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The World as Seen from Yarkand:
Ghulām Muḥammad Khān’s 1920s Chronicle

Mā Tiṭaynīn wāqiʿāsi

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I: Introduction

The field of Central Asian history has lately undergone a shift from a methodological and theoretical emphasis on identity and large-scale solidarities towards an approach to textual criticism that understands loyalty as inherently plural and conflicted and acknowledges the interplay between social imagination and social reality through the medium of text. On the one hand, we have become less concerned with tracing the origins of modern ethnonyms and identities, and more concerned with identification as a historical process. On the other, through a close and critical reading of texts, we may work beyond the cultural and begin to interrogate the social, or more exactly the

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1 I am very grateful to Dr. Tetsuya Ohtoshi of the Islamic Area Studies Center at the University of Tokyo (TIAS) for the opportunity to publish this study. The staff at the Lund University Library have been exceptionally kind and professional during my visits there. Prof. Wheeler Thackston and Joshua Freeman at Harvard University provided valuable comments on my earlier translations of the text and helped me interpret some particularly obscure passages. Some of this work was previously presented at the China in the Twentieth Century Young Scholars’ Workshop at Peking University in June 2013. All errors are my own.


3 Laura Newby and Rian Thum have made significant contributions to our conceptualization of pre-Uyghur Turkic Muslim community in Xinjiang with specific attention to the messy geographical, ritual, and textual constitution of local identities. (Laura J. Newby, “‘Us and Them’ in 18th and 19th century Xinjiang” in Ildikó Bellér-Hann et al., eds., *Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia*, [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007], pp. 15-29; Rian Richard Thum, “The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History”, PhD dissertation, [Harvard University, 2010].)
social-cultural nexus where powerful relations and systems of significance are mutually constituted. I intend the present work as a contribution to this effort where Xinjiang is concerned, that we may begin to understand better how Turkic Muslims (Turki) in East Turkestan made sense of Chinese power and of the world around them.

In April 1927, Ghulām Muhammad Khān Khwājam b. Shaykh Pir Shāh of Yarkand finished writing “Mā Tīṭaynīn wāqiʿasi,” a continuation of Mullā Mūsa b. Mullā ʿĪsa Sayrāmī’s (1836-1917) 1908 history, the Tārīh-i Ḥamīdī. In the following introduction to the text, I will discuss the significance of the work, which scholars have utilized only rarely, largely because it has little evidentiary value as a source for historical events as such. Rather, Ghulām’s chronicle captures a peculiar mentality in crisis, an understanding of the world specific to the Turkic Muslim encounter with Qing and Chinese power in Xinjiang. This worldview, which we see reflected in earlier texts, is fundamentally optimistic about the potential of Qing and Chinese rule to produce justice, and it adapts Islamic sacred history and political philosophy to explain and legitimize that rule. “Mā Tīṭaynīn wāqiʿasi” draws heavily on the Tārīh-i Ḥamīdī, and yet it brings Sayrāmī’s late-Qing ideas into an era when they were being challenged by post-imperial political and social realities. I will trace the genealogies of some of the major ideas that are operating in the text, focusing on intertextuality between Sayrāmī’s and Ghulām’s works. I will analyze their roles in Ghulām’s chronicle and relate them to the broader history of the 1920s as a Yarkandi scholar would have known and understood it.

As Ghulām tells us explicitly in the text, he wrote the chronicle in two stages: a little more than half of the text was written up to the first day of Jumada I 1344 AH (18 November 1925). This comprises a history of the world from the final years of the Qing through the time of writing from the perspective of Yarkand. The second section of the work was composed up to Eid al-Fiṭr 1345 AH (April 1927). In this, Ghulām chronicles further events in the world, focusing on those dating from the very month of writing. The view is panoramic, encompassing events mostly from the Islamic world, with extensive and significant treatment of China, all in relation to what was happening in Ghulām’s own Kashgaria. While Ghulām’s attention darts from one place to another, it is interesting to note both which events he chooses to relate and how he discusses and contextualizes them. The rarity of the text and its disjointed structure place Ghulām’s chronicle in a class with other idiosyncratic writings of a similarly broad or quotidian scope, such as the Kitāb-i ʿAbdullāh of ʿAbdullāh ʿOsōmī (b.1876), written contemporaneously and in the same region from the 1890s through the 1930s.

4 130a, 14-15.
The Manuscript

We do not know who commissioned or copied the manuscript, but it is useful to contextualize it and thus infer the conditions of its production. The only known manuscript of this Eastern Turki text is held by the Lund University Library, where it is included at the end of an abridged version of Sayrəmī’s Tārīḵ-i Ḥamīdī (Jarring Prov. 163). In the following, I will refer to the whole manuscript as Jarring Prov. 163 and to its constituent parts by their individual titles. Gunnar Jarring dates the manuscript to the 1930s, but its provenance is unclear, save that Jarring received it from Jacob Stephen (1914-1991), a Turki convert to Christianity. Ghulām’s work is a chronicle, first retrospective and then contemporaneous: the narrative picks up around the end of Mulla Mūsa’s, with the downfall of the Qing, brings the reader through episodes in history until 1925, and then continues to report on current events. It seems to have been intended in its appendage to the Tārīḵ-i Ḥamīdī to complete and update that longer history, which Mullā Mūsa himself stated to be the first history of East Turkestan since Dughlat’s sixteenth-century Tārīḵ-i Rašīdī.

There are several reasons to believe that another copy of this narrative exists. The text itself indicates that it was completed in 1927, so any copy from the 1930s would

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6 Lund University Library, Jarring Prov. 163. A photoreproduction of this text is available in full online at http://laurentius.ub.lu.se/jarring/volumes/163.html. Sayrəmī’s work is a substantial revision of his Tārīḵ-i Aminiyā.

7 See Jarring’s handwritten catalogue notes. http://laurentius.ub.lu.se/jarring/catalogue/163_2.html See also Jacob Stephen’s autobiography (Flykting för Kristi skull, [Stockholm: Missionsförbundet, 1947].)

8 Sayrəmī 2001, p. 30; 1b, 4-8. [Note: All footnotes referring to Sayrəmī indicate both the page number in the modern transliteration and the corresponding section of Jarring Prov. 163. The modern transliteration is cited as Sayrəmī 2001. Because there is significant divergence between the texts, I have transcribed the text of Jarring Prov. 163. This project has thus far fallen short of complete foliation with the photoreproduction of the Beijing manuscript of the Tārīḵ-i Ḥamīdī.] Balke Moğulistān [5] yurtlarida ȟukūmat qilip őtkän ḧān wā pādişiňlərni Tārīḵ-i Raşidiňiň mu‘allifi janāb Mirzā Ḥaydar Kūrāgān jam ‘al-sayyif [6] wa-‘l-qalamdın keyin tā bu zamānğičā, kim tört ūyilgā yeqin yetipdur, zamānaniň rasā wā dānālaridin hec birləri bu muddat [7] içiňä őtkän wāqi‘ wā hwādisätłar wūqū ‘din qışṣa wā ȟikāya namänä wā nişāna qoymaqni qaşa eytīp tārīḵ [8] yazympdur. Peculiarly, Sayrəmī claims that the Tārīḵ-i Raşidi was written “four centuries” beforehand, suggesting that he was not aware of the Turkic-language translation with addendum, a critical edition of which was recently published by Amanbek Jalilov et al. (Addendum to Tārīḵ-i Raşidi, Translation And Annotation with Introduction and Indexes, [Tokyo: NIHU Program in Islamic Area Studies, 2008].)
obviously be a copy. We also find this narrative copied into a Swedish-made notebook of the kind used by the Swedish missionaries who were active in Kashgaria from the 1890s through 1938. The notebook comprises 144 pages of slightly yellowed notebook paper with light blue ruling and rounded corners, bound with staples between oilcloth covers. There are numerous examples of such notebooks in the archives of the Swedish Mission Church, which was active in Kashgar, Yarkand, and Yengisar, in Stockholm’s Riksarkivet. They appear to have been used mostly for writing out lengthy texts such as these, including manuscript drafts of gospel translations, while ordinary notes and diaries went into smaller, more fragile books. Each page has twenty-two light blue lines, each of which the copyist has used more or less as a baseline for the script. Someone, probably the copyist, whose identity I will address further below, has also added margins in light pencil on either side of each page. The script itself is nastaliq, and not at all ornate, especially compared to the Beijing manuscript. Although there may be subtle differences in the hand that I do not perceive, there appears to have been only one scribe for the entire manuscript.

As Hamada has noted, Jarring Prov. 163’s copy of the Tāriḥ-i Ḥamdī is incomplete relative to the Beijing manuscript known from Ānwār Baytur’s later typescript edition. Though the present work was copied at a later date than the Beijing manuscript, the version presented and ends abruptly. In place of the final chapter, we have Ghulām’s “Mā Tīṭaynīn wāqiʿāsi.” In order to understand these differences in both the composition of the manuscript and its contents, it may be productive to characterize Jarring Prov. 163 not as an incomplete work, but a different version thereof, and one that responds to the circumstances of its production.

“Mā Tīṭaynīn wāqiʿāsi” contains frequent misspellings and omissions of words or dates that suggest copyist’s errors. If we presuppose that the narrative was copied for the Mission, we should also consider the increasingly lucrative trade in manuscripts for foreign travelers and scholars and its consequences for the quality of manuscripts. Only a few years later, Gunnar Jarring paid to have dozens of texts copied for his research. Other travelers were the victims of outright fraud through the production of fake ancient manuscripts, but Jarring’s collection shows him in several instances to be the customer of a sloppy copyist, or a secretive one. Another manuscript, copied for Jarring by a book merchant in 1930, presents an extremely truncated version of the Risāla-i Mūzadozī

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“Manual of the Cobblers” that shows frequent omissions from the text compared to other available cobblers’ manuals. We can well imagine a scribe producing a hurried copy for a foreign scholar or missionary who would hardly be able to judge its quality until long after paying for it. Of course, the copyist of the risāla may have been working to obscure secret knowledge to which only guild members were meant to be party, but such a hypothesis would not hold for the Ghulām text.

Another possibility is that the text was made for a learner of Turki. Many members of the Swedish Mission, including some noted turkologists, were dedicated to studying linguistics and lexicography, particularly in service of Bible translation. In 1929, one missionary had three risālas copied for him into a single notebook (Jarring Prov. 2), evidently for language study, as he added a small glossary to the beginning. Copyists may have caught on to foreign visitors’ imperfect grasp of Turki and thus taken some liberties in writing out the texts. The Tārīḥ-i Ḥamīdī in Jarring Prov. 163 is also missing the lengthy introduction, replete with Arabic phrases, that is present in the Beijing manuscript. Perhaps this was removed in favor of the short summary of the work that we find at the beginning in order to get the reader directly to the Turki-language material. The relative simplicity of the script, lacking ornament or the piling-up of words on line edges so common in manuscripts, may also suggest that the scribe intended to keep the text as simple as possible. Similarly, “Mā Tīṭaynîn wāqi’asi” may have been included specifically because of its interesting linguistic content, particularly the frequency of Chinese and other loanwords.

“Mā Tīṭaynîn wāqi’asi” is visually distinguished in the manuscript as a separate work. Every chapter in the Jarring Prov. 163 Tārīḥ-i Ḥamīdī begins with a heading in red ink, and these chapter headings are not placed on a separate line, but integrated into the body of the text. When it comes to “Mā Tīṭaynîn wāqi’asi,” however, the scribe

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11 Jarring Prov. 43. (See Jarring’s notes: http://laurentius.ub.lu.se/jarring/volumes/43.html)
Comparison with a number of contemporaneous manuals, including another Manual of the Cobblers (Jarring Prov. 500) strongly suggests that the copyist in this case omitted long passages of material, leaving the skeleton of a craft risāla. For a thorough and exacting exploration of the genre, see J. E. Dağyeli, “Gott liebt das Handwerk”: Moral, Identität und religiöse Legitimierung in der mittelasiatischen Handwerks-risāla, (Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2011).

12 Jarring Prov. 2. Jarring’s handwritten catalogue notes indicate the provenance of the MS: http://laurentius.ub.lu.se/jarring/catalogue/2_2.html

13 The Beijing manuscript of the Tārīkh-i Hamīdī, upon which Ānwār Baytur based his modern edition (Sayrāmī 2001), is reproduced in Zhongguo Xibei wenxian congshu, er bian, (Beijing: Xianzhuang Shuju, 2006), v. 41.
leaves a space of two lines between the end of the Tārīḫ-i Ḥamīdī text and the heading of Ghulām’s chronicle. The heading is then centered, set off by wide margins, and the script is larger and bolder. Red ink is used for European-style parentheses that further distinguish the second line of the heading, which gives Ghulām’s name as the author. Double horizontal strokes (=) mark either end of the third line, giving Ghulām’s full name and his parentage. Sayrāmī himself receives no such treatment at the beginning of the work.

However, the text begins in what would be an unconventional way, if this were an independent work of history. Ghulām gives us no way to contextualize the work, no complicated dedication in Persian, nor any formulae in Arabic. Even the title of the work, “Mā Tīṭaynin wāqi ʿasi,” is at first misleading: we might translate it as “the story” or “the death of Commander Ma,” yet the events surrounding the individual in question, Commander Mā Fǔxīng (馬福興 1864-1924), take up only part of the whole narrative. Instead, Ghulām jumps in with the year 1329 AH (1911 CE), the year of the Xinhai Revolution that toppled the Qing, and a very peculiar choice of setting: Beijing.

Thus, Ghulām immediately indicates that his work is to be a continuation of and possibly a response two Sayrāmī’s, something related yet distinct: it picks up where Sayrāmī has left off in time, and it returns to one of Sayrāmī’s most active and intriguing characters, the Khan of China, and the problems of the Khan’s parentage, authority, and place in world history. Ghulām presumes Sayrāmī’s political theory, which adapts Perso-Islamic ideas of kingship to explain the history of the Qing conquest, Muslim rebellion, and Qing reconquest. Yet, to Ghulām, the world has entered a distinct age of history, either indicating or merely suggesting the coming of the apocalypse: Sayrāmī’s just rulers have all fallen, and no one has arisen to take their place.

Ghulām in Space and Time

One of the fundamental questions about this text is its significance and representativeness in regard to popular thought in 1920s East Turkestan. Unfortunately, we have little

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14 124b.
15 124b, 10.
16 Shinmen Yasushi has discussed this topic at some length, comparing Sayrāmī’s vision of China with that one later advanced by the Uyghur leader Muḥammad Emin Buğra. (Shinmen Yasushi, “Higashi Torukisutanka mita Chūgoku” in Chūgoku: Shakai to bunka, 9 [1994], pp. 15-31.)
information about Ghulām. He was associated with Yarkand and either grew up or made his living there. Given his titles and those of his father, he and his family presumably held an esteemed place in their community. He is exceptional for noting his mother’s name, which suggests that she was also well enough known to be mentioned without further comment or explanation.

Despite his familiarity with Chinese bureaucracy and vocabulary, Ghulām’s geography of China is spotty, especially when compared to his knowledge of the Islamic world. His detailed knowledge ends at Qumul, beyond which he is aware of a “Lanzhou province,” meaning Gansu, and of the “region of Beijing,” indicating the whole of China proper, as well as a “Chengdu province,” meaning Sichuan. He knows that there are multiple other provinces, which he refers to by the term seŋ (< Ch. 省 shěng). Yet, by what can be discerned from the text, Beijing is just as familiar to him as far-flung London, and rather less so than Iran.

Ghulām discusses at length the politics of Central Asia, Hindustan, Turkey, and especially the Middle East, where he expresses great concern at the Saudis’ rise to power and destruction of holy sites in and around Mecca. The networks that brought news and travelers over the Pamirs to and from Hindustan were open. Ghulam tells us that he has gone on the Hajj by way of Kashmir, and after his visit to Mecca continued to receive news from hajjis. From the other end of the world, we learn that it was possible to send a letter from Mecca to Merkit, a region of Kashgaria known as the home of the Dolan people that Ghulām describes as a poor and isolated place.

Ghulām puts the events of his time, particularly those concerning novel phenomena such as the rise of communism, into strange phraseology that at first makes his account appear ignorant and fanciful. On further inspection, however, he emerges as a fairly keen observer of national and global news. While his story of the collapse of the Qing tells us more about Xinjiang than it does about the whole empire, as I will discuss below, he is aware of details such as the succession of presidents of the Republic. If some of Ghulām’s

17 125b, 16; 126a, 12, 15; 127b, 9.
18 129b, 3.
19 130a, 1-2.
20 131a, 12.
21 130b, 19.
22 129b, 1-2; 130b, 8-9.
23 128v, 10-12.
24 132v, 1-3.
25 132b, 1-3.
26 125a, 1-4.
stories about China seem outlandish, it is because they emerged in the institutional and informational gap between Turki subjects and their sovereign. Between the people who told these stories and the actual emperor, there was a very long road to travel indeed. Before the introduction of the telegraph to Xinjiang in 1895, even a palace memorial from the governor reporting on local conditions might take two months to reach Beijing. Before such a memorial could be written, however, the governor would have to receive reports from the provincial financial commissioner and judicial commissioner, who in turn depended on information from the four circuit intendants, who often as not chose not to pass along a report from the county, departmental, and prefectural magistrates under him. Of course, this was the case for much of the Qing empire, which incorporated remote areas on its borders and in pockets in its variegated physical and social terrain.

