A. Erkinov’s publication presented here includes a number of original sources, namely, works of eminent poets of Central Asia from the late 19th to the early 20th century. Such works are very rarely studied as original historical sources. However, local poetry, as a genre, provided the most complete reflection of the religious-ethical standards of the era, particularly with regard to the most significant events of the time, such as the Andijan uprising, which occurred during a rather peaceful period. The author begins his article with a brief analysis of a change in views toward the Andijan uprising and other similar uprisings that took place in Central Asia. Erkinov shows how the evaluation of these events changed in Soviet historiography, depending on the ideological clichés of a given period, and the level of “ideological attentiveness” (marginality) of a particular researcher. The survey of opinions from the period of independence regarding the same uprising and attempts to present the uprising’s leader as one of the fighters “in the long-lasting struggle for independence,” is quite interesting. Not without irony, Erkinov notices that now a reassessment of the same events is sometimes performed by literary critics, who in old times amicably supported another ideology and its “scientific” approaches.

To the observations of the author I would add the following. It seems that the historical evaluation of the advance of the Russian empire in Central Asia (which proceeded partly as annexation and partly as conquest with subsequent

1 I would like to express my thanks to proff. Devin DeWeese, Hisao Komatsu and Sergey Abashin for useful comments and discussions.

2 It should be remembered that the Kirghiz / Kazakh zhüzes (hordes) were incorporated into the Russian Empire on the basis of mutual agreements, e.g., Small and Middle Hordes. For detail see: Крафт И. И. “Судебная часть в Туркестанском крае и степных областях.” New ed.: Ешмухамбетов С., Жакеев С. (сост.) Из истории казахов. Алматы: Жалын, 1999. С. 330-339. One of the older works on the subject: Demko G. The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan (Uralic
The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dākchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

colonization) will be influenced for a quite long time by the political realities of the present day, which have arisen after the disintegration of the USSR. The present reconsideration of history in the countries of the region predominantly comes with an ideological coloring, continuing the pattern established in Soviet times which fostered, especially in the “marginal” (or “provincial”) republics, the development of hypertrophic national narratives that led to isolated to the “national privatization of history,” in the Central Asia countries. Moreover, in the vast majority of the countries in the region the official authorities determine the vector of historical reassessments of the past, especially regarding the colonial and Soviet periods, by considering history as the most convenient way for “consolidation of the nation” (in perceptions of modern ideologists and politicians of the countries in the region). Post-colonial “patriotism” (in the definition given by politics and a significant part of the marginal intelligentsia) bursts into “modern history” and forms paradigms for the next “reconsideration” of history. This political (nationalist) ideology, by the way, is a product of the former Soviet provincialism and hidden opposition of “the Soviet Eastern sister republics,” which already then (in their own ways) had begun in a concealed manner to challenge the results of national delimitation. Such realities to one extent or another politicize today’s process of the reconsideration of one’s own history, which even without this is already so politicized that the occurrence of even more or less objective studies induces an ambiguous evaluation among researchers, who were once unified (shackled) within the uniform political and ideological system.

What is indisputable is that the conquest and colonization, and especially “membership in the country of the Soviets” (or, “semi-centennial apologetics” as defined by S. Dudoignon, the French researcher) for a long time left a deep mark, and particularly influenced the minds of historians of the senior and middle generations in the former “southern republics” of the USSR. The “mark” was so deep that the anti-colonial and anti-Soviet rhetoric frequently published now is couched in well-known Soviet stylistic formulas and clichés. Moreover, as has
been said, the “reassessment” is more often done by just those historians who themselves obtained a decent Soviet education, and once with a fair share of emotions (expressing the same loyalist moods, but to the red banner) proved the all-round advantage of “Annexation of Central Asia to Russia,” and one-sidedly convicted those “bourgeois scholars,” who wrote at that period about expansion or colonization, and so on. The reaction of some Russian scholar appears not less emotional and not entirely scientific; they also diligently try to argue the facts that the colonization of Central Asia did not bring benefits to the Crown of the Russian Empire and that it was precisely the local peoples who gained more advantages from colonization.7

