris, J.Vrin,1999.217-234.

<sup>16</sup> *Ars Meliduna*, Oxford, *Digby* 174, 213ra55-57: «Causa institutionis vocum fuit manifestatio intellectus, id est ut haberet quis quo alii intellectum suum manifestaret. Ideoque sicut intellectu duo principaliter comprehendimus, suppositum scilicet et quod de eo dicitur, ita quoque inventa sunt duo genera dictionum, nomina scilicet et verba, .... »

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* 213rb1-7: «Notandum tamen quod institutio vocum non fuit facta ad significandum, sed tantum ad appellandum, quippe cum appellatio vocum magis sit necessaria ad loquendum de rebus subiectis quam significatio. .... Appellans ergo nomina res illas propter quas supponendas fuerunt instituta. »

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* 213rb7-9 :«Licet autem ad appellandum tantum fuerint institutae voces, tamen praeter

appellationem habent etiam significationem; sed hanc ex appellatione contraxerunt, sive ex institutione facta ad appellandum. »

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 213rb57-va3: «...fatetur dictiones significare communes status vel privatos, id est participabiles ab uno solo vel a pluribus, ut hoc nomen 'homo' significat specialem statum, id est participatum tantum a rebus unius speciei; 'animal' vero generalem,...; 'Socrates' vero privatum statum, id est ab uno solo partici<pa>bilem. Verba quoque communes status significant, ut hoc verbum 'legit' quoddam accidens participatum ab omni re legente...»

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 213va5-8: «Hanc autem opinionem confirmat Priscianus, ubi loquens de nominibus dicit quod 'appellativum naturaliter commune est multorum, quos eadem substantia sive qualitas sive quantitas generalis vel specialis iungit', id est quos iungit idem substantialis status per appellativum significatus aut idem status significatus qualitativo vel quantitativo vocabulo, hoc est qualitatem vel quantitatem copulante. » Cf. Priscianus, *op.cit.* II, c.24, II,58.14-16.

<sup>21</sup> *Ars meliduna*, 213va8-10: «'proprium vero naturaliter uniuscuiusque privatam substantiam et qualitatem significant', id est privatum statum alicuius, quicquid sit illud determinando circa illud aliquam certam qualitatem. » Cf. Priscianus, *op.cit.*, II, c.25, II,58.25-26.

<sup>22</sup> *Glosule super Priscianum*, ad II 18, 1502 edition(e) 24v, cf. K 13rb in, Mews,C., «Nominalism and Theology before Abaelard: New Light on Roscelin of Compiègne», *Vivarium* 30-1,1992: 4-33, 17,n.37; De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* II-1, 228n.: «Notandum est tamen quod nomen non significat substantiam et qualitatem insimul nuncupatiue, .... sed substantiam nominat tantum, quia ei fuit impositum, qualitatem uero significat non nuncupatiue, immo representando et determinando circa substantiam; ...»

<sup>23</sup> *Ars meliduna* 213va13-20: «grammatici aliter et communius accipientes significare,... ponunt omne nomen significare substantiam cum qualitate, quia omne facit intelligi suppositum cum quacumque proprietate. Posset tamen fortasse dici nomen significare statum pro qualitate, ut 'homo' speciem, 'animal' genus, 'Socrates' individuum; necessario tamen aliquod universale vel individuum erit qualitas, nam qualitas nominis non est qualitas, sicut nec qualitas propositionis est qualitas, ..... Item non erit reci'piendum secundum hoc sub una suppositione nomen significare substantiam et qualitatem, cum significare dissimiliter. Nec fortasse recipienda relatio cum verbo ad essentiam pertinentem, ut 'hoc nomen significat qualitatem quae est vel non est', sed 'quam significant'. Sed haec sententia minus videtur probabilis quam praedicta. »

<sup>24</sup> *Glosule super Priscianum*, ad II 18, e 24v: «*Proprium est nominis significare substantiam .... et est sic exponendum: proprium est nominis substantiam cum qualitate significare...*» cf. Shimizu, T., «Words and concepts in Anselm and Abelard», in Biard,(ed.), *op.cit.*, 179, n.7. See also note 22 above.

<sup>25</sup> This strategy of the author can be recognized also in his negative examination of the first theory among modern scholars, which explains *significare* in terms of *appellare*.

<sup>26</sup> *Ars meliduna* 213rb10-18: «Plerique enim Veterum arbitrati sunt voces significare imaginationem, eo quod voce prolata aliquid imaginamur, ... Alii ideas, formas scilicet quasdam quae in mente divina constiterunt ab aeterno intelligibiliter antequam in corpore prodirent; hoc inde sibi persuadentes quod desinente re appellata manet vocis significatio, sed nihil potest manere nisi forma per ipsam significata. Alii vero intellectum. A quibus quaeri potuit utrum haec vox 'homo' unum solum significet intellectum; et utrum intellectum huius vel illius; et qualiter ibi accipiatur intellectus, utrum scilicet pro illa vi animae, an pro actu intelligendi, vel pro passione rei intellectae, an etiam pro modo intelligendi,...»

<sup>27</sup> Shimizu, *art.cit.*, 177-197.

<sup>28</sup> *Ars meliduna*, 213va20-23: «Aristoteles tamen, causam impositionis ipsarum vocum recipiens, dixit eas esse notas earum passionum quae sunt in anima, id est intellectuum; voces enim impositae sunt rebus non propter ipsas res...., sed propter intellectus habitos de rebus interpretandos. Magis proprie tamen dicerentur interpretari vel constituere intellectus quam significare. » Cf. Aristotle, *De int.*, 1, 16a3-4.

<sup>29</sup> Abaelardus, *Glossae*, 19,7-9. etc. Anselmus, *De grammatico*, Schmidt, I, 160.29-31.

<sup>30</sup> *Ars meliduna*, 213va23-27: «Boethius quoque, ipsam causam impositionis considerans, ait eas principaliter significare intellectus, secundo vero res; principaliter, inquit, significant intellectus, id est cum significant intellectus propter ipsos significantes sive exprimendos sunt impositae; secundo vero significant res sive appellant, quia cum significant res, propter aliud eas significant, scilicet propter intellectus. Ad hoc quippe, ut interpretemur, id est intellectum exponamus, significamus, non autem e converso. » Cf. Boethius, *In librum de interpretatione, editio secunda*, PL 64, 409B-C.

<sup>31</sup> I deeply appreciate Charles Burnett for his help in preparing the English draft.