Several other channels of information were open. Firstly, many could cross the linguistic divide between Chinese and Turki. Translators had worked in the Qing administration on an ad hoc basis since the eighteenth century. Chinese theater was being performed in Ili in the early nineteenth century, and it drew a Turki audience, suggesting that there was some indirect knowledge of oral Chinese or Manchu on their part, or of Turki on the part of the performers, to allow them to understand the storyline.²⁷ There is macaronic poetry blending Turki and Chinese in evidence,²⁸ and even a somewhat mysterious manuscript that appears to be a Turki translation of a Chinese novel, albeit possibly through the intermediate step of Manchu.²⁹ Since the 1870s, the Qing regime in Xinjiang had worked to create a class of translators (Ch. tōngshì, ET tuyēi) to serve as intermediaries between Chinese officials and Turki subjects. Quite a number of Turki students, though it is still unclear how many, succeeded not only in learning Chinese, but also in reading and memorizing a number of Confucian Classics.³⁰ One Turki, who

²⁷  V. V. Radloff, *Proben der Volkliteratur der Türkischen Stämme*, v. 6, (St. Petersburg, Commissionäre der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1886), pp. 92-94.
³⁰  I have found a number of local records relating to the education of Turki boys in the Chinese classics in a recently-published collection of documents from Turpan. (*Qingdai Xinjiang dang an xuanji*, [Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012].) For example, a report from 1889 lists Han Chinese, Hui, and Turki students. (v. 29, pp. 217-218) One Turki boy, aged fourteen but singled out for his precociousness, had already read the *Book of Odes* (*Shījīng* 詩經) and rapidly worked through the *Book of Documents* (*Shāngshū* 尚書).
presumably had this or a similar background, eventually came to teach Chinese to Turki boys in a school in Kashgar. Such translators facilitated the official distribution of news in multiple languages.

Nor should we discount the importance of merchant networks, who may have served to bridge the information gap. In making up for the state’s weakened capacity to create meanings, however, merchants would have passed along a mixture of popular and official understandings. It is clear that merchants from China proper operating in Xinjiang had extensive contact with Turki. Relations between the two communities were not limited to predatory lending and other financial practices, but also included everyday relationships such as cohabitation, prostitution, and marriage. The merchant houses were based elsewhere in China, particularly Tianjin, Shaanxi, Hunan, and Hubei, and members would have traveled regularly from one end of the country to another. Turki merchants also operated in China proper. Although their activities are less apparent in the historical record, some Turki literally made names for themselves in the cross-country trade.

Ghulām’s sources and means of obtaining information influenced a particular worldview informed partly by the Islamic textual tradition, partly by news from beyond Kashgaria, and partly by the experience of Qing and Chinese rule. What Ghulām presents is not a canonical Islamic perspective, if such a thing can be said to exist in the world, but a cosmology cobbled from multiple sources. Through critical reading, it is possible to excavate something of this cosmology and how it came into being.

**China and its Ruler**

A good starting point is the conception of Qing and Chinese rule, as Ghulām’s narrative is overwhelming concerned with Chinese power in its various manifestations. An attentive reader of Ghulām’s work will notice that the author labels the ruler of China a khan, while the land he rules over is called ḥāqān. Ḥāqān, as I will discuss below, was originally a

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32 *Qingdai Xinjiang dang’an xuanji* again provides significant documentation this effect. (e.g. v. 29, pp. 371-372)
title, obviously related to Turko-Mongol qaghan, and until recently, Turki writers had used it to label the ruler of China himself. Exploring the vicissitudes of this term as it traveled through history will illuminate a great deal about East Turkestan conceptions of Chinese power. Because the ruler of China is very much at the center of much of Ghulām’s text, reflecting on the meaning of this figure will address the ideological and geographical dimensions of Sayrāmī and Ghulām’s worldview.

For all of its idiosyncrasies, “Mā Tīṭayniṇ wāqī’asi” is, like its parent text the Tārīh-i Ḥamīdī, a story about power and legitimacy. Sayrāmī began his work with a reminder that the fate of rulers, including that of all those actors in his history of rebellion, violence, and kingship, is in the hands of God.34 This is a generic statement, but one that immediately indicates that the narrative to follow is a political history intended to explain the shifting fates of rulers over East Turkestan, Sayrāmī’s Moghulistan.

How interesting, then, that Sayrāmī, like Ghulām after him, devotes so much of his work not to the eventful history of his recent past, but to ancient and sacred history. Scholars have so far drawn on Sayrāmī’s earlier Tārīh-i Aminīyya and the Tārīh-i Ḥamīdī for their evidentiary value, assured by Sayrāmī’s explicit dedication to the historian’s craft that much of the work has been written on the basis of several sources that the author himself approached critically.35 However, because Sayrāmī also collected oral narratives among his various sources36, the work is just as valuable as a repository of stories about the distant past that circulated in East Turkestan in the first decade of the twentieth century. Moreover, Sayrāmī deploys sacred and ancient history strategically: throughout the narrative, he juxtaposes the events of the distant past with those of the recent past, reminding the reader of the origins of leaders, places, and peoples and implying parallels across time. In short, while Sayrāmī’s work is a political history, the author considers a great deal of legendary history to be relevant to his argument. Because such a strategy is familiar from historical writing globally, it does not constitute an innovation in itself; rather, “Mā Tīṭayniṇ wāqī’asi” demands that we regard the particular ways that sacred and political history interact in the text.

34  (1,5) Tāği saltanatnī hār kîmin bāşiğā ḫwāhlasa qoyadur; ḫwāhlasa aladur; ḫwāhlasa uluq qiladur; ḫwāhlasa hār qiladur; ḫwāhlasa hidāyat-i ’azā qiladur; ḫwāhlasa zalālatkā saladur; pastnī baland wā balandnī past qiladur: I have excerpted this line from the Beijing manuscript, since Jarring Prov. 163 is missing this opening section.
35 Hodong Kim, in his introduction to Holy War in China, calls Sayrāmī “truly one of the best historians Central Asia has ever produced” and praises his accuracy. (Hodong Kim, Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and the State in Chinese Central Asia, [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004], p. xvi.)
36 Sayrāmī, p. 144.
We must give some consideration in this light to a character who haunts this narrative from a considerable distance, the ruler of China, the “Khan” (ET ḥān). Ghulām expresses an unexpected nostalgia for the Qing emperor. Ghulām, like Sayrāmī, sees the majority of Qing emperors as just rulers in the Perso-Islamic mold, and he understands the downfall of the Qing, along with the tyrannies visited on the Muslims of Xinjiang, to have been the doing of an imposter and pretender to the throne. Throughout the narrative, this character remains an active figure, despite the supposed end of the royal line in 1911. The Khan appears as the source of just commands meant to counter the tyranny of disobedient officials in Xinjiang and throughout the empire, yet he possesses no power to act. Ghulām holds this view even when writing in 1925, after the emperor Puyi, long since stripped of political power, had been expelled from the Forbidden City in 1924; by 1927, he has realized that the emperor is gone and so loses hope for just rule in China. How did this particular image of the ruler of China come into Ghulām’s chronicle? Why did he include such a figure in his narrative?

East Turkestanī conceptions of Qing and Chinese power have a complex history. The Turkic-language documentary records indicates a number of ways that Kazakh and Turki addressed or referred to the Qing emperor around the time of the conquest in the mid-eighteenth century: early communications acknowledged the emperor as sovereign in Manchu terms, by the name ejen (ET ezen), which meant “ruler,” “lord,” or “emperor” in Manchu, or in Chinggisid terms, calling him a “khan.” Both terms were in use in Kashgar in 1811, but their referents had changed slightly: ezen indicated the Yongzheng Emperor (r. 1723-1735), also called ’āzīm ḥān “magnificent khan,” while his son, the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736-1796), was referred to as the “khan in Beijing.”

Turki officials had the greatest and most routine exposure to Qing power, and so the most opportunities to think and learn about China. Nevertheless, although Chinese officials were present across Xinjiang in the early nineteenth century, and Turki officials traveled to Beijing for audiences, this is not to say that Turki became overly aware of Qing geography or history. A travel narrative from the early nineteenth century presents travel advice for the road from Kashgar to Beijing and a smattering of Qing history. If what the author presents is correct, then Mullā Naẓīr Muḥammad of Kashgar, who

37 Noda Jin and Onuma Takahiro (A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty, [Tokyo: TIAS, 2010]) provide numerous examples.
39 Meer Izzut-Oollah, pp. 30-32, 43-44.
claimed to have traveled to Beijing twice with Kashgar ħākim beg Iskandar Beg Wang, and Āḥūnd Tāhir of Turpan, who had gone once before, possessed strange and, from a modern perspective, inaccurate understandings of that history: that 1811 CE (1226 AH) was the sixteenth year of the Jiaqing emperor is certainly correct. That Qianlong reigned for ten years, however, was not. Mullā Naṣir Muḥammad estimated that 1228 AH (1813 CE) was about thirty years after the sixtieth year of “Ezen” Yongzheng, that being about 1198 AH (1783 CE), towards the end of Qianlong’s reign. Qianlong’s victory over the Zunghars and conquest of Kashgaria from the Khwājas in the 1750s is attributed to Yongzheng. Although their knowledge of who was emperor when was unclear, Mīr Izzat Allah’s informants probably did not misremember when major events had happened in the recent past. Rather, I am inclined to think that Qing imperial power, filtered through multiple languages, overlapping systems of government, and the distance from Kashgar to Beijing, manifested itself in a very nebulous way. Turki officials on the ground strove to make it intelligible.

Imperial power, in Ghulām’s text, operates through the possession and mobilization of letters. Apart from immediate acts of violence, every powerful character in his narrative is a writer of petitions, issuer of decrees, circulator of missives, and most importantly possessor of seals. This is the image that coalesces around the Ḩāqān-i Čīn or “Ḥāqān of China” in the Turkic-language appendix to the Tarikh-i Rašīdī. In that text, the Ḩāqān is a distant ruler who mainly receives reports from his officials, or from the people they govern, and then reacts to them through edicts. The Ḩāqān is a bureaucratic ruler, the head of a hierarchy of functionaries.

The source for the term Ḩāqān and its associated character was not, as far as I can discern, the Qing court, nor even in a direct way from Qing officials. Rather, it came from local instantiations of broader Perso-Islamic literature. One of Ghulām’s sources for sacred history, which I will discuss below, was the 1126 anonymous Persian-language history Mujmal al-Tawārīḵ wa-ʾl-Qiṣaṣ, or something like it; if he had access to an unknown copy of the work, he might have found in it a list of titles of the rulers of various kingdoms of the East (Ar. mašriq) as of the twelfth century CE. One title

41 Jalilov et al, pp. 136, 141.
42 Muḥammad Taqī Bahār, ed., Mujmal al-Tawārīḵ wa-ʾl-Qiṣaṣ, (Tehran: Mu’assasah-i Ģawar, 1939), pp. 420-423. Sayrāmī lists two sources for his work that I have been unable to locate and that might have served to carry these narratives up to his time: a Zubdat al-Aḥbār and
is given for the pādišāh of China (Ĉîn) – faḡfur – and another for the pādišāh of “Inner China” (Ĉîn-i Andarūn) – ṭuģuzgūz ḥāqān. Sayrāmī makes some use of the former, while Ghulām does not. The term faḡfur or faḡfurčīn is thought to derive from an unattested Indo-Persian compound *bhaghaputra via Pahlavi bghpwr “son of God” whence it was adopted by Muslim geographers to refer to the ruler of China (Ch. 天子 tiānzǐ “son of Heaven”). Sayrāmī uses this title occasionally, and interchangeably with ḥāqān-i Ĉîn. In the Mujmal, the title ḥāqān is ascribed to the rulers of Inner China, the Khazars, Tibet, and the Russians (Rūs). As ṭuģuzgūz indicates the Toqquz Oğuz Turkic confederation, it is readily apparent that ḥāqān was considered to be an Inner Asian title, one for rulers of the land beyond Iran, but not yet at the borders of China. Its association with the people or region of Ĉîn had not yet coalesced. Similarly, Maḥmūd Kāšgarī (1005-1102) defines ḥāqān simply as a title given to Afrasiyāb, the Turanian sorcerer of literature, the descendants of whom are called ḥān. Ĉîn appears in his dictionary, as well, divided into three regions: upper, middle, and lower Ĉîn, variously labeled Tabḡač; Ḫiṭāy or Ĉîn; and Barkan or Māčīn, respectively.

Neither formulation is entirely surprising, as Ĉîn could also refer to Khotan, which occupied an ambiguous place in geography: the Qarakhānid Yūsuf Qādir Ḫān (r. 1026-1032) claimed, after his conquest of Khotan in the name of Islam, to be the “King of the East and of China” (malik al-mašriq wa-‘l-Șīn), where the “East” was Ferghana and Kashgar, and “China” meant Khotan. From this point onward, Ĉîn and Māčīn gained a closer association in native literature with central China.

Thus, nearly ten centuries before Ghulām, concepts of China and its ruler were already emerging in complicated ways from two different lineages: one in the literature of the Persian world, and one in the local legends and sacred histories of Kashgaria. As Rian Thum has argued, Persian literature and its gradual nativization in Kashgaria had a
profound effect on local historical consciousness. Thum describes a complex interplay between the Persian canon and preexisting legends that unfortunately must remain obscure in its details to the modern scholar, yet particular narratives and works clearly left their mark on the ways that people thought about and wrote history. A chief influence was Ferdowsi’s (940-1020) *Shāhnāma*, which he composed on the basis of a variety of stories already in circulation around the time that the *Mujmal* was composed and Kāšgarī wrote his dictionary. Thum finds stories from the epic in circulation in Kashgaria already by the eleventh century and confirms that it was available to East Turkestani readers by the sixteenth. By the end of the seventeenth, it was an influential work. The mention of Khotan in the *Shāhnāma* helped to connect the text to the local geography of the Tarim Basin, further enforcing the association of Čīn with this part of East Turkestan.

For such Central Asian readers familiar with the Persian canon, the character of the Ḥāqān-i Čīn in the *Shāhnāma* would have been familiar: he is the ruler of a land of magic and ritual somewhere east of Turan who gives certain contestants in the epic shelter and makes some attempt to invade Iran. It is unknown exactly what place a reader of the *Shāhnāma* in Kashgar or Yarkand would have associated with Čīn, since they ostensibly lived on its edges. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, Turkic Muslims living in East Turkestan had a very real encounter with “Chinese” power and routinely encountered its expressions. Although China and the Chinese were under Manchu rule, popular awareness of the distinction between Chinese and Manchu people and power was lacking. Thus the land of Čīn became associated unambiguously with China.

By the early nineteenth century, the Ḥāqān-i Čīn could be conceived of as a distant and bureaucratic sovereign who operated through ritual, as in the *Shāhnāma*, and through the writing, reading, and certifying of messages passed along the roads past Jiayuguan to and from the “land of Beijing” beyond. According to the Turkic translation of the *Tārīḫ-i Rašdī*, for example, when a *beg* violated the “rituals” of the Ḥāqān-i Čīn – significantly, not his “laws” – a higher-up wrote a petition (Ar. *ʿarż*) to the Ḥāqān-i Čīn, who upon reading it replied with an edict removing the *beg* from office. The Ḥāqān-i Čīn appears only as an epistolary sovereign; while his image changed significantly after the reconquest, Sayrāmī and Ghulām still depict him as the head of an administration functioning strictly through petitions, edicts, and seals (ET *tamgū*), which are themselves chief sites of contestation between Qing and Chinese leaders.

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47 Thum 2010, pp. 20-27.
49 Jalilov et al, p. 140.
50 125b, 13-126a, 17.
At the same time, Sayrāmī and Ghulām reconceive of the Emperor of China in terms and images borrowed from sacred history and literature, denying the historical record as it had come down in the Islamic world. Muslim historians and geographers, of whom Sayrāmī was well aware and Ghulām ought to have known, had long depicted China as an infidel mirror of their own society: the Chinese possessed technology, and were determined by their clime to be intelligent, but they remained beyond the lands of Islam. Like the Arabs or the Byzantines, they had their capital, their religion, and their ways of life. Raḍūd-Dīn’s Jamiʿ ut-Tawārīkh was the first work of Islamic history to embrace China as a part of world history, as he recounted the dynasties and their emperors by the contemporary Chinese reckoning as related by Chinese sources through a pair of Buddhist monks. Raḍūd-Dīn ascribes no special qualities or origins to the Chinese or to their ruler, and indeed his account is comprised mostly of a very dry list of reign dates.

Early Qiṣṣa al-Anbiyāʾ literature is also silent about the origins of the Chinese, save that they may be descended from Yāfīs b. Nūḥ. After all, they are human beings and must have descended from one of Nūḥ’s sons. Sometime by the late seventeenth century, however, stories were circulating to the effect that the ruler of China was a direct descendant of Čīn b. Yāfīs b. Nūḥ, and that the hereditary line of kingship had not been broken until the Manchu conquest in 1644, making the suicide of the last Ming emperor, Chongzhen (r. 1627-1644), the end of the legitimate rulership of China by its primordial ruling house. Sayrāmī goes to great lengths to repeat the assertion, apparently drawn from the oral culture of Kashgaria, that the Qing emperor is in fact the descendant of Čīn. I will return to this theme shortly.

Questions of genealogy are central to Sayrāmī’s political history: throughout his narrative, officials and rulers gain and maintain power when they respect the promises and intentions of their ancestors but lose it when they violate them. He makes this principle explicit later in the Tārīḥ-i Ḥamīdī. Sayrāmī explains the importance of this principle of rulership: the Qing emperor lost control over Xinjiang when his officials there, both Muslim and Chinese, broke their oaths. Similarly, Ghulām’s characters

54 Sayrāmī 2001, pp. 145-149; 28a, 14-29b, 6.
55 Sayrāmī 2001, p. 547; 119a, 5-120a, 20.
56 Sayrāmī 2001, pp. 149-157; 30b, 10-33a, 13.
meet their downfall when they violate promises made in the past to their superiors or ancestors. Ma Fuxing’s own death comes ultimately from his scheming and defiance of his superiors. The agent of his end, Ma Shaowu (馬紹武1874-1937), falls from the path of justice after a threefold ritual violation of Islam: worshipping an idol, swearing an oath before it to serve the governor, and then entering the yamen to eat pork with other officials, implying that Muslims who serve the Chinese governor have separated themselves from the Muslim community.