Similar problems (in particular, as far as it concerns Islamic studies) existed and still can be seen today among western researchers (taking into account the conventionality of this geographical term). The significant part of western research was and still remains under, as defined by Devin DeWeese, the captivity of “Sovietological Islamic studies” (“Sovietological Islamology”), which is not interested in any other aspects of complex processes, aside from the special influence of Soviet ideology and the regime on the Islamic heritage within the framework of the creations of the history of new nations.8 Certainly, the limitation of both the “Soviet” and “Sovietological” schools is conditioned by realities of the “Cold War,” the former common borders, limited access to sources, language barriers, and the like – problems, which, it seems to me, still persist, especially among the post-Soviet researchers of Central Asia. Though the present isolation of research in many respects repeats the problems of Sovietology, with the same ideological schemes (of anti-Soviet and sometimes anti-Russian orientation), and is amazingly similar to the approaches of the Sovietological school, but in a more primitive form.9 It is quite clear that the debates among historians in the post-Soviet era – of what was “better” for the region, whether its annexation to the Russian empire, or “everything remaining unaltered” - are absolutely unproductive, and, as noted, they simply reflect the ideological and partly political realities of the post-Soviet period.10
The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dākchī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

In any case, these two extreme estimations can only have scholarly interest (for example, in terms of studying the post-Soviet [post-colonial] reassessments of history, their links with political realities, the professional level of researchers, etc.).

Apparently, the best way out of such peculiar “dead ends” in debates is to publish original sources, and Erkinov does this rather productively and in a professional manner.

The evaluation (self-estimation) of approaches used in Soviet time is an especially sensitive issue among post-Soviet scholars. Self-justificatory references of some CA researchers to “the ideological dictatorship of Moscow” in discussions of publications or dissertations, particularly covering the Timurid period, and especially the period of colonization, look interesting (if not to say amusing). Also repeating ourselves, we say that the same type of reassessment ( alas, not always objectively) occurs among some modern Russian researchers who are held captive by the series of fundamental works from pre-revolutionary and partly post-revolutionary periods. However, in Russia the idea of a “civilizing mission” was regularly revived and made its way into popular publications in the past as well. Such is the case with a series of articles that obviously served to justify the elimination of the Kokand / Khoqand Khanate (February 1876). It was precisely in that period, when, in a manner of speaking,
the “civilizing missions” formula of colonization, and the blessings brought to
the subject peoples by the “civilizers,” were actively discussed again.15

Most likely, for the military leadership and politicians of Russian Turkestan, the rhetoric of the “educating and civilizing mission” served only as a
necessary accompaniment to the quite pragmatic goal of the “subjugation of the
frontiers,” or, according to S. Gorshenina, a way of “politically legitimizing” the
conquest.16 That position appeared and began to be introduced in political and
even in military lexicon (alongside with such words as “reconciliation,” “gain,”
“advance”), chiefly in the days of the first “Organizer of the territory” K. P. von
Kaufman.

Self-inspired estimations of this sort frequently looked like
self-justifications as well, and in the course of time they eventually generated the
sense of a “high civilizing and educating mission,” even though the mission was
accomplished with the help of force and contrary to the will of the local peoples.
Such self-estimation, to one extent or another, provided a guiding principle or a
reference point for many Russian researchers of the territory, for example, N. P.
Ostroumov (1846-1930) and, in part, V. P. Nalivkin (1852-1918). It should be
mentioned however, that the position of the latter moved in the opposite direction
as a result of the influence of numerous circumstances, including some of a
personal nature.17 In fact N. P. Ostroumov showed great diligence in “the
education of aborigines,” but in such a form that he and his like-minded fellows
understood it.18

In the present paper, I do not intend to make inferences about views on
Russian colonization, or on the correlation of imperial, national or historical
narratives in works of modern researchers - a subject of bibliographic and

15 Thus, for instance, one of the anonymous authors (probably from military-political circles) of
that time, in an attempt to prove the rightfulness and appropriateness of the elimination of the
Kokand Khanate, writes, “therefore it is desirable that force serve the actual preservation of our
domain [in Central Asia], which is possible only when European culture penetrates into these ... steppes, if force will be found to be a blessing for that civilization for which it would serve as a
protector. (The Russian people) possess the ability to master and attract (to) themselves foreign
ethnic groups, or at least those that stand at lower stages of educational [development]” (italics
mine – B. B).
16 Горшенина C. “Крупнейшие проекты...” C. 46.
17 For more detail see: Абашин С. Н. “В. П. Наливкин: «...будет то, что неизбежно должно
быть; и то, что неизбежно должно быть, уже не может не быть...». Кризис ориентализма в
Российской империи?” Суворова Н. Г. (ред.) Азиатская Россия: люди и структуры империи.
18 The activity and views of N. P. Ostroumov in the capacity of the “expert-orientalist” and in the
context of Russian “orientalism” and colonialism are discussed in the article by A. Khalid: Khalid
A. “Russian History and the Debate over Orientalism.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and
проблемах управления мусульманским населением Туркестанского края.” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и науч. ред.) Сборник русского исторического общества. Т. 5 (153).
methodological disputes of the last 10 or 15 years. I am mainly interested in responses of Russian experts and politicians to the Andijan uprising, and especially in the responses of those who worked in Central Asia, and in their own way stimulated a new wave of discussions on “the Muslim question” in association with that uprising, as has been mentioned already by some researchers. This question is also closely related to historiographical and methodological debates on colonialism, Russian “orientalism” (including the well-known concept of “power and knowledge”), and the status of Russian experts. These debates are naturally associated with the idea of Russian Mission and attempts to bring the “aborigines” into the “civilizational space,” as it was understood by some experts and politicians. However, the existence of the personal, sometimes rather very friendly, contacts between the “regional experts” of Russian Turkestan and the “aborigines” requires substantial corrections the widely discussed question of the status of the Russian colonial expert (within the framework of the evaluation of “Russian orientalism”), and requires more complex concepts than those offered by some researchers. However, to speak about “patriarchal colonialism” as some Russian researchers (see above) try to do is also irrelevant.

Nevertheless, jumping ahead, we should note that the majority of Russian experts working in the region could not overcome estrangement from the autochthonous population in spite of the fact that some of them (for example, V. P. Nalivkin) were inclined toward just that. On the other hand, I was also interested in the attitude of the local population toward the colonizers, as the degree of estrangement of the local population was much more extensive, and

---

19 See the brief review in the above mentioned articles by S. Gorshenina. One more article on the subject (written in French and intended mainly for western readers) is being prepared in co-authorship with S. Abashin.


could hardly be surmounted “as soon as possible,” as wished by V. P. Nalivkin, whose liberal position, it is necessary to say, could not gain dominance in the general colonial policy in the south of the Russian Empire. In any case, the “Russian vision,” or more precisely, Russian “orientalism,” has been studied for a long time and there are more works on the topic than works that analyze the views emanating from the South (“The East”).

There is no need to prove that it was unusual for the majority of uprisings among the discontented masses in the period of colonization to have open political demands. However, the uprising of Dūkchī Īshān was undoubtedly political, though some of his followers were guided by different motivations, at least at the initial stages of involvement in the Īshān’s “organization.” Deliberate political engagements (including those of an obvious anti-colonial nature) were not extraneous to local peoples, and especially to the intelligentsia, as well as to Bukhara and Khiva Khanates. In this sense the major action was demonstrated by the various reformers and, particularly, by their (relatively) left-wing elements – the Jadīds, and later (during the period of the two last Russian revolutions) by the opponents of Jadīds – the so-called “qadimists.”

Again looking at the Andijan uprising, we repeat that it should definitely be considered as an action of a purely political nature (though a local one), and one clearly targeted against the colonial authorities. At that time it had been taken precisely in this spirit both by the local colonial administration and by the center of the Empire. This is confirmed by the appearance of a flood of publications in the Russian press, which expressed reactions (sometimes with an extremely aggressive attitude) to the Andijan uprising, and thus this gave rise to a new discussion of “the Muslim (Mohammedan) question” and “dervishism.”