The greatest promise, of course, was that which the ruler of China made following his secret conversion to Islam, which Sayrāmī narrates at length. The story is familiar in its broad strokes to Hui origin stories, and it explains the existence of the Chinese Muslim community: during the time of the Prophet, the emperor of China had a dream concerning a man whom his dream-interpreters identified as Muḥammad. The emperor sent a messenger to bring Muḥammad to China, but, after some mishaps, returned only with the Prophet’s ambassadors. The emperor converted to Islam, keeping this fact from his advisors, who were divided over the matter of accepting the religion. The emperor encouraged his people to respect and adopt Islam, and also exchanged a number of his subjects for some from Samarqand, who settled down with the Prophet’s ambassadors on land specially designated for them, creating the community from which the Hui descend. Sayrāmī is not entirely credulous of this story, yet he takes care to remind the reader over the course of the following passages that the Chinese emperor “had become a Muslim,” and the chapter in which this occurs is even titled in part “how the Ḫaqān-i Čīn became a Muslim.”

Although the emperor’s descendants forgot their Islam, they nevertheless defended the sharī‘ah, as exemplified by the emperor’s efforts to investigate and act according to Islamic custom upon the conquest of Kashgaria. The imperial law held up as long as the original Muslim officials who had submitted to the Qing and their descendants remained in power. However, the emperor’s promise was broken when local officials raised illegal taxes and sold their offices to others. While the emperor remained committed to justice, he was unable to receive the petitions of his Muslim subjects in Xinjiang, and so could not act on their behalf. The result was the Muslim uprising, not against imperial power

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57 126a, 21-126b, 6.
58 126b, 19-22.
60 Sayrāmī 2001, p. 145; 28a, 14. Ḫikāya-ye zamāna-ye Ḫaqān-i Čīn musulmān bolğanı....
61 Sayrāmī, p. 153; 30b, 10-20.
62 Sayrāmī, pp. 158-162; 32a, 10-33a, 14.
per se, but against the tyranny (Ar. ẓulm) of local officials.

Thus, neither descent from Čīn nor ancestral conversion to Islam alone made an emperor legitimate. Rather, the critical shift in late-Qing depictions of the ruler of China is that he is conceived of anew as the archetypical “just king” of the Perso-Islamic political tradition: a distant and impartial arbiter of the diverse interests of his differing subject peoples. Sayrāmī similarly goes to some length to legitimize the emperor in such terms, presenting narratives that establish him first as a rightful ruler over a Muslim community and second as a source of ultimate justice (Ar. ʿadālah). Although the Empress Dowager ran the empire in place of young Guangxu, Sayrāmī writes, because their rule produced justice, the country was at peace.

Ghulām holds to the same principle and uses it to explain the fortunes of Chinese rule in Xinjiang. In the very last days of the Qing, Ghulām tells us, a pretender put a child on the throne in place of the rightful emperor. Secretly, the royal line was broken. Because this child was controlled by his father, a corrupt official, under his brief reign the relations between the empire’s subject peoples were soured by unprecedented policies that forced Chinese customs on the Muslims. Moreover, the child was too young to be the emperor, and so he had to undergo a strange ceremony in which the officials around him prayed to grant him extra years of age. “These stupid infidels,” Ghulām notes, “have such customs.” In the aftermath, according to Ghulām, the corrupt father of the puppet emperor specifically targeted the Muslims of Xinjiang, violating again the imperial promise of the integrity and separateness of the Muslim community by forcing Chinese education and language upon the Turki. God, protector of the genuine imperial line, does not permit such a policy to continue, and instead intervenes – the people rise up and declare the Republic of China.

Here we see the intersection of the genealogical principle in Sayrāmī and Ghulām’s writing and the Perso-Islamic principle of just rulership. We might see Sayrāmī’s efforts...
to justify Qing rule as justification for Turki involvement in the imperial system, which by the first decade of the twentieth century seemed likely to remain in place. Yet, Sayrāmī and Ghulām, who both draw on oral sources, seem to be tapping into something in the broader culture. From the 1870s, Qing justice begins to fit into the quadripartite scheme of sacred lineage that popular Islamic manuals ascribed to various crafts: the “law of the Chinese” was also the “law of Moses”\(^{67}\), or else one of four valid systems of justice operative in Xinjiang.\(^{68}\) Following the reconquest, a number of narratives began to circulate in oral and written sources across the region and in the Turki diaspora of Central Asia to the effect that the Ḥāqān-i Čīn was a source of justice, and that his dominion over Xinjiang was dependent not on skill at conquest, but on his intention and capability to maintain the integrity of the Islamic community and prosecute justice in a manner according with God’s will on Earth, the shāriʿah. Such stories likened Qing emperors to Anūšīrwān, the pre-Islamic Sassanid ruler who continued to serve as an example of kingly justice in the mirrors for princes literature of late-Qing Xinjiang.\(^{69}\) A story in Sayrāmī further relates an experience of imperial justice on the part of a beg in the early 1860s, when an epistolary Ḥāqān-i Čīn cleared him by decree of a wrongful accusation of malfeasance, bringing the beg to reflect some time later on what a just and clement ruler the Ḥāqān-i Čīn was.\(^{70}\)

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\(^{67}\) “Then God created four prophets and four books, which were sent to separate nations: the Bible, this is the law of the Russians; the Psalms of David, this is the law of the Qalmuq people; the Torah of Moses, this is the law of the people of China; the Furqan of Muḥammad, this is the law of the local people [of Xinjiang].” (Potanin 1883, v. 2, pp. 14-15, quoted in David Brophy, “Tending to Unite?: The Origins of Uyghur Nationalism”, [PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2011], p. 30).


\(^{69}\) Kašif Sabzavārī’s sixteenth-century Aḥlāq-i muḥsinī was translated into Turki at least three times, one or two of those in Kashgar. I have seen a copy from Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Library (650000-1401-0004984 5-XTQ 62). The work draws on stories of Anūšīrwān extensively in its discussion of “justice.”

\(^{70}\) Sayrāmī, pp. 572-575. Again, the Qing emperor is compared to Anūšīrwān. This section is missing from Jarring Prov. 163.
Ghulām’s Anxieties

By the time Ghulām wrote his work, the world had changed in unexpected ways, and so had the ways that people understood their world. In the Kashgarian mind, the Ḥāqān was divorced from his political meaning and became closely tied instead to the geographical conception of China. This is how Ghulām uses the term. At least through the 1920s, writers referred to the Chinese people as ḥāqānī. On a few maps of Asia and of China preserved from Rachel Wingate’s mission schoolroom of the 1910s, children have clearly labelled Xinjiang with the Chinese term Šīnjiān, but the whole of China is scrawled with Ḥāqānistān, and right below it in Chinese, Zhōngguó quān tú 中國全圖 “complete map of China.” A contemporary source refers to China as “the clime of Ḥāqān.” At this same time, while schoolchildren could label Nanjing, Beijing, and Hong Kong on a map, the overall Kashgarian understanding of Chinese geography seems to have changed little from Sayrāmī’s time: Sayrāmī knew that the Chinese called Xinjiang “beyond the pass” or “beyond the mouth” (Ch. kōuwài 口外, Sayrāmī’s gobāy). By the 1920s and Ghulām’s work, there is no ruler called ḥāqān or fağfūr, only the Khan in Beijing. Instead, Ghulām uses ḥāqān to refer to the land of China and its government, but not the ruler: “The fortunes of China were on the rise.” “In order to enter into the service of China.” “We are of the people of the Eight Cities in China.”

In the broader culture, then, the ruler of China was gone, but his people were still defined on some level by the imperial legacy. Ghulām is nostalgic for the empire, and for empires everywhere, all of which had their protecting patriarchs to ensure the peaceful interaction of subject communities. He sees fighting first between the Muslims and the Chinese, and then between Muslims, Chinese, and Russians, as sure signs of the coming apocalypse. In order to approach his perspective on his contemporary world, however,

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71 Maps and other materials are held in the Riksarkivet, file SE/RA/730284/240.
72 Jarring Prov. 201, II.3 “Čān čilāni baqānī.” Čān čilā degân qadîmî zamândin tartip Ḥāqān iqlimidāki but-parastlarning arasida rasim bolğan wä musulmānlarning kitâbânlari bâzârlardâ yûrûp wä izliq qiladurğan mullâlariğa oňša bir rasimdur “Drama has been a custom among the idol-worshippers in the clime of Ḥāqān since ancient times, like when mulâls and reciters go about the market preaching.”
73 Sayrāmī 2001, p. 158; 32a, 15-17.
74 126b, 4.
75 129b, 20.
76 133a, 13.
77 128b, 1-5.
it is necessary first to explore his understanding of sacred history.

We begin again with Sayrāmī, without whom Ghulām does not make sense. Sayrāmī asserts that the current ruler of China was not only a direct descendant of the son of Yāfīs b. Nūḥ and a secret Muslim, but also that his land was unconquerable even by Dhū ‘l-Qarnayn (Alexander the Great), Chinggis Khan, or Amīr Timūr (Tamerlane). The effect is not only to write China into the popular and formal history of Islam, but to outright contradict histories as known from elsewhere in the Islamic world. Sayrāmī asserts the antiquity of Chinese rule in order to justify it, but also makes the imperial line out to be older and possibly more legitimate even than Alexander the Great, an important model of kingship, and older even than Abrahamic line, from which the caliphs are meant to have descended.

Sayrāmī has made quite a radical assertion about history, but it is one that makes sense in the wake of the failure of the Ottoman caliphs to assist Ya‘qūb Beg in maintaining his state in East Turkestan. It makes sense in a world where sources of ultimate authority seemed to be falling away one by one, as Islamic states in Central Asia fell to the Russian empire, the British consolidated control over Hindustan, and Qing power in Xinjiang seemed both firmly established and singularly capable of producing satisfactory justice, particularly in the eyes of a ruling class of Turki with greater access to the bureaucracy. The Qing could not be challenged, it seemed, and Sayrāmī comes up with reasons to explain why.

Sayrāmī’s account of sacred history, as mentioned above, comes almost word-for-word from the Mujmal al-Tawāriḥ w-al-Qiṣaṣ, which makes Čīn, Turk, and Rūs, among others, out to be sons of Yāfīs. In Sayrāmī’s time, the Mujmal would have provided not only a statement of the Chinese, Turkic, and Russian people’s common descent, but also reasons for conflict between them, as the Mujmal narrates the origins of their enmities. Sayrāmī, drawing on “certain histories,” makes further additions to the genealogy, casting the Chinese, Turks, Manchus, Kyrgyz, and others as descendants of Turk b. Yāfīs and asserting that they “founded a great city in the land of Beijing.” Given that Sayrāmī then casts strong doubts upon Alanqoa’s immaculate conception, it is curious that he

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78 Sayrāmī 2001, pp. 49-59; 3a, 19-8a, 15.
80 4a, 9-10. Bejīn mamlakatidā bir śāhār-i ‘aẓīm bināh qildi. Sayrāmī 2001 (p. 49) has a slightly different narrative, which includes a different set of sons of Yāfīs, including “Daghestan.” Another is named “Daching,” possibly from Ch. Dà Qīng 大清 “Great Qing.”
81 Sayrāmī 2001, p. 56.
is less skeptical of the genealogy as he relates it and provides no alternative, suggesting that he approves of it.

Ghulām revisits the relations between the Chinese, Turkic, and Russian peoples, bringing his present history into dialogue with Sayrāmī’s sacred history. “Muslims fought with infidels, infidels with Muslims and with Russians, Russians with Chinese, and Christians even with each other,” he tells us. “These signs make known the coming of the great Mahdi.”82 At this point in Xinjiang’s textual history, “Muslim” musulmān of course indicated “Turkic Muslim,” while Chinese Muslims were simply “Dungans.”

For Ghulām, conflict between these peoples is one of several signs of a coming apocalypse. Simultaneously, Ghulām is concerned with the integrity of communal boundaries and the possibility of moving across them. Ma Shaowu, as noted above, becomes not Dungan, but thoroughly Chinese by engaging in official rituals. There is a peculiar incident in which the Bolshevik consul puts on Bukharan robes and tells Turki notables of Kashgar, “Now we are all the same!”83 The Kashgaris are not convinced, and the Chinese present agree: “Even in a robe, you’re still a Russian. These officials sitting here are Chinese. We’re Turks. How are we the same? If you become a Muslim, we’ll be the same.”84 Again, it seems that ritual and religious boundaries are prioritized over outward appearance, but in a different way than before. There is also an interesting class dimension to this encounter, reflecting the extreme difference in wealth between Kashgarian Turki and Central Asian Russians. Ghulām emphasizes several times the superficiality and fundamental meanness of identification through clothing: the Turki who cross into Central Asia and join the Bolsheviks are singled out for their uniforms and affected gait.85 An Iranian professor and his family dress in “Christian” clothing and shock their community.86 The jādīdīs of Istanbul, whom Ghulām sees as disrespectful hooligans, mock others for their turbans.87 The Chinese abandon old sumptuary rules as they cast off the empire and their country descends into chaos, making men and women dress in a similar way.88

Sayrāmī and Ghulām converge in their concern for linguistic difference, both past and future. Sayrāmī recounts that the descendant of Nūḥ developed different languages

82 128b, 3-4.
83 130a, 9-14.
84 Of course, from the author’s perspective it is more acceptable to become a Muslim than to leave the community, even if becoming a Muslim means crossing boundaries.
85 133a, 3-7.
86 130b, 19-21.
87 130b, 16-17.
88 125a, 17-18.
and so had to communicate through translators. His choice of terminology is interesting, as he uses the Chinese word for “translator” tōngshì 通事, nativized as tuyči, which would have been very familiar to his audience, given the proliferation of Turki-Chinese translators in the late Qing. Sayrāmī does not depict this as a good thing, but rather a sign that natural relatives were growing more distant. Ghułām similarly sees the presence of tuyči as an uncomfortable sign of distance between family members: the tyrannical pretender imposes Chinese education on the Turki, with “this malicious intent, … that fathers and sons should speak together through a translator. The goal was that, when the old people died, all of the youth would have become Chinese.” Both Ghułām and Sayrāmī themselves make use of Chinese vocabulary to index difference, voicing Chinese characters with words and short phrases in their own language. This suggests both that the authors and their audiences were in positions to understand more than a little Chinese, and that they felt ambiguously about being able or required to do so.

To return to the issue of communal boundaries and ritual, Ghułām is also concerned with the destruction and violation of sacred sites. Again, I believe that Ma Shaowu’s entering an idol-temple is significant, particularly as it reflects related concerns on the part of Turki ʿulāmā’ over Muslims’ engagement with Chinese rites in the growing number of Chinese temples in Xinjiang. More broadly, the chaos of the Xinhai Revolution and its aftermath is reflected in Ghułām’s account in Muslim and Chinese officers’ destruction of each other’s temples. He recounts the conflict over a mosque or Hindu temple in Kashmir, which escalates into an outbreak of unconscionable violence against Muslim children. The Bolsheviks destroy an ancient mausoleum in Bukhara, just as they scatter the contents of a treasury dating to the time of Tīmūr. Finally, in the distant Hejaz, the Wahhābīs, of whose beliefs and actions Ghułām does not approve, tear down important shrines, leaving some sites intact in Mecca only for fear of the consequences of doing so.

As Ghułām’s narrative returns to the center of Islam, it returns also to the past. Ghułām juxtaposes the Wahhābī rise to power with the Ethiopian raid on Mecca in the Year of the Elephant, shortly before the birth of the Prophet Muḥammad. Directly

89 4b, 1-4.
90 125a, 9-14.
91 A central issue in Abūl Wāḥid Āḥūnd’s account of Chinese theater in Kashgar is the Turki presence in the audience at theatrical events. (Jarring Prov. 201, ll.3 “Čan čilānin bayānī.”)
92 125b, 10-11.
93 128b, 9-16.
94 128b, 9; 130a, 16.
95 130b, 8-15.
96 132a, 13-22.
after, he relates two earthquakes that seem to happen all at once, one in Mecca and one in Merkit.\textsuperscript{97} I do not think that Ghulām’s choice was random – the Year of the Elephant would have been a known story in any case. We must recall that, up until this point in the narrative, the world has been gradually falling apart. Arabia is now in the hands of rulers who, despite being Muslims, act tyrannically.\textsuperscript{98} There is no more Khan in Beijing. Across the world and in Xinjiang, conflict rages. Ghulām’s implication is that a distinct era is coming to an end, an era defined by the history of the descendants of Yāfīs, and something new is appearing in its place.

**Ghulām and the Jadīdis**

Ghulām may not have had a single clear idea of what that new era would be, but several of his anxieties about it can be discerned from the text at hand. Hamada, the only modern scholar to have commented on Ghulām’s work, states simply that “Ghulām Muḥammad Khan of Yarkand offers us an interesting example of the ideas of the qadīmists.”\textsuperscript{99} In light of the foregoing discussion, however, it is not sufficient to characterize Ghulām merely as a “qadīmist,” particularly given how nebulous and politicized a term this is. Hamada assuredly labels Ghulām a qadīmist, or a supporter of old ways, because of his frequent criticisms of things jadīdi, “new.” The sheer breadth of the word jadīdi’s reference in this text, however, demands that we define more clearly what it was that Ghulām meant by it and, conversely, what he supported in its place.