22 For more detail on the uprising see our previous publication: Бабаджанов Б. М. “Дукчий Ишан и Андижанское восстание 1898 г.” Абашин С. Н., Бобровников В. О. (сост.) Подвижники ислама: Культ святых и суфизм в Средней Азии и на Кавказе. Москва: Восточная литература, 2003. С. 251-276.
23 It will suffice to mention Ahmad Dānish, Dāmulāh Ikramcha, Ṣadr-i Diyā, who in fact became the precursors of the Young Bukharans’ movement. In this respect the last quarter of the 19th century in Khorezm remains uninvestigated and it appears that Young Khivans’ movement was the product of external influence, not an indigenous movement.
24 The most comprehensive analysis using this approach has been recently accomplished by Professor S. Agzamkhodjaev: Агзамходжаев С. История туркестанской автономии (Туркестон мухторияти). Ташкент: Тошкент ислом университети, 2006 (the chief sources and bibliography are discussed there).
25 This is true despite the fact that the ideological motivations for the uprising came from religious paradigms, with a vague appeal to the Turkish Sultan (as the “Caliph of the Muslims”). Of particular interest is the fact that just before the uprising Dūkchī Īshān, according to the old tradition, was “raised and hailed as a khan,” thus giving the uprising a political color in a most striking manner.
26 In my earlier paper I have already discussed the “Sufi constituent” of the Andijan uprising. See: Babadžanov В. М. “Дукчй Исан und Aufstand von Andižan 1898.” Kügelgen A. v., Kemper M., Frank A. (eds.) Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries. Vol. 2. Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998. pp. 167-191. I think speaking about the Andijan uprising in terms of “Sufi movement” is absolutely
A very distinct assessment of this uprising and of “the Muslim question” in general was made by the local colonial administration of Central Asia. In this respect, “The report written and presented with unquestioning obedience and veneration by faithful and loyal subjects” signed by S. M. Dukhovskoy, the Governor-General of Turkestan of that time (March 1898-1901), is particularly interesting.27 From the first words of the report, it becomes clear that it was precisely the Andijan uprising that motivated writing the document and addressing it to Nikolay II (1894-1917). The report perceives the uprising exclusively as “a secret plot... of the Muslims kindly treated by the Russian authorities” and indicates that “the impulses among the Muslims to uprisings similar to the Andijan uprising are possible in the future, as well.”28

Taken as a whole, the document represents the distinctive quintessence of the inconsistent attitudes toward “the Muslim question” that reigned in the moods of the region’s so-called “practical specialists in Islamic studies” (experts), who were the actual authors of the document; thus, the document reflects their personal observations, investigations, and, most importantly, their apprehensions and fears.29 Certainly, their views in one way or another influenced the formation of the positions of some politicians, military leaders and representatives of the administrative system, both in the colony, and in the capital.

The position toward “Muslims,” or “Islam and natives,” expressed in the document, was dual to some extent. On the one hand, we see “fatherly love and care” (in a rather political and messianic sense) toward the Muslim “masses of beloved sons,” and a sincere aspiration to destroy the “walls and chasm” between the Russians and the local people.30 On the other hand, Islam is perceived as “clearly hostile to Christian culture and it excludes any possibility of full moral...
assimilation with us by the present Muslim subjects.”

This sharp estrangement was decisive in defining the main direction of the policy towards “Mohammedanism” (Magometanstvo), which was also offered in the document – the politics of force (power) in combination with the idea of “moral / cultural assimilation” through educational establishments of the colonial administration (first of all, Russian-native schools).

With regard to the first part, i.e. resolving issues with the Muslims by force, the most typical remark of the document (inter alia) is the following: “The Turkestani natives over the course of many centuries became accustomed to the unrestrained autocracy of their former governors... and respect brute force.” Building on this message, the document persistently calls for demonstration to the local population of the constant readiness to resolve “any discontent” with the help of the active armed forces of the tsarist military and to consider the demonstration of force as the most effective means of “suppression and pacification.”

When it comes to the question of “cultural assimilation of the native population,” the document as we can see presents complaints about the failure of the “campaign” and testifies to the Muslims’ fidelity to their religious authorities.

The other documents, to which I want to draw attention, were created by S. M. Dukhovskoy’s administration and offer special significance to the Andijan uprising and to “the Muslim question” raised in association with it. These are secret documents reported by the colonial administration (in Tashkent) under the title: “The General Rules of the Commission on the Question of a Muslim Religious Directorate in the Turkestani Territory” with Appendices (Draft of the