The first instance of jadīd in “Mā Tiṭaynin wāqiʿasi” is in the phrase ‘ilm-i jadīd, “new knowledge,” which, Ghulām tells us, emerged in Bukhara in 1921-1922.\textsuperscript{100} Ghulām does not refer here to the ideas of Ismail Gaspirinskii or other nineteenth-century Muslim reformers, however, but to something associated with a group that ushers in Bolshevik rule. To Ghulām, the Bolsheviks are primarily people opposed to royal or imperial rule, by the Russian emperor or any other.\textsuperscript{101} His understanding of their political or economic policies is secondary to their role in the narrative, particularly as supporters of the jadīdi Chinese.\textsuperscript{102} Ghulām sees the jadīdi Chinese as Christians, much like the Iranian

\textsuperscript{97} 132b, 1-6.
\textsuperscript{98} 131b, 17-132a, 6.
\textsuperscript{100} 128b, 6-9.
\textsuperscript{101} 123b, 2-8.
\textsuperscript{102} 130b, 22-131a, 5.
reformers.

*Ilm-i jadīd* is a destructive force in Kabul and in Istanbul, as well. In both places, adopting the new learning results in widespread violence and depopulation. The same happens in China, where the *jadīdī* Christian Chinese start a war with the Europeans. At the root of violence is the disruption of preexisting schemata of difference, both between genders and between groups of people. The Chinese, having changed their clothes, imitate the Europeans, but end up turning against their erstwhile tutors. It is significant that the peace settlement at the end of the war establishes separateness between peoples. Similarly, Ghulām suggests that the Wahhābī leaders have learned from the West, and their party visits significant violence and destruction on the Hejaz.

Given how different and diffuse these movements were, it is apparent that Ghulām is not referring to any specific ideology or even cluster of modernist or reformist philosophies, but rather expressing a general anxiety that incidentally uses the term *jadīdī* to refer to novel and negative things.

The common thread binding *jadīdī*, Christian, and Western things together in Ghulām’s work is their opposition to the dominance of emperors and the schemata of difference that they maintain. In the old world of Ghulām and Sayrāmī, people performed their own rituals and maintained their own communities under the protection of rulers who could trace their descent back to Islamic sacred history, among them the Ottoman caliph, the Chinese emperor, and perhaps by implication the Russian emperor as well. In Ghulām’s new world, Christians and *jadīdīs* go about undermining imperial authority by dressing everyone the same way, destroying ancient sacred sites, and thus bringing chaos, tyranny, and the breakdown of hierarchies of authority and rule.

Ghulām’s *qadīmīsm*, then, is a historically specific phenomenon with identifiable roots both in the popular ideas communicated by Sayrāmī and in Ghulām’s own circumstances. His text is a rare source for the history of thought in 1920s Xinjiang, one that points to the continued circulation of ideas between oral and written and popular and elite cultures. It also demonstrates a view that we might be surprised to encounter in modern Xinjiang, so much historiography of which is dedicated to exploring the emergence of large-scale solidarities and opposition to Chinese power. Ghulām is concerned about boundary maintenance, but he does not understand Chinese rule *per se* as harmful to it: rather, he is troubled by a specific kind of rule at a particular time, and he

103 128b, 17-21; 129b, 2.
104 131a, 5-16.
105 129b, 18.
106 130b, 15.
Introduction

attempts to explain why one was benign and the other harmful. Such a perspective may represent a broader attitude not represented in the writings of nationalist elites. I thus present the following translation and transcription in hope that it will contribute to the cultural and social history of Xinjiang during a critical and still understudied period.

Bibliography


Introduction

II: Translation

Notes on the Translation

The following translation follows the original text as closely as possible so as to facilitate comparison and impart a sense of Ghulām’s style. He writes in a particularly disjointed fashion, even for an Eastern Turki text. While holding to the maxim that the translator should write as the author of the text would have written, had that author known the translator’s language, I acknowledge that Ghulām is not always very clear or precise in his phrasing or felicitous in his choice of words.

Part of the reason for Ghulām’s lack of clarity is that he was putting into words phenomena that were at a great distance from him and often, as he attests, novel and unfamiliar. There is a great deal of Chinese vocabulary in this text, much of which only had a fleeting presence in Eastern Turki and has not survived into today’s dictionaries. (See Transcription for notes on language.)

Translation

[124b, 7] Commander Ma of Kashgar
[8] Narrated by Ghulām Muḥammad Khān of Yarkand
[9] = Ḥajjī Ghulām Muḥammad Khān Khwāja, son of Ḥaẓrat Khwāja Shaykh Pir Shāh, his mother Maʿṣūma Khānim =

[10] In the year 1329 AH [1911 CE], the Xuantong Khan107 in Beijing had no children.108 He discussed with his mother what to do, and he came to the conclusion that, [11] “If I have

107 I have translated ET ḥān as simply “khan,” and pādišāh as “king” or “emperor” depending on context.
108 Emperor Xuāntōng (宣統 1906-1967, r. 1909-1912), known better by his personal name Puyi, was indeed on the throne at this time, but he was childless mainly because he was three years old. The events as narrated here more closely resemble stories surrounding the reigns of the Tōngzhī emperor (同治 r. 1861-1875) and his cousin and successor Zǎitián, called Guānxù (光緒 r. 1875-1908): Tongzhi, the son of the Empress Dowager Cǐxí (慈禧 1835-1908), was sickly and indeed produced no male heirs. The regent, his uncle Prince Gōng (1833-1898), along with Cixi, was the real power behind the throne. Cixi was one of several members of the Court who engineered the succession of the child Guangxu and establishment of another regency. Guangxu died one day before Cixi, and it was widely rumored that Cixi had him poisoned when she realized her own impending death. Xuantong, Guangxu’s cousin and
no progeny, then later the affairs of the khanship will not go well. I must adopt a child, educate him, and teach him the affairs of the khanship.” [12]

In the Khan’s offices, there was a trusted high official. The Khan thought his son would do. [13] The Khan informed the boy’s father and took him into his care. He educated the boy for a year and a half, giving him to a master, whom he ordered to teach the boy the knowledge of the khanship. [14] The tutors, per the Khan’s order, made great efforts to teach him. This went on for about a year and a half.

One day, [15] his father found an opportune time to tell the Khan, “You educated this child. If all of the officials, both inside [16] and outside these offices, know that he is my son, then why would they ever make him khan after you? This is a half-baked plan.” [17]

The Khan said, “What should we do?”

The Khan immediately gathered all of the officials together. “Why don’t you all make this child khan after me,” he ordered. “So, all of you, sign, and stamp your seals. Make an ironclad document.” [18] The child’s father had a secret desire in his heart for the khanship.

[125a, 1] The father seized the opportunity. He conspired with the Khan’s cook. They made several promises and oaths together, and they put poison in some food and gave it to the Khan. And the Khan ate this [2] and died. The Khan’s mother, when she saw this, threw herself upon the Khan, embraced him, and cried. For three days and three nights, she did not sleep, [3] but she passed away on that very spot.

And this good-for-nothing scoundrel’s son was six years old. [4] They asked God for two years. He turned eight years old. They asked Heaven for two years and Earth for two years. He turned twelve years old. These stupid infidels have such customs.109

109 According to this account, the young Xuantong emperor gained his majority, and so qualified for the emperorship, through his officials’ intervention with special prayers and rituals. Ghulām’s account perfectly parallels Sayrāmī’s story of the child Guangxu emperor becoming an adult through the same means:

[5] After that, he sat his child up on the throne. He himself sat by his son’s side. He gave whatever commands he wanted to. [6] The people had no choice but to bow to his will, and they obeyed his commands.

The court rode for a month. They put the Khan’s mother in a coffin, and, according to their own customs, carried his mother’s corpse nine paces (ahead). [7] They carried the Khan’s corpse nine paces behind it. They carried them to the royal tombs and buried them.¹¹⁰ [8] Then, the seed of enmity appeared in the hearts of all of the officials and subjects, of people both great and petty. They started saying all kinds of things.

This scoundrel [9] had this malicious intent, that all the way from Qumul to Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, in every town and country where Muslims lived, they should establish great schools; [10] that they should establish twelve schools in every city, and ten in every begship¹¹¹ and rural district; [11] that they should increase the number of schools from year to year; that they should establish a big school in any place with twenty-five households; that, when the mothers and fathers of the children studying in the schools came to see their children, [12] a child should speak to his father in the speech of Beijing; and that fathers and sons should speak together through a translator.¹¹² [13] The goal was that, when the old people died, all of the youth would have become Chinese.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ The author refers to transporting the bodies of the Qing aristocracy, here Guangxu and Cixi, to the western dynastic tombs southwest of Beijing.

¹¹¹ The begs were native officials who governed on behalf of the Qing.

¹¹² Ghulām shares Sayrāmī’s concern with the multiplicity of languages and the inability of descendants of Japheth to communicate. In Sayrāmī’s narrative, the employment of tòngshì (< Ch. 通事) was also a necessity for the progeny of Nūḥ in the aftermath of Babel. (4a, 1-4)

¹¹³ Here, the author relates the drama at the Qing court to events in Xinjiang. There were two waves of official school building in Xinjiang in the late Qing: First, the scholar-general Zuò Zōngtáng (左宗棠 1812-1885), who led the Qing reconquest of the region in the 1870s, directed schools to be built in every major population center so as to train the sons of Turkic Muslim aristocrats in Chinese language and culture. In total, sixty schools were built. This is the period of school building that later Uyghur nationalist leaders attacked in their writings as forcibly assimilatory, and they focused on the mandatory inculcation of Chinese language. Some of these schools continued until 1911, and Mannerheim (Across Asia from west to east...
Our God the Creator [14] would not allow it. The seed of enmity in the hearts of the Chinese sprouted. They joined together with one heart and on one side and said, “We will be a Republic!” They seized the child khan and his father, [15] locked them up in a tower, set soldiers around them to observe them, and set up cannons. [16] Like a chicken in a cage, they regretted what they had done – they were in a briar patch.

The Chinese said that the people’s time had come, and they called it the “Republic.”[14][17] Because the victorious high officials realized that they had moved beyond the infidel collars about their necks and the hairstyles on their heads, [18] they prohibited these. The “loose clothing” became common among both men and women.[15]

In the year 1330 AH [December 1911-1912 CE], an organization from among the Chinese [19] called the “Black Turbans” rose in rebellion.[16] These were of the same religion and sect as the Chinese. They killed the generals, the circuit intendants, [20] the prefects, and the magistrates, plundered, took their money, and spent it. But they did no harm to bureaucracy and governance. [21] “What a strange thing,” it was said. “In four or five years’ time, people would call these Black Turbans officials.” [22] So, they pulled them out and completely annihilated them. They killed them in the places where they had settled and stayed for five or ten years. To begin with, in the cities, they [125b, 1] finished off the Black Turbans one by one.

At the beginning of the Republic, they put a man named President Yuan into

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114 The term for “Republic” in this text is Mingoy, from Chinese mínguó 民國. This is one of many terms borrowed from Chinese in Ghulām’s work, among them “president” zōntōng, from Chinese zōngtōng 總統. Given the events that follow, there is no particular sense that Ghulām is aware of the political peculiarities of a republican system of government; his experience of it comes strictly from the Chinese case, and so he gives it a Chinese name.

115 Presumably, the author refers to the rapid spread of Western-style dress that became de rigueur among Chinese as a sign of national modernity.

116 The author certainly refers to the secret societies that rose up and carried out the Xinhai Revolution of 1911-1912. The reference to “black turbans,” however, is obscure. The only major revolutionary actions in Xinjiang took place in Ili and Urumchi – perhaps some of these revolutionaries dressed in black turbans?
power.\textsuperscript{117} [2] They got rid of him, too, and he was left helpless and died. Next, they put a man named President Li into power.\textsuperscript{118} This man, too, on account of his enemies plotting against him, [3] escaped to the country of the English. Then, they put another President Li into power. Among the Chinese, [4] this is how they described him: they say, “He has a good reputation, he thinks much of himself, and he has spies everywhere.\textsuperscript{119} He’s a well-connected man.”

Even with the Republic, [5] the Beijing region could do nothing for anyone.\textsuperscript{120} All of the issues from the child khan’s reign were confused. Lord God the Merciful [6] saved the faithful from these tyrannies. These things turned out just great. All of the great generals, officials, and princelings in the confines of Beijing [7] became khans in their own eyes. They didn’t give anything to anyone. [8] They kept their own retinues, and whatever they did, they did it themselves. They made the soldiers, officers, and commanders under them acknowledge their own subordination. They took whatever money they wanted from the wealthy in their countries, [9] and, if there were good lands or good watermills, they grabbed those, too, and they persisted in their extreme tyrannies. [10] Nor did anyone have the means to prohibit this. When there were commanders from among the Muslims, they knocked down and destroyed the idol-temples that Chinese officials [11] had erected in those places. The Chinese officials had no power to say anything against it.

Things that came to pass in the year 1342 AH [August 1923-August 1924]: [12] President Li\textsuperscript{121} sent a command to the general of Xinjiang province\textsuperscript{122} that said, “You

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Yuán Shìkǎi (袁世凯, 1859-1916) was the president of the Republic of China for nearly four years (March 1912-December 1915), after which he declared himself Emperor and ruled briefly until his death.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Lí Yuányíng (黎元洪, 1864-1928) was the second President of the Republic of China (June 1916-July 1917) and later returned to office (June 1922-June 1923).
\item \textsuperscript{119} Literally, “He has a big face, a big head, and two ears that hang down below his shoulders.”
\item \textsuperscript{120} Here the narrative jumps from 1917 to 1923. Ghulām correctly notes that China had now entered the chaos of what came to be called the Warlord Era (1918-1928).
\item \textsuperscript{121} The author seems unclear on exactly who was the leader of China at this point. To be fair, neither was anyone in China. He refers alternatively to President Li, President Yuan, and the Emperor. At this point, Yuan Shikai’s restoration of the empire (1915-1916) had failed, and he was dead, while Puyi, although not yet expelled from the Forbidden City, was powerless. Note that, although Ma Fuxing is reputed to have made the people of Kashgar call him pādišāh, the term does not refer to him in this text. (Justin Jacobs, “Empire Besieged: The Preservation of Chinese Rule in Xinjiang, 1884–1971,” [PhD dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2011], p. 126.)
\item \textsuperscript{122} The “General of Xinjiang” was Yáng Zēngxīn (杨增新, 1867-1928, g. 1912-1928), governor
have been a general for a long time. [13] Send back the seal of office.”123

The General did not give him any reply. Next, the President sent people whom he had told to take the seal of Xinjiang province. [14]

When the General got news of this, he sent a letter ahead to them, which said, “From what I hear, [15] he sent you to take the seal. If you are out of your senses, come take it.” They saw this letter, [16] and they went back to the Khan. They told him what had happened.

The Khan sent a letter to the Governor of Lanzhou.124 It said, [17] “A command was sent to the governor of Xinjiang to return to us the seal of the Xinjiang governor. [18] The governor of Xinjiang sent a letter to all of the magistrates in every city who were his relatives and relations. It said, ‘The Khan has ordered four times [19] that my seal should be taken from me. Our heads are on the line, so let’s increase our numbers. If you all write him letters that say, “He is greater than a father to us. There has never been, nor will there ever be, someone as good to us as he is. [20] And we don’t need any governor but this governor;’ [21] then don’t be surprised if I hang onto my seal. If I stick around, you’ll be trouble-free.’ [22] He sent letters with even more tricks and schemes. I (the Khan) did not believe it. The reason I did not believe it was [126a, 1] that the English and Russians informed me of the tyrannies that the General had done in collusion with all of the magistrates; of the tyrannies that the Commander had done; of the fact that they had shut down the radio in Urumchi [2] and Kashgar; of the tyrannies done by the Commander’s son and daughters; of the way they took four hundred yambu125, [3] three

of Xinjiang in this period. Yang is the subject of a great deal of folklore suggesting that he had a colorful and violent career, including stories about the spectacular assassination of two of his rivals at a dinner party. Appointed to Xinjiang under the late Qing, he opposed and eliminated the revolutionaries before seizing power with a Dungan army. At the time this text was written, Yang was still in power. The text refers to him alternatively as the General and as the Governor.

123 By 1923, Feng Yuxiang (馮玉祥 1881-1948), a warlord known popularly as the “Christian General,” had successfully gained a control of Beijing and set his eyes on securing Xinjiang. Feng drafted a plan to place Xinjiang within the jurisdiction of a new Northwestern Frontier Commissioner’s Office, thus ousting Yang, but the plan failed. Feng successfully planted a spy, Zhang Chunxi, in the Dihua administration, and Zhang began to work to undermine Yang, including by cultivating a relationship between then-President Cao Kun (曹锟 1862-1938) and Yang’s subordinate Commander Ma Fuxing, whom we will encounter below. (Jacobs, pp. 179-181)

124 By “Governor of Lanzhou” Ghulām indicates at this time some member of the Chinese Muslim (Hui 回) Má 馬 clique. Again, the author refers alternatively to the “Governor” and the “General.”

125 ET yambu < Ch. yuàn bāo 元寶: a silver ingot used as currency.
hundred yambu, two hundred yambu, or one hundred yambu from the wealthy by force, or fifty from some, or good lands, or water mills, [4] without giving them any money; of how they had shot some and cut of the hands and feet of others; how one person in ten was cured with the medicine of youthfulness, [5] but the other nine died; and of how they had killed some people by cutting them up in a hay-chopper.”126 For this reason, the Khan did not believe the memorials they sent. [6]

Again, President Yuan127 sent a letter to the General that said, “Send the seal immediately.”

And the general of Xinjiang province sent a letter that said, [7] “I have a petition to the Khan. Perhaps he will listen to my petition. Please keep me informed.” And he sent his petition to the Khan.

The Khan said, “If he has a petition, [8] let him make it, and I will listen.”128

Because that scoundrel’s tricks and schemes and deceptions had come to naught, he then wrote, “When the Khan did me a kindness [9] and gave me the seal of the Urumchi General, what I got was an empty seal and an empty office. It seems that I’ve killed General Yang Song129 [10] and squandered all of the money in the treasury; that I’ve taken four-year loans from petty traders and rich men [11] and frittered them away; and that the people have been greatly impoverished.

“I issued currency and made the people rich. [12] I paid off my debts, too. I even put a little money back in the treasury. So, I ask for the seal for another year, or six months, whenever.”

When he sent this petition, the Khan wrote to the general of Lanzhou province, [13] “Ask this: ‘He made this petition. We hear that he’s made a Dungan the commander

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126 This last comment is most gruesome. Several foreign observers in Kashgar assert that Ma Fuxing, whom we will soon meet in the narrative, used to amputate people’s limbs with a machine for cutting hay. (Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949, [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986], pp. 23-24.)

127 Of course, Yuan Shikai was deceased and no longer president. By this point in the narrative, the president was probably Duàn Qīruì (段祺瑞 1865-1936, g. 1924-1926). The scribe may have written Yuan for Duan. Alternatively, confusion over the name may point to the nebulousness and distance of central Chinese power in Xinjiang.

128 It should be noted in addition that, while the Xuantong emperor continued to reside in the Forbidden City, he had no power. Indeed he was expelled from the palace on 4 November 1924, right around the time of these events, by Feng Yuxiang, who was also working against Yang. The “Emperor” in this story is a fiction. (See Introduction.)

129 By “Yang Song,” Ghulām may mean Yáng Zuānxù (楊續緒 1873-1956), a member of the Brothers and Elders Society (Ch. 哥老會 Gēlǎo Hui) who led the Xinhai Revolution in Ili and briefly served as the Kashgar intendant under Yang Zengxin before fleeing to China proper.
The World as Seen from Yarkand

[14] of Kashgar and given him the seal of office. The tyrannies that this commander has done are known to me. What do you say to that?” And he sent this letter [15] to the general of Xinjiang province, as well.

The Xinjiang General sent a petition to the Lanzhou General. It said, “I am guilty of this. I appointed him without knowing the evil in his heart. [16] I’ve heard of the bad things he’s done, too. When I admonished him, he didn’t listen. When thrice [17] I sent him a letter telling him to give up the seal, he sent back a reply that he wouldn’t. If I send soldiers to give him his just desserts, then what if the conflict blows up, [18] and news reaches the Khan’s ears? He might scold me for starting a conflict without his permission, and then I’ll really be stuck. [19] If the Khan would be so kind as to send two or four men from among the trusted officials at his court, then we will need no money or soldiers from the Khan. [20] I’ll take care of everything. It will be fine if the people the Khan sends are faithful to what I do, write down what has happened, and inform the Khan.” [21] The Khan sent ten officials. No one knew them.

And it happened that the Commander (of Kashgar) had written false letters in the name of the eight Bolshevik governors claiming the lands subordinate to Kashgar – Maralbashi, [22] Seriq Qol, Keriyä, and Chärlçhän – and all of the lands within that area under its various prefects, six county magistrates, seven vice-magistrates, one intendant, and one commander. [126b, 1] It seems he had also sealed it. [2] He fought with them [these officials], and, when his strength was not enough [to win], he fled with the intent of getting money in Andijan. The English consul in Kashgar found this out [3] and immediately informed the Khan and made him aware. The General had no news of this. They (later) found this letter in the Commander’s trunk [4] and sent it to the Khan.

The fortunes of China were on the rise. In the time of the Black Turban Chinese, when things were peaceful under Nikolai, [5] the intendant of Kashgar had also promised these cities to Nikolai with a letter. When they killed the Black Turban intendant, this letter came to light. [6] The Khan found this out later, too.131

130 Here at last we meet the title character, Mâ Fûlixìng (馬福興, 1864-1924, g. 1916-1924). Contemporary descriptions paint a picture of a “half-comic, half-homicidal” thug who governed Kashgar with horrible cruelty. (Forbes, pp. 22-24) The following narrative conforms to what Western sources tell us about his downfall while providing more information and insight from a local perspective.

131 Here it seems the author has provided two slightly differing versions of the same story. Given that Ma Fuxing, in this narrative, did not flee abroad, I believe that the second version, wherein the “Black Turban” intendant of Kashgar promised that territory to the Russian Empire, is the one the author intended. The Black Turban intendant in question would have been Yang Zuanxu.
In the year 1341 AH in the month of Eid al-Adha [May 1923], the General gathered up all of the soldiers stationed in Urumchi and sent them to Aqsu. He sent them under the command of the Aqsu intendant. He also sent officers with them. They totaled 12,000 soldiers and sixty officers. The Kashgar intendant was in Yarkand. The General sent a letter and commanded him to make for Aqsu as well. Of the six prefects, he commanded one to make the soldiers’ clothing ready. He commanded one to provide provisions every month. He commanded one to prepare and send in 1,000 bags of sifted flour every day. He commanded one to conscript soldiers. He ordered one to provide and clean rifles. He ordered one to collect horse-carts, camels, and donkeys, then to send them off with soldiers supplied with feed. He assigned the intendant who had been brought from Yarkand to record what these six officials did in a notebook, and then, as the head of intelligence, inform the official who was the head of the soldiers in Aqsu about them every day. The intendant who was the head of the soldiers in Aqsu gathered the coppersmiths in his office and made each of them hammer out cook-pots for more than 100 people. On the advice of the intendant who had come from Yarkand, 2,000 soldiers entered Kashgar and cut off the troops making for Russia. Another 1,000 soldiers came and blocked the roads to Badakhshan and to the Bolshevik country. Their concern was that they thought the Commander might run off in some other direction.

In Ush Turfan, there was a Dungan official named Mr. Ma. He was also a prefect. He was also a colonel with 100 soldiers. The General feared him, thinking, “This is going to go wrong, too.” The General told him, “You will arrive on such-and-such day of the month.”

Killing thirty horses, he arrived three days after the order was given.

“Are you a Dungan?” asked the General.

“My mother and father are Dungan,” he said.

“Will you go to the idol-temple?” asked the General.

132 “Mr. Ma” was Mǎ Shàowǔ (馬紹武, 1874-1937, g. 1924-1933). Ma Shaowu, a Dungan from Yunnan, began his career in the Qing military. At this time, he was an official and military commander under Yang Zengxin in Ush Turfan. Note that Ghulām contradicts the relationship between Yang, Ma Shaowu, and Ma Fuxing that emerges from the Chinese documents: Ma and Ma had a longstanding rivalry, and Yang appointed Ma Shaowu magistrate of a county in Aqsu in order to counter Ma Fuxing. (Jacobs, pp. 182-183) Here, Yang is concerned about Ma Shaowu’s loyalty, and so brings him into the fold through a series of rituals: kowtowing before an idol, eating pork with officials, and receiving the seal of office.

133 Perhaps he “kills thirty horses” by riding them roughly in his rush to get to Urumchi from Ush Turfan.
“I will,” he said, and he went. He kowtowed before the officials in the idol-temple. He swore in the idol-temple to do no wrong. He went back with them, and he ate pork with the officials.

“He shall receive the seal of the colonel,” ordered the General, who took it and handed it [22] to another Chinese. That Chinese went and gave the seal to Mr. Ma along with his 500 soldiers.

At that moment [127a, 1], the General told Mr. Ma, “Take the soldiers and go to Aqsu.” They left that day and came to Aqsu.


Mr. Ma said, “I’ll do this job. Whether with words, whether with diplomacy, whether with warfare, I’ve taken it on as my task.” Together with 2,500 soldiers and the wisest of all of the officers, [5] he left for Kashgar. They slept during the day and marched during the night.

Six of the Commander’s informants had gone to Aqsu. [6] They seized the informants and killed them by cutting them up. Four informants had gone to Maralbashi. They seized them, too, sent them to Aqsu, and killed them. No one knew that these 3,000 [7] soldiers were coming without notice. But the officials went out and met together. The Commander heard about this, and, on a Friday, he gave his seal over [8] to the county magistrate. Mr. Ma, intending that the Commander would give up his weapons to the army, sent two circumspect men. They appeared in person before the Commander, [9] who listened to what they had to say and then personally shot them both to death with a pistol. A man who was waiting with their horses went and informed Mr. Ma.

[10] That day, Mr. Ma waited until evening. With all of the soldiers, in the middle of the night, he went up to the gates of the New City. “Open the gates!” he said. The gatekeepers said, “We won’t open them!” and did not open them. With his assembled wardens, Mr. Ma, five or ten officers, and fifty soldiers climbed the wall. [12] They opened the gates and fired artillery three times. The soldiers who had stayed behind blew the horn and entered the gates. They came to the Commander’s gate. They passed [13] through the gate, entered, and went before the Commander. The Commander killed one man with a pistol. They shot the Commander in the arm. The Commander collapsed. [14] They rolled him up in felt with his head sticking out, took him into the stable, and laid him down in the manure with his two ankles on his head. They also brought out his children and retainers, put them in the stable, and set soldiers to keep watch. They also set guards at the two gates. The officers took responsibility for the treasury and the city.
[16] The rest accompanied the Colonel\textsuperscript{134} to the Old City. When they got the hint that they were coming, they opened the gates. It seems that one of the Commander’s [17] men had brought news of what had happened (in Kashgar). These men surrounded the Colonel’s \textit{yamen}. The Colonel climbed to the top of the city wall with his soldiers [18], and they fought for two and a half hours. Commander Tājī\textsuperscript{135} died.

For two days, the city gate was closed off. [19] No shop opened. Nor could one find water to drink. On the third day, they announced to the city, “All important people should go to the New City. [20] We are going to kill the Commander, and they should see it.” All of the important people went, and they saw the officers who had come.

The officers asked, “Look at the man who oppressed you. [21] What state is he in now? Look, the Commander has been bound to a rack and leaned up against a wall.”

[22] Then the Commander said, “If there is any Muslim here, may he give me a cup of water.”

The Muslims said, “You have shown no mercy to us. So you will drink Satan’s piss! [127b, 1] We won’t give you water.”

Mr. Ma took pity on him and gave him a cup of water.

“If I could have some steamed buns?” said the Commander. [2] With his own hand, Mr. Ma gave him a steamed bun to eat, one of his own steamed buns.

Then, ten soldiers shot him with their rifles, but in [3] a place that did not kill him. He gestured to one of them, who shot him in the heart.\textsuperscript{136}

Mr. Ma brought the Colonel to his own \textit{yamen}\textsuperscript{137} and then tossed him out [4] into the city. He ordered the important people to bury him in six days. He seized half of their wives and retainers.

[5] The thing that happened the third time: three times, the Commander refused to

\textsuperscript{134} Perhaps the Colonel Wang referred to in a few lines?
\textsuperscript{135} I do not know who Commander Tājī might have been.
\textsuperscript{136} This account of Ma Fuxing’s execution suggests that Ma Shaowu was remarkably merciful to him. Nicholas Roerich, whom Ma Shaowu frustrated, offers an altogether less charitable account of the execution: “The details of the murder are medieval. The captured man was crucified and after two days of crucifixion the present commander of Khotan [Mr. Ma] shot at him at such close range that the blood spurted upon the victor. At the same time his soldiers were also shooting with him. … [A]fter the murder of the Titai and his son, in Kashgar, their families suffered complete robbery. The earrings were ripped out of the ears of the son’s wife. They brought a photo of the crucified Titai. Friends, look upon this brutality committed without trial and without thought of responsibility!” (Nicholas Roerich, \textit{Altai-Himalaya: a Travel Diary}, [Kempton, Illinois: Adventures Unlimited Press, 2001], pp. 163, 214.)
\textsuperscript{137} It is normal practice in writing on Chinese history to refer to the physical office of an official by its Chinese name, the \textit{yámen}. I follow that standard here.
comply with the Khan’s order to give up the seal. [6] The Khan remembered this. When he told the Commander of Kashgar to give up the seal presented to him by the General, he got the General’s order but did not give up [7] the seal. The Khan remembered this, too.

In the year AH 1342 [August 1923-August 1924], the thirteenth year of the Republic: The General sent one of his wives home with 400 soldiers, [8] two cartloads of gold, and seventy-eight cartloads of [silver] taels and coins. The Khan heard about this [9], and he sent an imperial letter to the General of Lanzhou. It said, “The General in Urumchi has sent his wife with eighty cartloads of gold and silver. [10] Dispatch someone to welcome them, bring them to the city, and detain them. Turn the soldiers around and stop them. Send the wife with some of her people back to her own homeland. Remand the eighty cartloads of gold and silver to my treasury with their accounts.” [12]

What was the Khan’s order, that he did this? The Khan sent a letter to the General of Urumchi that said, “You have sent treasure in eighty carts. [13] I took it into my treasury. I sent your wife and your people to your homeland. What was the reason for sending this treasure?”

The General of Urumchi said, “In my homeland, there is no water tower. I sent it to get this, and also for my reputation.” [15]

“This plan of yours is quite good after all,” said the Khan. “But the area around you is not safe. This, too, will come to pass in its own time.” [16] The Khan remembered this, too.

The English informants reported the truth of it to the Khan: [17] “The General has filled a city up with gold and silver. The people of Xinjiang province have no gold or silver left. [18] The magistrates in all of the cities collected all the gold and silver and issued paper money in its place. The people are in an extremely despicable state. [19] Every magistrate has set up a treasury. They’ve taken in two and a half years’ worth of taxes in one year. The official himself took the extra six months of tax. [20] They sent the two years’ worth of taxes collected in one year to the General. The General hoarded it. Where will this business end? [21] We will write again as things develop. We hear that the Khan desires to treat the people well and take care of them. [22] We hear, too, that the officers who oppressed the people got their stations and run them out of covetousness.”

[128a, 1] A verse: The teeth will know the taste of food. / The one who catches the

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138 Ghulām’s conception of the role of European agents in China is complicated. Here the English seem to act in service of justice and in support of imperial authority.
mouse and squirrel is the cat.\textsuperscript{139}

[2] The General made a gift of 400 taels to Mr. Ma. For his service, Colonel Wang gave 40 taels, and all of the other officials [3] made contributions accordingly. Apart from Mr. Ma, the other soldiers and officers were sent away to Ili. Mr. Ma ordered, “Take all of the vegetables from the fields that [4] the Commander had planted and give them to the people.” They sold all of the vegetables. They gathered up all of the money from the vegetables. [5] They also collected the money from the Commander’s 2,000 donkeys, 400 carts, sixty trucks, 400 camel carts, 2,000 horses and mules, silk carpets, rugs, [6] cups, bowls, various household goods, 8,000 bags, and 1,000 spades and figured out its total value. They informed the General.

Mr. Ma received an order from the General. [7] It said, “With the contents of the accounts, and with witnesses, summon the judges. Whosoever had their money taken by the Commander, give it to them, [8] and get a receipt from them. If he has seized people’s lands, also note whether or not they were remunerated with the equivalent in cash. [9] Return the equivalent of the money they gave according to testimony. Everyone should return the equivalent land in their own districts with appropriate documentation [10] to the people and so placate them.”

The Commander’s oldest wife, as it turns out, was the Colonel’s mother. She took the Colonel’s wife and one of the Commander’s [11] sons to Yarkand and established him in the \textit{yamen} set up by the Black Turbans. Every month, these three people were supplied from the \textit{yamen} with flour, rice, firewood, and money. [12] They had enough to sustain them. The \textit{beg} of the New City and his \textit{yüz bashi}\textsuperscript{140} went there twice a day, in the morning and in the evening, saw them with their own eyes, and brought information to the \textit{yamen}. [13] They made those who stayed in the Commander’s service and worked for him in Kashgar, both Muslims and Dungan, consolidate what they had received. [14] Where would this business end?

All of these matters came completely to an end in the year 1343 AH the month of Jumada I [December 1924], [15] five months later.

We have written out an example of one of the \textit{ghazals} that the people of Kashgar recited out of joy.

\textsuperscript{139} The idiom means, “rodents” will eat well now, but the “cat” will catch them later. That is, one benefits from covetousness in the short term but will eventually be punished. Does it mean that the corrupt will be swallowed by the just, or simply by the more powerful?

\textsuperscript{140} Literally “hundred-head,” the leader of a group of one hundred under the Inner Asian system of decimal organization. This and other similar offices persisted on the sub-magisterial level through the Qing and Republic and into the 1950s.
The road to Xihu is reedy; / No one has cut it with a sickle. / Fourteen years ruling the city, / There’s no one else like Commander Ma!

Oh! I say, My God! I say, / In the city, I weep! / Commander Ma who lay in the open cart, / Commander Ma who lay in the Chinese cart, / Fourteen years ruling the city, / Great Commander who lay in the manure!

The white sparrow got eaten, / The black sparrow got eaten too. / Upon the Great Commander’s death, / The Kashgaris were happy!

The Great Commander was a barn mouse; / He squandered a lot of taxes! / When Mr. Ma arrived, / He ran into his hole!

That is the whole verse.

Oh, tyranny, tyranny and trouble, / The market shall not be lively forever. / The blade of tyranny struck in the world / And brought innumerable troubles to the people.

Was it right to wield the blade of tyranny? / Killing this innocent like this, / Whatever poor wretch the hour of death comes to, / They cannot escape it, no matter what trick they try.

Oh, Muslims, oh, believers, thanks be to God! Sing his praise, that he has supported us at a good time, at a good hour! In the great books, they tell this good news, that the great Imam Mahdi would come into existence, and conflicts and killing would come to pass in all of the regions within Creation. Muslims fought with infidels, infidels with Muslims and with Russians, Russians with Chinese, and Christians even with each other. These signs make known the coming of the great Mahdi. Should my God grant me life, and should my beard be stained with blood, and should the moment of exalted martyrdom come to me, it will be no surprise.

The second event is one that came to pass in the year 1340 AH [1921-1922]. Some of the children of the Muslims in Bukhara studied the ‘ilm-i jadīd. [7] They

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141 Literally, a “bag mouse.” Possibly Apodemus uralensis or Ural field mouse, a rodent common across Central Asia.

142 The line in the MS is unclear (see Transcription). Another translation might be “He ran out of sight!”

143 Ghulām’s purpose in narrating these three seemingly unrelated events is gradually becoming clear. The first event, the end of Ma Fuxing’s rule in Kashgar, has cosmic implications, serving as a sign of increasing chaos in the world, including in Xinjiang. The hierarchy of imperial rule has been upset, as commanders at every level trick and disobey their sovereigns and superiors and are corrupted by power even as they attempt to act justly.

144 The ‘ilm-i jadīd is, literally, the “new knowledge,” generally referring to modern, Western-style education. As noted in the introduction, I have left the terms jadīd and ‘ilm-i jadīd untranslated in order to emphasize the breadth of their range of reference in this text.
blinded themselves to Islam, sent a letter to Russia and the Bolsheviks, and secretly led them to Bukhara and opened it up to them. [8] The king of Bukhara fled to Kabul. They obliterated the people of Bukhara. The Russians stole away all of the gold and silver coins and jewels collected in the treasury from the time of King Tīmūr all the way up to today. [9] The pen is insufficient to the task of describing these events in detail. [10]

The third event was that which came to pass in the year 1342 AH [August 1923-August 1924] in Kashmir. In the city of Kashmir [Srinigar], atop the road to Hindustan, [11] there was a mosque. When your humble author went on Hajj, the people there showed this very mosque to me, saying, “If the Muslims win, [12] they’ll claim it’s been their mosque of old and make it a mosque. If the Hindus win, they’ll claim it’s their idol-temple and make it an idol-temple. [13] It’s been eight years. The Hindus made a petition, and they put a lock on it and stuck a notice to it.” In that year, they secretly brought 12,000 Hindu soldiers from Jammu. [14] The next day, when all of the children studying in the schools were gathered in the schools, the Hindu [15] soldiers spread out from school to school and massacred them. They put all of the little schoolchildren to the sword. [16] They visited this tyranny on the Muslims.146

[17] The fourth: The event in Kabul. Amir Amanullah Khan147 said to his people, “They shall study the ‘ilm-i jadīd! The shepherds in the mountains, married women, [18] all of them should study the ‘ilm-i jadīd.”148

While he was assiduously teaching the ‘ilm-i jadīd, the people were growing restless. “Married women [19] going to school is not Muslim,” they said, and they grew rebellious. Finally, it came to killings and conflicts. And both this side [20] and that side were victors and vanquished, and after six or seven months it was not over. In the end, 70,000 people on both sides [21] were killed.

[129a, 1] The Commander’s daughter Shujakhan made a request to the Intendant and Mr. Ma that she might go away to Beijing. They forwarded the petition [2] to the General, who ordered, “Let her leave. Have her come here.” When that order came, they let her leave.

145 The second event sees the destruction of a treasure dating from the reign of one of the great world-conquerors, Amir Tīmūr. It is betrayed to the Bolsheviks, whom Ghulām sees as a destructive and divisive force.
146 The third event is a struggle over a sacred site, reflecting Ghulām’s earlier account of the destruction of temples in China, culminating in inter-communal violence, a massacre.
147 King Amanullah (1892-1960, r. 1919-1929)
148 Ghulām provides a fourth event indicating trouble in the world: “new knowledge” has upset the order of the family. Moreover, it signals the sovereign’s violation of his duty to uphold the sharī‘ah.
It seems that Shujakhan had said in Kashgar, [3] “Not all of the Dungans died. Two Dungans died, my father and my elder brother. When I get to Beijing, I will petition the Khan. I will take my revenge on all the Chinese!”

[4] The General had heard about this. There was a garrison of soldiers blocking the road about two days out of Urumchi. [5] The General sent them a letter. It said, “If the Kashgar commander’s daughter Shujakhan arrives, inform me. [6] When I send the order, you will obey it.”

When Shujakhan got there, the sentries sent a garrison from the city that she was to pass through. [7] When they entered the wayside inn, Shujakhan was in a cart. “Get down,” they said. “Why should I get down?” she asked, and they said, “Get down. [8] That’s an order.” When she got down from the cart, there were twenty-eight people there, men, women, and the carters. They shot them all on the spot.

[9] For the service that Mr. Ma had rendered in Kashgar, they made him the Intendant of Khotan. They split off eight administrative regions and eight cities from Guma and gave them to him. Earlier [10] they had taken one circuit and divided it into two.\(^{149}\) In the month of Eid al-Adha, he left (for Khotan) with 300 cavalry, 200 infantry, four machine guns, [11] twelve black powder artillery, fifteen trucks with windows, 400 camels, and his store of black powder armaments in eighty carts. [12] They were left over from the Commander. The General had ordered him to hand everything over to the (Kashgar) Intendant. He did not obey.

[13] In the year 1323 AH [1905], Sultan Abdü Ihamid Khan\(^ {150}\) established a great many new schools in Istanbul, distributed the books of the ‘ilm-i jadīd, [14] and commanded that children should study it. He made them teach the children and educate them. [15] In the year 1318 AH [May 1900-May 1901], the children had studied, opened their eyes, and gotten educated. They turned away from Abdü Ihamid Khan, and children broke into the inner harem [16] and did rude, shameless, and evil things.\(^ {151}\) The Sultan removed himself from office with his own pen, and he sent them this letter. [17] They killed drove off the Sultan’s four wives and his children in front of a great many people. The Sultan’s eldest son fled. [18] It is said that there is a city on the Russian side called Salonika. There is a palace there, too. They turned it into a fortress. They set 4,000

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\(^{149}\) Previously, the circuits of Xinjiang and their intendants were based in Zhendi, Ili-Tarbaghatai, Aqsu, and Kashgar. Under Yang Zengxin, the eastern part of the Kashgar Circuit was turned into a new Khotan Circuit.

\(^{150}\) Sultan Abdü Ihamid II (1842-1918, r. 1876-1909)

\(^{151}\) Ghulām is ambiguous in his judgment of the ‘ilm-i jadīd: the students “open their eyes,” yet do rude and eventually revolutionary things, bringing ruin to Istanbul.
soldiers to watch. [19] They pulled his escaped eldest son from a river and imprisoned him with his father. At that time, [20] the population [of Istanbul] was calculated at 1,250,000. They studied the *ilm-i jadid* and acquired knowledge. On account of their doing so, they lost hold of 1,000,000 of their people, their city and the lands and waters they cultivated, their mountains and rural districts. 250,000 people [22] were left in Istanbul. One-fifth remained. Bukhara, too, obliterated [129b, 1] the *jadids*, and [the Ottomans] lost their grasp on those affairs. The Wahhabis occupied Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina and held them. The Sharif\footnote{The dates are unclear, but this ought to be Hussein b. ‘Ali, the Sharif of Mecca in 1924 who was deposed by the Saudis.} [2] and his sons fled with their lives and took themselves into the protection of the English. And God knows the truth.

[3] The events in the country of China. – In the year 1343 AH, in the month of Eid al-Fitr [April 1925], the common people of the region of Beijing split in two. [4] They warred with each other, murderously, destructively, excessively. The Europeans brought the Chinese to their senses and told them, “We’ll teach you how it’s done.” [5] More than 500 English set up artillery factories, rifle and pistol factories, and factories to make swords and scabbards of iron and [6] suspension bridges of iron to go over rivers. They readied things in the workshops, readied post offices to operate the postal service in every city, [7] staffed them with their own people, taught their learning to the Chinese, and trained apprentices. These apprentices replaced the Europeans who had taught them. [8] They killed some scores of them, and they plundered the money and goods of those who remained. [9] They drove those still alive back to their own countries. The great English bank closed, too. They even drove off the English consul. [10]

The Chinese ambassador said, “This has all gone wrong. We are going to see some very hard times.” The Chinese deliberated at length, [11] and they sent some of their most illustrious people, protected by a force of 500, to take the English consul by force, [12] bring him back, and sit him down.

The ambassador apologized to the English consul. The consul said, “This is not the time for apologies. [13] You have killed our people, seized them, stolen from them. After all that, why should you apologize? There is no point in my staying here. [14] No harm could come from leaving. As for me and my forty men, for our country, it doesn’t matter if we die… [15] I’ve sent a letter.”\footnote{Ghulam dramatically explains the impending fall of Chinese power by the Chinese mistreatment of the Europeans. Yet, this appears to be a war between two misguided peoples: the English show the Chinese how to do wrong things, and the Chinese have the temerity to cast off their infidel tutors.}
The ambassador was speechless. At that moment, twenty warships arrived, each carrying 25,000 soldiers, with artillery batteries. [16] When the Chinese saw this, they were perplexed. Then the Bolshevik ambassador said, “If the English are going to destroy the city like this, [17] then we’ll fight them. I will return with 500,000 soldiers.”

The ambassadors from the remaining countries were caught in the middle. [18] They said, “This is a loss to the Westerners – now everyone should stick to their own affairs as it was before. They ought not work in the post offices. [19] This is how the conflict will end.” And they ended it completely.

In the year 1344, at the beginning of the month of Rabi’ I [late September 1925], 70,000 Bolsheviks managed to enter [20] the country of China, which was mustering troops. “Why did you enter with armaments and weapons and such pompous fanfare?” they asked. The Bolsheviks replied, “In order to enter into the service of China.” [21] When the Khan heard this, he said, “They should leave. We have no service for them,” but they refused to leave. They stayed. [130a, 1] What they were thinking when they entered, God knows.

Also, in the province of Chengdu[?], a famine began. [2] The price of one jin of flour rose to six sār. [2] The Chinese were unable to handle the famine in Chengdu[?], so they sent 70,000 households of Chinese to Xinjiang province. [3] The General blocked them. The Chinese said, “We will not go back! If we go to our homeland, we will die of hunger. Countless people have died of hunger in our homeland. [4] Two provinces of people have died off from hunger. You might as well kill us – we’re probably dead anyway.” The General had no choice [5] but to inform the Khan. The Khan sent an order not to block them. He did not block them. This news came to Aqsu. The price of rice had been three tānggā and thirty pul. [6] All of a sudden, it rose to twelve tānggā. Wheat, maize, peas, millet, sorghum, barley, and vetch quadrupled in price. May my God save these lands [7] in his refuge, amen. He is the fulfills of prayers.

The region of China and the region of Russia [8] were at peace, and Chinese consuls were set up in five places in the region of Russia. And seven Russian consuls were set up in the region of Beijing. [9]


154 So the English and Bolsheviks each had a force of 500,000.
155 The famine to which Ghulām refers is obscure, as is the toponym.
156 The author refers to Yang Zengxin’s independent establishment of consulates in the Soviet Union. (Brophy 2011, p. 341; Jacobs, p. 206)
They declared, “Now we are all the same!”

A mullah from Kashgar said, “Even in a robe, [12] you’re still a Russian. These officials sitting here are Chinese. We’re Turks. How are we the same? If you become a Muslim, we’ll be the same. [13] You have four gold rubles. You have five gold ten-ruble coins. I don’t even have one silver coin. How are we the same?” [14] When he said this, the Russians were speechless. The Intendant and all of the Chinese officials said, “He’s right.”

On the first day of Jumada I [18 November 1925], I wrote up to here. [15]

This is the administration of the Bolsheviks: The countries of Ferghana [16] are a little bit more peaceful than they were before. The people of the cities are at peace. The rural people and the Kirghiz and Qipchaqs in the mountains are not at peace. (The Bolsheviks) have knocked down and demolished all of the tombs with the intent of turning the great mausoleum in Bukhara into an orchard.157

[17] The Wahhabis in Arabia have gained the seat of government. [18] They do no harm at all to the people. Nor do they harass hajjis. They have destroyed and razed the tombs and shrines. [19] They have done nothing disrespectful to the tomb of the Prophet PBUH.

[20] The situation of the country of China: There is no khan158, but they have put a man named Yan Dā159 in the khan’s place. He has no treasury. One province [21] remains obedient to him. The highest official of each province and its general are not loyal to the Khan, but have become emperors themselves. They take the taxes from their lands [22] and collect them in their treasury, and they appoint officials according to their own will. If [the Khan] orders them to send soldiers, they [130b, 1] do not send them. If he orders them to send money, they do not send it. If people die as they take their lands, they do not inform the Khan as they did before, but govern however they want. [2] Nor is Yan Dā a descendant of the Khan. He cannot do anything.160

Things between the Bolshevik Russians and the Russians who supported Nikolai became untenable. The Nikolai-supporters [4] thought ahead, and they said, “We are

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157 Ghulām again shows his concern with the destruction of sacred sites.
158 At this point, the Emperor had been expelled from the Forbidden City and lost even his ceremonial role.
159 Perhaps Yán Huìqìng (顔惠慶 1877-1950), briefly President (May 1926-June 1926). His time in office is consistent with the dates given in the MS for the writing of this section. Dā, as above, < Ch. dà “great,” from dà zòngtòng 大總統 “great president.”
160 Just as a pretender sat on the throne in 1911, precipitating the fall of the Qing, now the imperial lineage has been disrupted once again. The president is illegitimate without imperial descent and so cannot rule.
few, and the Bolsheviks are many. All of them are working men, low-born people. If we all support them, [5] it’ll be the end of us, but, if it doesn’t stop, they’ll kill us, too. They’ll kill our wives and our little children. [6] They’ll wipe out our posterity. We will be the cause of their deaths.” The Bolsheviks became informed of this. [7] A few people acted as go-betweens, and both sides backed down. Yet, they did not trust each other. In their hearts, [8] both of them were suspicious of each other.

The year 1345 AH [July 1926-June 1927]. The Wahhabis entered Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina, and every night they slaughtered three hundred of Mecca’s notables like sheep. [9] When the people of Medina heard this, they were afraid, and they all went out to meet with them. The Wahhabis made apologies to those who had come out, [10] and rather than ride their camels, they walked back to the city with them on foot. And they did not attack anyone. They razed all of the shrines and [12] erased any trace of them. They did not do anything inappropriate to the shrine of the Prophet.161 As the king Ibn Ṣaʿūd was beholden to the English king, [13] he wrote out all of his conditions, the English withdrew all of their officials, and they signed a treaty. Ibn Ṣaʿūd [14] sent a letter to his son that said, “You have not destroyed the tomb of the Prophet.” His son replied, “This is not the time. There would be a riot.” [15] It’s said that Ibn Ṣaʿūd and his son had studied Western methods.

[16] The events in Istanbul: Turks have stopped wearing turbans. Nor can they go to the mosque for prayers. All of a sudden, when [17] a man wears a turban, the jādīdī Turks laugh and make fun of him. When a man is about to go into a mosque, the jādīdīs notice what he is doing [18] and frighten him away from his prayers.

[19] The events in Iran: There was a professor, a high-ranking scholar. On this day, he said, “I have chosen the religion of Jesus!” He and his children put on Christian-style clothes and wore caps on their heads, and they showed themselves off. The Iranians were very troubled [21] and shamed by this.163

161 Once again, Ghulām associates the destruction of sacred sites with the rise of the new order. Interestingly, Ghulām sees the Wahhabis as proponents of Western learning. This may be an astute observation, given that fundamentalism and revivalism are distinctly modern and often post-colonial phenomena, spurred in this case by European incursions into the Islamic world and emerging under conditions of repression and the effort toward liberation. It may also be an easy way for Ghulām to indict the Wahhabis rhetorically.

162 As with ʿilm-i jādīd “new knowledge,” I have left jādīdī untranslated. From context, the most neutral translation would be “neophile,” “new-style,” or “reformist,” with all of the vague connotations that the English terms carry.

163 I am uncertain as to exactly what Ghulām indicates with his story of the professor. However, the date is consistent with the Pahlavi reforms under Reza Shah (1878-1944, r. 1925-1941), which included new sumptuary norms.
The events in the region of China: The region of China split into two parts. One, the region of the capital, held to the old religion and sect, while the other party of jadidi Chinese held the Christian religion in highest esteem and took control of four provinces. Their supporters were the Bolshevik Russians. 30,000 Bolsheviks came in to join them with rifles, swords, and armaments and gave them aid. These sent 20,000 soldiers to Xinjiang. The General in Urumchi was afraid. He gathered soldiers together, and he hesitated.

The General sent someone with the message, “Why have you come here?”

They said, “We’ve come to take the seal.”

The General said, “If they need the seal, I’ll give it to them. If they say they need money, I’ll give it to them. But someone like me still has to be the general. I’d like to stay.”

They replied, “A very large amount of money, without measure,” and the General sent the money they asked for immediately. Once they had gotten the money, he sent a letter to the effect that, “We are no longer beholden to Beijing. We are now beholden to the jadidi side.”

The jadidis’ provisions ran out. They were forced to go back. On one side of the country, the old Chinese fought hard with the jadidi Bolshevik Chinese. The Chinese racked up their debts to Europe. It seems that they had pawned several cities through treaties. The English set up factories and produced goods. They also set up factories for iron bridges, and they built bridges. The jadidi Chinese killed off all of the English in the factories, the merchants, and the travelers.

The English consuls said, “These things you’re doing simply won’t do. We will put this to all of the consuls in the Republic. Whatever they order, we will do.” From the consultative office arrived an order: “Send soldiers.” 10,000 English soldiers from London and 50,000 from Hindustan, in total 60,000 soldiers, went in the first wave. In the second wave went Afghan and Nepali soldiers from Hindustan, 30,000 of them. The reason for their hard strike was that the Bolshevik Russians had gone to Beijing and assisted the jadidi Chinese. They worried, and they chose to support

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164 The “Christians” may refer to the Chinese Nationalist Party, which was now based in the South and launching the Northern Expedition to take control of Beijing and the North. Depending of Ghulam’s level of knowledge, when he received this information, and how it was communicated to him, he may also mean the split between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party that was then unfolding. Ghulam will momentarily refer to the Bolshevik Chinese as jadidi, presumably indicating the latter case. In either case, the depiction of one party as “Christian” and the other in the capital (presumably Beijing, but possibly the new capital of Nanjing) as holding to the old Chinese religion is interesting.
the old Chinese’s side, to take their revenge, and to take possession of their dead, their money and goods, and the cities that had been pawned to them. [16] And so they girded themselves for such a great conflict. Three or four kings supported each faction.

[17] The events of Urumchi, Xinjiang, China: At the beginning of Ramadan [March 1927], the six brigade commanders held a meeting. [18] “In Beijing,” they said, “things are extremely tumultuous; as for food and drink, these are in extremely short supply. Four jin of unsifted flour is thirty-seven and a half sär. The General has a large treasury. [19] How about we kill the General in the night and abscond with the gold and silver in his treasury?”

[20] One of them went and said, “I will meet with the General,” and he went in and met with the General. “The six of us had such a discussion!” he said.

“Who?” the General asked.

“One, and then me, and such-and-such and so-and-so…” He wrote out the names. [131b, 1] “They will stay quiet for three days, and then, on the fourth night, they will kill you. I should leave now. Otherwise, they’ll kill me, too!” he said and left.

The next day, the General [2] invited all of the officials, including the six officers, to a tea party. When it was time for tea, the officers went. These [3] were led off to a different place. Those five officers were led to a special place. None knew what was happening to the others. Sooner or later, [4] they came in. They shot all of them in each of their rooms.

(One of them) was the younger brother of Yang Tong, who had killed the previous general, plundered the treasuries, and come to Kashgar.165 [5] He (the younger brother) asked if his companions had gone to tea.

“According to the old custom, [6] they went with three or four of their men.”

This didn’t even break his stride. “Send all of our soldiers, mounted,” he ordered his runners. [7] When they were ready, he went with his soldiers to the tea party. It was not customary for the General’s men to come to tea with soldiers. [8] If the General hears or sees, he’ll realize something is up, and he’ll be upset, he thought.

“Keep the soldiers here, mounted. [9] I’ll go in myself.” He went in himself. They led him to the place where his four companions had entered. They [the General’s men] were standing on either side of the door. [10] They shot him in the ribs. He grabbed hold of one of them. He got his pistol and shot two men with it. The rest of them shot him several times [11] with their rifles and killed him.

165 This “Yang Tong” is probably the same figure as “Yang Song” above. Again, the author indicates Yang Zuanxu, who was responsible for the execution of the Ili General Zhi-rui (志銳, 1853–1912) during the Xinhai Revolution and whom Yang Zengxin later posted to Kashgar.
His soldiers had no idea what was going on. The General came out to greet them and recounted the event to them. The soldiers dismounted from their horses and stood holding their rifles and the sedan chair. The General said, “What do you say?”

“These armaments, weapons, these horses, food and water, clothing – you gave them to us,” they said. “We are beholden to you. We have nothing to say. You generously gave us these. If you want to be generous to someone else, too, that’s your choice.”

“Mount your horses,” he said. He ordered them onto their horses and hurried them on their way. Swiftly, they informed the Khan of what had happened.

An order arrived: “Give every soldier 15 sār and new uniforms.” He gave them new ones. He made another Chinese their brigade commander.

Four hajjis made a petition to Shahzade Abdulaziz 166: “Six Bedouins robbed us in such-and-such a place.” When Abdulaziz had first risen to power, he had had eight prominent men from all of the tribes come and swear their oaths. “We won’t rob people,” they had said, “nor take on our camels more than what the King has ordered.” He brought out the eight who had sworn oaths and told them, “Six of your people robbed some hajjis.”

“We don’t know about it, nor do we know these people,” they said. “They have nothing to identify them, and they told the hajjis nothing. How could we find them for you?”

He had them locked up and sent out a hundred soldiers. One lonely Bedouin had gone up onto a mountain. They seized him and gave him a hundred blows with a whip.

“Who are the ones who robbed the four hajjis?” they asked.

“I heard that such-and-such Bedouins robbed them,” he said, and he led the soldiers to them. The soldiers captured them. They brought these six in. They interrogated them and imprisoned them together with the eight (oath-givers), making fourteen, surrounded them with 1,000 soldiers, and took them to their homeland. They showed these fourteen and before their very eyes massacred all of the men and women in their homeland and even slaughtered babies in their cradles like sheep. And they brought their heads strung together on ropes.

Then they (the prisoners) said, “Oh, Abdulaziz! Did you see? This happened because of you, that they tortuously dismembered these people to death. And then these eight, though they had nothing to distinguish them, couldn’t they have been found?

166 Abdulaziz b. Saud (1876-1953, r. 1926-1953)
You brought ruin to so many lives!” [6] And with great torment, over the course of one day, from morning to night, they tortured them to death. And God knows the truth.

[7] In the holy city of Mecca, a prosperous man petitioned Abdulaziz, “Would you grant me a plot of land? There is a storehouse that I know. [8] I will show you.”

“Let him show us!” he said. “I’ll give him a plot.”

But he had dug this place out in the holy city’s storehouse. [9] He showed them. The Sultan had grown concerned, and he had sent 2,000 black powder rifles [10] and secreted them away in the storehouse. Every rifle was accompanied by over a thousand bullets. He showed them this, too. The power of God [11] had given the Wahhabis their opportunity. And there were also 400 chests of gold in that treasury, the kind of chests that a camel can carry two of. [12] God brought fortune to the Wahhabis.

[13] It has been passed down in the biography of the Prophet that the Negus [of Ethiopia] had sent soldiers to lay waste to Mecca. The soldiers had made off with 300 of Abdulmutallib’s camels.167 [14] The commander came before Abraha [the Negus].

Abraha said, “Oh, Abdulmutallib! Why have you come?”

Abdulmutallib replied, [15] “Your soldiers made off with 300 of my camels. I came to ask for them.”

Abraha said, “If you asked me for more than this, even if you asked me for Mecca, I would give it to you.”

Abdulmutallib said, “The camels, those are mine. As for Mecca, it has a master.”

They gathered up the camels and gave them to him.

And then Abdulmutallib climbed up a mountain and sat atop it. The infidels tried to lay waste to Mecca, [18] and they drove their elephants to destroy it. The elephants trumpeted, but they did not approach it. By the order of the Most High, with the creaking and crashing of Hell, they spit out hailstones bigger than peas from Hell, [19] each one at an infidel’s head, [20] and the infidels died with their horses and beasts of burden. Even now, some of these stones are kept by some prominent people of Mecca [21] in their homes as good luck charms. I, your servant, have seen them with my own eyes. [22] And God knows the truth.


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167 Ghulām here presents the story of the “Year of the Elephant” (‘Āmu ’l-Fīl), c. 570 CE. The siege of Mecca by the Ethiopians is intended to provide an historical parallel the invasion of the holy city by the Wahhabis.

168 Merkit (also Makit, Mekit) is a medium-sized town southeast of Kashgar and northeast of Yarkand.
have been in the House of God for two months. The ground keeps quaking terribly. The time for Arafat approaches. How will we go on Arafat [3] and stay alive? Won’t we fall over? Be pleased with us.”

Events in Merkit:

[4] In the year 1345 AH, in the month of Eid al-Fitr [April 1927], there was a fierce earthquake, and the ground split open. The houses and buildings all fell over. The people spent the day sitting on the muddy ground. [5] What’s more, a heavy rain fell on them. None of these Dolans knew any law but the Law. Their trade is selling firewood, branches, and the roots of trees from the wilderness.

[7] The events of the Ili General: In the month of Eid al-Fitr [April 1927], thirty-six Bolshevik officers and four Chinese garrison officers conferred, and the Chinese pledged to become Bolsheviks, too. They came to the agreement that, “In two days’ time, in the evening, [9] we will kill the General and lay waste to the land.”

Right there, in front of a Chinese officer, there was a [10] little child. He did not see this child. If he did see him, then he did not notice him. After they dispersed, this child went to the General’s yamen [11] and knocked on the door.

The doorkeeper said, “Who are you?”

“I want to speak with the General,” said the child.

“I don’t have an order for that. [12] I’m not opening the door.”

The child said, “Open this door immediately! If you don’t open it, tomorrow you’ll never escape it!”

The doorkeeper was scared, and he told this to the second doorkeeper. [13] The second doorkeeper told the third doorkeeper, and the third doorkeeper told the General’s attendant. [14] The attendant told the General. The General immediately came out. He had them open up all the way to the third gate.

169 Given Ghulam’s apparent concern with the signs of the coming apocalypse, the juxtaposition of an earthquake in Islam’s holiest city and one in the poorest backwater of Kashgaria can hardly be coincidental.

170 The Ili General *Yīlǐ jiàngūn* 伊犁將軍 was a high office under the Qing, and for a century its holder commanded all military forces in Xinjiang. Following the reconquest under Zuo Zongtang, the Ili General’s area of administration was significantly reduced in preparation for the conversion of the Inner Asian territory into a province. At the beginning of the Republic, following the Ili revolutionaries’ brief seizure of power, the Ili General’s command structure remained largely in place, but titles changed: the general was now the Ili Garrison Commander *Yīlǐ zhènshǒushì* 伊犁鎮守使. In 1927, the office had been held since 1921 by Niú Shí (牛時 d. 1933).

171 A Chinese yamen was protected by a series of courtyards, each with its respective gate.
The General saw the child and said, [15] “What do you have to say?”

“I have something to say just to you.”

The General brought the child inside. “Tell me what you have to say,” he said. “If you’re afraid, [16] you can hold my hand. Reveal who this person is.” And the child did. And then he told the General everything that had happened and that he had heard them say. [17] The General replied, “Go back to where you came from.”

The next day, he summoned those [18] four officials before him, together with six or seven scribes. They came, one by one, according to the usual procedures. [19] He put someone on the first door, where they seized each of them and tied them up tightly. And then, he served the officials tea, and when they were finished, [20] they took those four officials in and interrogated them. They confessed. They hung the sins they had committed about their necks and executed them in front of the six scribes.

[21] They brought the child. “I’d like to appoint you to a high position,” said the General, “but you’re a little child! For this great service you have done, [22] when you’re grown up, you’ll get a position. You’ll receive 1,000 sär every month. Take it from the treasury.” And he put a stamped [133a, 1] document in his hand. This is the truth of things.

[2] The events in Kashgar: The intendant of Khotan sent the Dungan Mr. Ma and appointed him to the intendancy. He made the Kashgar [3] intendant the head of the troops in place of the commander. Mr. Ma controlled Kashgar very tightly. The reason was this, that people went off to Andijan [4] to labor and trade. They got used to and practiced the Bolsheviks’ attitudes and ways of doing things, and Bolshevism became appealing to them. [5] “We’ve earned a profession that requires no effort!” they thought. They forgot the Islam of God and the Prophet, [6] converted to the religion of the Bolsheviks, put on caps, coats, and trousers, and took up rifles over the sabers and pistols on their belts. They marched ten [7] paces in front of the Bolsheviks, showing off their Bolshevism, standing in place and refusing to turn back, their bellies sticking out in front. Every night, [8] a bunch of them found out who still had money for the Bolsheviks, and they went and broke into their homes. [9] They worked out a scheme of those who had been Basmachis in Nikolai’s time, and every evening they went to forty or fifty places and took all of their money. “We didn’t give them [the Basmachis] any money!” they would swear. [10] “No one came to us [to hide]!” they would swear. Over time, this way, everyone was made to take three oaths. They put them in pain, [11] but they killed no one, nor bloodied their noses. This was a method whereby they brought many peoples together, and they united first the consultations of seventy people, and then 1,300 people,
or [12] 800,000 people.\footnote{This coercing uniting of “consultations” appears to be a description of the Soviet political system. See Brophy (2011, pp. 103-112) on the extensive labor migrations between Xinjiang and Semirech’ye. In the 1910s, perhaps 50,000 a year made the journey. The next figures available, from a 1930 Soviet survey, estimated 7-8,000 annually, a majority of them poor and traveling on foot. By the mid-1920s, there were over 100,000 people in Semirech’ye with ties to Kashgaria.}

In the month of Eid al-Fitr [April 1927], eight of them went one evening before the [Soviet] governor and the Bolshevik officials. [13]

“We have a request,” they said.

“I’ll listen to your request,” said the governor. “Say it.”

“We are of the people of the Eight Cities\footnote{While Southern Xinjiang had been known previously as the “Six Cities,” and under Yaq’ūb Beg as the “Seven Cities,” the region was divided under later Chinese rule into eight cities.} in China, [14] but we are your subjects,” they said. “Our request is this, that you give us artillery, airships, bullets for the rifles we carry, and [15] officers to teach us how to fight, standards and banners, and wages. Our homeland is in the hands of the Chinese, and our people [16] are under their thumbs in tyranny. We want to bring them to live in peace, as we do, and to prosper. [17] We also want to bring our homeland under your administration. As for war supplies, we can buy those if you provide us with money. [18] We are 60,000, and we are all obedient to our masters.”

“In eight days, on such-and-such evening, come here,” said the governor. [19] “I’ll put this to all of the officials, and all of us officials will gather this evening. Then we’ll hold a meeting and let you know.” And he sent them on their way.

[20] He sent a letter to officials far and near. All of them gathered. Secretly, he was afraid of them. He was vigilant.

“Where did they find this money?” [21] they asked.

“As it turned out, they heard about who had been a Basmachi,” he replied. “They gathered all of these people up, place by place, and interrogated them, and they got three [22] oaths from each of them, both Russians and Muslims. For that reason, they could not say. Russian against Russian, Muslim against Muslim – the qadi\footnote{The qadi is the religious judge in Islamic law.} [133b, 1] issued an opinion concerning the rightness of saying this: An oath taken unjustly did not count as an oath. But this was how they got their money.”

Then the Russians [2] knew the truth of the matter. And then, on the appointed evening, the eight people came. They had a good meeting. And then seven people came. [3] They had a good time. The Russians imprisoned sixty-eight people and put them in jail. They interrogated all of them [4] and wrote down their names one by one. That
night, they seized over 300 more people. All of the money they collected was gold. [5] They went and tossed it in the treasury. The next day, they seized another 500 or so people. The rest of them [6] fled in all directions.

The Chinese consul, prefect, and head consul heard about this. They sent letters to the Urumchi and Ili Generals. [7] The Kashgar intendant also sent a letter to his officers. He was asleep. He woke up. He was drunk. He sobered up. He wrote in a letter to the Generals, “The Russians are well pleased with him. [8] He has turned away from us, as well.” For this reason, the Khotan intendant was also [9] removed to Kashgar. More than eighty of those who had fled reached the Eight Cities.

[10] The Russians had gathered opinions from all of their lands, cities, towns and neighborhoods, and captains. They sent these to the General. [11] The General had it sent to the Kashgar intendant. The intendant wrote out the names of all of their towns and neighborhoods, [12] of their mothers and fathers, and their own names and sent them out to officials in every city, and they had them all arrested. Some of them were killed. Some of them who knew things [13] were brought to the General. The General heard what all of them had to say, and then he killed them. He also shut down all traffic on the Andijan road.174

[14] The General sent a letter to that governor. It said, “From what I hear from our subjects, [15] you have arrested 800 people. If you would release these villains and send them to me, then I might be pleased with you, [16] and it might declare our friendship.”

The governor sent 370 people to the General. [17] “Take the Osh road back to Kashgar and your homelands,” the Russians said and drove over 200 people to Irkeshtam. [18] The intendant was aware of this. When he sent his soldiers out, they found that the prisoners were exhausted, and they gradually imprisoned all of them [19] and put them in jail.

The Chinese did not know if those who had fallen into their hands were alive or not. The Chinese [20] worried greatly, and they said, “The helpless people do not know the value of the kingship. Nor do they need to know anything about the situation it’s in. [21] With the blessings of God’s mercy, with the justice of the kings, if we are [22] satisfied and content with our lot…” Four months later, when the traders and hired laborers crossed over from Andijan, [134a, 1] the guards made note of them. They seized all of these people from countryside and city and interrogated them. [2] They would suddenly set one free, and the rest they put all together in jail. This is the truth of the matter.

[3] The year 1345 AH, the month of Eid al-Fiṭr [April 1927].

174 In 1926 and 1927, a “war scare” prompted Bolshevik authorities to clamp down on traffic across the Sino-Soviet border. (Brophy 2011, pp. 351-353)
In the following, I have adopted the system of transcribing Eastern Turki used in David Brophy’s “The Qumul Rebels’ Appeal to Outer Mongolia.” In this system, there is a simple one-to-one correspondence between sound (segment) and letter (graph). I avoid introducing any artificial distinction between front and back variants of [i], as the [i] and [ɪ] familiar from Chaghatay appear to have merged in Eastern Turki by this point. While some phoneticians suggest that there remains a slight articulatory difference in Modern Uyghur, if so, it is phonetically all but indistinguishable and phonologically inactive.

Similarly, I also choose to be agnostic about vowel harmony and the front or back quality of suffixes. Harmony is rarely marked in this text, as it is not in its contemporaries. Indeed, suffixes as written appear often as not to be disharmonic with their stems, even though phonetic evidence shows that the opposite was the case. Regardless, we will learn nothing useful about vowel harmony from “Mā Tīṭaynîn wāqî’asī.” In the case of vowel raising and reduction, which are arguably more important for marking prosody in Eastern Turki and Modern Uyghur, the text does often show a distinction between [a] and [ä] and their raised form [e], while there is no apparent reduction phenomenon marked in the script. When in doubt, I have transcribed with a prejudice towards the Kashgar dialect of Modern Uyghur, triangulating with descriptions of Kashgari and Yarkandi speech in the early twentieth century from Jarring, Raquette, and others.

Some specifics: ژ is transliterated as <j>, ئ as <č>, ا as <ḥ>, and ې as <ḫ>. ض is transliterated as <ẓ>, ص as <ṣ>, ظ as <ṭ>, ظ as <ţ>, ى as <ż>. Where ف denotes the sound [p], I have written it as <ṗ>, as in فيغمبر ṭayğambar “prophet.”

I have made one exception to Brophy’s system: I have represented non-Turki words according to the manner in which they are written in the text, including the length and quality of segments as indicated by each letter, rather than according to their presumed pronunciation at the time of the manuscript’s writing. I think it is interesting to see how the scribe indexed the foreignness of words: by maintaining the spelling of Arabic and Persian terms, reader and writer distinguished them from Turkic homophones and recalled their own relationship and that of the text at hand with the Islamic canon. Loan words or terms transcribed from Chinese or Russian receive the same treatment, as

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Turki scribes used letters for Arabic sounds to write similar sounds from Chinese, for example Arabic <ź> ژ for Chinese [ts] (Pinyin <z>), as in ژنگذۇ < Ch. ژونگذۇ 統督 “governor.” The same is true of ژاۋۇت “factory” < Russian завод. Conversely, it may be of interest to lexicographers to see which non-Turkic words have been nativized and how.

Language

The language of the Ghulām narrative displays a number of peculiarities that frustrate an otherwise capable reader of either Chaghatay or Modern Standard Uyghur. Indeed, it is far more difficult to read than the bulk of Jarring Prov. 163, largely because of the frequency of Chinese loanwords rendered oddly into Aralo-Persian script. The language belongs to that panoply of transitional dialects of Eastern Turkic that suddenly infiltrate the written word in the nineteenth century and only gain some formal institutional status over the course of the early twentieth century. We call these varieties collectively Eastern Turki, though they represent a range of mutually intelligible but otherwise phonologically and lexically divergent varieties.176 In the meantime, as Āsāt Sulayman has argued, the printing enterprise of the Swedish mission and its educational efforts comprised one source of standardization in the region of Kashgar.177 It is from their Eastern Turki textbooks, among other ethnographic and dialectological materials, that we derive this convenient label, while remaining agnostic of its reference to a distinct variety of speech or writing.

The lowering of high vowels in final position is most evident in loanwords from Chinese: zhēng mómó 蒸饅頭 “steamed buns” is rendered as jīn yǔmó,178 while tīžī 貼子 “promissory note; paper money” becomes tīzhā.179

176 Compare, for example, the Kashgar dialect presented in Jarring’s materials with the Qumul dialect recorded by Katanov. (Karl Menges and N. Th. Katanov, Volkskundliche Texte aus Ost-Türkistan, [Leipzig: Zentralantiquariat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1976 (1933, 1946)].)


178 127b, 2-3.

179 126a, 11.
“Mā Tiṭayniŋ wāqiʿasi” displays an unusual feature: European-style punctuation. Periods, commas, one exclamation point, and a question mark, reversed as in printed texts to align with the right-to-left direction of Arabo-Persian script, appear here and there. I have so far found no examples of this in the Tārīḫ-i Ḥamīdī section of Jarring Prov. 163. This suggests that they are peculiar to Ghulām’s text, perhaps even from an earlier or the original version. Of course, East Turkestani manuscript culture did not exist in a vacuum, and the scribe or author would have had access to printed matter in Arabo-Persian script that made use of these marks. While, as far as I am aware, this punctuation is unique in the manuscripts of the Jarring Collection, it nevertheless has little significance without further context.

Transcription

[124b, 7] Kāšgar Mā Tiṭayniŋ wāqiʿasidur
[8] (Yārkand Ġulām Muḥammad Ḥānnī bayān qilişi)
[9] = Ḥājjī Ġulām Muḥammad Ĥān Ḫwajam bin Shayḫ Pir Shāh180 şāhib ḡaẓratim anasi Maʿṣūma ḡanım =


180 MS Jarring’s catalog calls him “Pur Shāh.” There is no sure way to tell which rendering is correct. I choose pīr because this spelling .IsEnabled? of pīr appears extremely frequently in contemporary craft manuals from the same region.

181 MS ɣāmūn < Ch. yāmēn 衙门 “official’s office.” Here, it refers to the offices in the Palace in Beijing, but it also indicates any office, down to and including that of the county magistrat.

182 MS ʿālīr < Ch. sīye 司業 officials in charge of a prince’s education. (See also Sayrāmī 2001, p. 152.)


183 > MU توزکور tuzkor “a treacherous, ungrateful person”
185 > MS مینگ گی < Ch. míngwò 民國 “republic”
186 > MS توزف طیفور, probably top taypûr/tayfûr. Meaning unclear, but “cannon” is spelt elsewhere in the MS.


187 MS unclear. The graph resembles تَأَيْفَة.
188 MS تَأَيْفَة.
189 MS جَنْئِيْجَن < Ch. jiàngjūn 將軍 “general”
190 MS 道 吾 < Ch. dàotái 道台 “circuit intendant”
191 MS 爰 ə < Ch. zhōuguān 州官 “prefect”
192 MS 郡 ən < Ch. xiàn 縣 “county magistrate”
193 MS 龍 ən da zoŋtəŋ < Ch. Yuān dà zōngtōng 袁大總統 “great President Yuan (Shikai)”
194 MS 程 ən da zoŋtəŋ < Ch. Lǐ dà zōngtōng 李大總統 “great President Li (Yuan-hong)”


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197 MS سیننج < Ch. Xînjăng 新疆
198 MS سئن < Ch. shèng 省 “province”
199 MS لنجو < Ch. Lânzhōu 蘭州
200 MS دوردوز < Ch. zòngdù 總督 “governor”
201 MS جي, possibly < Ch. zhè 揶, literally “fold,” indicating a folded memorial or report


Ḥaqqänınıñ tâla’i nahayiti egiz ikän. Qara sällä Ḥiṭaylärñiñ waqtında Nikläyniñ tînëlîq

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202 MS tîzâ “paper money, bill” (Schwarz, p. 244) < Ch. tiēzi 贴子 “promissory note.” See also Poškämiä, p. 151: Ćiçardi tiyza dâp kağazni jannuy hukmidar zalim, / Wä bâ zân tiyzan hukmiğa amban bolmadı qadîr. “They issued papers called tîzâ, by the General’s tyrannical order, / And sometimes the officials were not faithful to the tîzâ order.”

203 MS unclear, resembling بوسهه

204 MS tîtay < Ch. titâi 提臺 “commander.” (Ippolit Semenovich Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organization of China, [Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh Limited, 1912], p. 337.)

205 MS کاچرمک

206 MS جورونکوپه تاری نئیک Gubûnrâtûrûlûläriniñ

207 later always modifying خط (Radloff, v. 4, p. 375) cara (Tob. Kas.) “leichtgläubig, phantasiereid” (=“gullible, fantasizing”), so “false” or “forged.”
The World as Seen from Yarkand

210 MS unclear, possibly Ch. yáncaí 薰菜 “salt and vegetables,” so “provisions” or “salary.”

290 MS شیطی šitāy < Ch. xiètái 協台 “colonel.” (Brunnert and Hagelstrom, p. 340)

210 MSبولک bolāk “another.” (Schwarz, p. 83)


211 MS بيز biz.
212 MS شوتا. Possibly “die Leiter” (“the superintendents, chiefs, wardens”)
213 MS تایپور, a piece of artillery known in Xinjiang by the 1870s. “une sorte de faucou” (Hamada, p. 72)
214 MS قیش < قیچ “der untere Theil des Fusses vom Knie bis zum Knöchel” (“the lower part of the leg from knee to knuckle”) (Radloff, v. 2, p. 792)
215 MS بارقه سیئینی
216 MS تونک لونک Türkisch “brigade commander” (Brunnert and Hagelstrom, p. 295)
217 MS سودیک (Radloff v. 4, p. 838) = sidik (p. 720) “der Harn” (“urine”)
içärsän. Sança biz su bärmäyımiz,” dedi.


Ürümcä Jänjüni, “Öz yurtumda bir su ‘imäratim yoq idi. Şuni almaqqa wä âbrä üçün [15] ibärgän idim,” degäniñä,

“Bu hüyäliñiz häm obdän ikan. Lekin aträfimiz tinçliq emäs. Ul häm öz waqti [16]

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218 MS جينك موما čiň mümä or jeŋ mümä < Ch. qǐng mómo 清馍馍 “steamed buns” or zhēng mómo 蒸馍馍 “steamed buns.” I am grateful to Jun Sugawara for offering a solution to this puzzle.

219 The scribe has written 1341 for 1342. First, if the date is 1341, then the narrative has gone back in time, and the events make less sense in context. Second, the thirteenth year of the Republic, noted here in the text, corresponds to the latter half of 1342 AH (March-August 1924 CE), not 1341. Third, the text indicates that the events recounted here ended “five months later” on a date falling in December 1924. (128a, 14-15)

220 MS چاجان < čajäŋ “welcoming party,” perhaps with an ironic sense. See also Poskämi, p. 147, Yiraqtın kälsä Mänčînîlar yoliğa qildilär čajäŋ “When the Manchu Qing came from afar, they gave them a welcoming party on the road.” < Ch. cházhâng 茶帐, a tent for serving tea to traveling dignitaries.

221 MS كندنيچک gündäŋ < gündâ “Fosselklotz” =“manacles” or “cangue” (Menges and Katanov, p. 45)
bilä n bolur,” dep üčür qilibdur. Ḥānniν könlidä bu hâm bar.


[128a, 1] Bayt: Ḥordaniniň lazzatini tıš bilur. / Pin bilä n sičqan tutuštî miš bolur.223


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222 dâhîra “hoard.”

223 In this line, I take قُن pin to be short for pinhan “squirrel” and ميش mîš to be short for mîşık/mîşiğ “cat.” Miš may also be < مِص “der Ofen” (=“oven”) (Radloff, v. 4, p. 2161)

224 MS شرطة pošta. Ross and Wingate (p. 15) have “The Chinese use also … an open carriage, a kind of Russian landau, called a pošta.”

225 MS قوت quwwat.
tutqañ ğwâh musulmân wâ ğwâh Tüngâ-nilarni [14] qoîqa kälgûnî birikitip turubdur. ‘Äqibati nà yârqû injâm tapar ikân?


[16] Sołu’226 yoli qomuﬂûq; / Örğaq bilân urğan yoq. / On tört yilçä sâhâr surap, / Mä Tîtaydek bolğan yoq!

[17] Ğh, deymân, Ğudâ! deymân, / Šâhârlârdä yîglâyman! / Poštada yatqan Mä Tîtay, / Maĥfâda227 yatqan Mä Tîtay, / On tört [18] yilçä sâhâr surap, / Qiğda yatqan dâ tîtay!

Aq qoçqaçmu göşt boldi, / Qara qoçqaçmu göşt boldi. / Dâ tîtayniñ [19] ölgânîgä / Kâşqarliklär hôş boldi!

Dâ tîtay tulum siçqan; / Âlbânî tola saçqan! / Mä Dären yetip kälsä, / [20] Manzargâ228 qaçip čiqqän!

Tamt-i tamâm-i bayt.


Zulum têqin rawâmudur sûrmäk? / Bi-gunählarîn mundadâ öltûrmäk, / [22] Qayuw qulğa ğilîñni ğukumî yâtsä, / Qutulmas hâr näçêh kim ñiyla âtsä.


226 Possibly 西湖 Xihu in Yarkand.
227 Usually pronounced mappa. It is used only for passenger traffic.”
228 MS مانترا, Manzarga or منظرا manzari.


[129a, 1] Tiţaynin Şûjahân231 degân qizi Dawtay birlä Mâ Dârenqâ, “Bâjin yansam,”


[11] on iki dâna kârtûs232 top, on bâs dâna âynaklik püştä, tört yüz tiwâ, wä sâksän

229 Possibly teğ-i siyâsat “sword of execution,” so “they put all of the children to the sword”
230 MS Yüg-ı tâği “rebellious”
231 MS Şûjâhân. Probably a transliteration of a Chinese name.
232 MS < Russian kaprûs “black powder (cartridge or bag)”
The World as Seen from Yarkand


233 Modern Uyghur dictionaries define lâk as “100,000,” but this figure does not work in this context. I translate it as “10,000.”

234 MS .Delay < Anglo-Indian dawk “postal service”

235 MS getSize, same for all subsequent examples


236 MS < cagnote with Turkish vapur “boat”
237 MS جبس
238 MS کومک > MU kōmmiqonaq “sorghum”


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⁵³⁹ MS صوم som. Sayrâmiň indicates that som refer specifically to the currency of Russia. (Hamada 2001, p. 53)

⁵⁴⁰ MS شروان širwän < R. chervonets чевронец “gold coin; 10 rubles” or chevonnoe zoloto чевроное золото “pure gold.” The term is a homophone and homograph for the city of Shirvan, Iran, suggesting a folk etymology. I am grateful to Akram Khabibullaev and Matthew Price for suggesting this interpretation.

⁵⁴¹ MS تكسابلا


242 MS yəndəğə. Almost certainly a blend of yənda “on the side of” and yənə “to the side of;” hence yəndəğə təbi’ “beholden to the side of.”
The World as Seen from Yarkand

The term, as “prison warden,” is actually a contraction of a longer title, and one could take the meaning of this foreshortened form to be simply “office official,” referring to anyone who worked in the yamen. Ch. 司官 sīguān is also a possibility, and its meaning is similarly vague.

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243 MS тонжлу < Ch. tōnglíng 統領 “brigade commander” (Brunnett and Hagelstrom, p. 661)

244 MS سوغان Etymology unclear: Ch. 所管 suōguān “prison warden” should not be taken to refer strictly to someone with the duties of a modern Euro-American prison warden, but probably a sub-magisterial official who acted as a “police runner” and so carried out tasks that broadly related to legal enforcement. The term, as “prison warden,” is actually a contraction of a longer title, and one could take the meaning of this foreshortened form to be simply “office official,” referring to anyone who worked in the yamen. Ch. 司官 sīguān is also a possibility, and its meaning is similarly vague.


245 MS тâskârî. “die Sänfte” (“A sedan chair or litter.”) (Radloff, v. 3, p. 1099)
246 MS اکین شریف, possibly a copyist’s error for مکّه شریف.
ikân. Ǩuđa Wahh pérdărğa naşib qilibdur.

[13] Sīrādā247 kältürübər kim najāšī Makkani buzmaqqa laškar ibärə. 'Abd ul-
Muṭallibnä üç yüz tögäsini [14] laškar təlän qilip alip kätti. Laškar başi Abrahamiñ aldïğa
“Meniñ üç yüz tewənni laškarlıñiz təlän qilip alip kätti. Şuñi tiləgäli käldim,” dedi.
Abraha, “Mondin närsäni [16] tiläsänjz wä Ģwâh Makkani tiläsänjz hâm berür edim,” dep
tə’aläniz umri bilän dozänñiz [19] qars-wä-ğaçlı248 dozänñiz məsdın çöqrəq təsərni
tişläp čiqip, här biri bir käfärniño çoqasığa249 taşlap, [20] käflərniñ ät ulaşları birlə haläk
boldi. Şubu zamänädä hâm şubu təşlərdän Makkani ba’zi kattalarınıñ [21] öydä bir
däna ikki däna tabarruk saqлаğən bar ikän. Faqır özüm közłüm bilän kördüm. Wa ‘llâhu
a’lamu [22] be-haşiqäti ‘l-hâl.

boldi. Yär qattiq tābrəp turadur. ‘Arafät yeqin boldi. Nâ tərîqa bilän ʿaraftäğa čiqamiz,

Merkitdä bolğan ațwilät.

[4] Sana-i 1345 roza ‘id ayida bir nihâyat yär tâbrəp, yärler yerılıp kätti. Öy imärətlər
tamäm yiqilip kätti. Âdamlar läyläñ251 yärda olturup [5] kün ötkâribdur. Yânä üstigä
şär’iñi bilmäydu. Bularnız tijärət jangäldin otun wä şâh wä darahštərniñ yildızlərini
sətatdər.

[7] İlî Jânjūşınıñ ațwilätı: Roza ‘id ayida ottuz altâ däna Bâlşîwîk ‘amaldärləri,
tört däna Îhtây [8] länzâ/sänzâ ‘amaldärləri maşlaḥat qilaşip Îhtâyılar häm Bâlşîwîk

247 MS سيرده

248 Qars and gač each refer independently to a creaking or cracking sound. The words are paired
here, which is not abnormal, but they seem also to be anthropomorphized. Perhaps the “qars
and gač of Hell” refers to a certain kind of demon? Perhaps the author simply missed the
postposition bilän “with,” which would turn the phrase into “with the creaking and crashing
of Hell.”

249 MS جوقة čoqa. Sayrämî refers to a poll tax imposed by the Qing before the Dungan Rebel-
lions called the čoqa başî. (Hamada 2001, p. 52) Radloff’ (v. 3, pp. 2005, 2016) gives “cloth”
for جوقة čoqa. Given context, I take the word to mean “head” or “body, person.”

250 The copyist has not written a year above سنه as he has elsewhere.

251 MS لابلانك lãylän “dirty, muddy.”


252 MS ʬ[dâya. It is unclear if what is meant is P. dâya “nurse” or Ch. 大爺 dàyè, a term of respect for an older man.


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253 “wages”
254 MS ฮ่ม ฮีเม
255 MS Муні Моңі


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256 MS. Unclear. Possibly ganza ganza “stinking, putrid?”