31 Там же. С. 155.
32 On the experience of organizing Russian-native schools in the Volga-Ural region, see: Geraci R. P. Window to the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001. pp. 116-158. The researcher states that these schools (at least when famous Turkologist V. V. Radlov administered them) were not so much agents of Russianization and Christianization as instruments of education for citizenship and secularization: Ibid. p. 157. S. Abashin (with reference to the work by R. P. Geraci) believes that “The policy of establishing Russian-native schools in Turkestan was apparently correlated with the politics of establishing Russian-Tatar schools”: Абашин С. Н. “В. П. Наливкин... ” С. 77, note 87. However, the curricula of the Russian-native schools in Turkestan (both in Russian Turkestan, and in the khanates) were clearly different from the Tatar ones. In order to attract children of the local Muslims (on the initiative of N. P. Ostroumovo), the major portion of schools’ curricula was represented by introductory-level religious (Islamic) sciences, and the Russian language, whereas the ideas of citizenship and moreover, of secularity were not publicized at all: Sulaymonov S. Russ-tuzem maktublari va ularning o’quv dasturlari. Magistrlik malakaviy ish. Toshkent: Toshkent Davlat Sharqshunoslik Instituti, 2006. 20-34-b.
33 “Ислам в Туркестане...” С. 155.
34 See the following quotation: “The Russian administration has in hand the most insignificant means for cultural struggle against the Muslim religion, and for weakening that influence which Muslim schools, qādisīs, īshāns and so forth exert...” “Ислам в Туркестане...” С. 154.
Directorate’s Staff and Draft of “On Muslim educational institutions”). The General Rules were accompanied by a cover letter from the General headquarters of the (Asian) Military Ministry, which contained a revised version of several articles of the Regulations “On the organization of a Directorate for the Religious Affairs of the Muslims in Turkestan” (as a replacement of the 1886 edition of Regulations). It is clear as evidenced by the drafts of the General Rules and the cover letter that the Andijan uprising stimulated debates on the legitimacy of the policy of “ignoring Islam by the Russian administration” and on the forms of “supervisory control of the religious affairs of the Muslims.” The colonial administration of Turkestan insisted on putting an end to the former policy of “non-interference into the religious affairs of the Muslims of Turkestan,” having submitted the results of the work of their own experts on amendments and additions into the former “Regulations on the administration of the Turkestani territory,” produced earlier by the Count Ignatiev’s Commission.

The most important issue, which drew objections from some experts who lived and worked in the southern frontiers of the Empire and were involved in the creation of the above-stated document, was resistance to the emerging proposals for the creation of a Religious Directorate in Turkestan following the example of the Religious Directorates in Ufa and the Caucasus. The documents suggest the creation of a Directorate that would be under direct military-and-administrative control (without any intermediary role for the Muslim elite, such as muftis) over the appointment of mullahs over the opening of mosques, madrasahs, and maktabs, and over supervision of waqf properties. In the opinion of the authors of the Cover Letter and of the commentators from the Military ministry, the establishment of Religious Directorates in Russia and the delegation of powers to “administer their religious affairs,” created conditions for the unification of previously “scattered and separated Muslims” and enabled them “to manage and regulate the affairs of Muslims in an even stronger Muslim spirit,” providing “enabling conditions for the rallying of more Mohammedans.” Should a similar organ (i.e., Religious Directorate) be established in Turkestan, the Russian State would lose the ability to wage a struggle against “the hardcore Mohammedans,” and it would create an undefeatable wall, “through which it will be difficult for Russian culture and ideas of assimilation to penetrate,” etc. As a consequence,

36 Там же, С. 194-201.
37 Там же, С. 198, 200, 202-204.
38 Там же, С. 195, 202-205. In the above-mentioned Report of the General Dukhovskoy, the Religious Directorates of the Muslims of the Empire were blamed for “anti-Russian and anti-Christian propaganda”: “Ислам в Туркестане...” С. 147-148. It was precisely because of this notion that the authors proposed (even before writing the Report) to establish an “Administrative Religious Directorate” subordinate to an administrator (most likely chosen among the experts of the territory).
The 1898 Andijan Uprising and “Muslim Question” in the Russian Empire

as the compilers of the documents remarked in dismay, “the conversion of Muslims to Christianity occurred in exceptional occasions, while reversion to the Muslim faith by those who had once departed from it became rather common.”

Another question that deeply worried the Turkestani experts (and, accordingly, military officials and administrators of the territory) was the Islamization, by Tatar mullahs, of the nomadic and especially the settled “Kirgiz” (i.e., the Qazaqs) who were considered the most convenient target for assimilation because of they remained “indifferent in matters of religion.” The same idea in similar phrases was worded in General S. M. Dukhovskoy’s Report.

The publishers believe that both S. M. Dukhovskoy’s Report and the Note of the Commission “had been put into cold storage” and had no practical consequences. This may correspond to reality, because, at a minimum, strong-arm tactics in relation to the so-called “Muslim frontier regions” were resisted by relatively authoritative state figures such as S. Yu. Vitte, then Minister of Finance. He accused General Dukhovskoy of extreme measures and of a “negative attitude toward the Muslims and to Islam,” and stated that the Andijan events invoked a ghost of “Pan-Islamism.”

Meanwhile, General Dukhovskoy remained as governor for three years and managed to implement a significant part of his own proposals. He punished with utmost severity not only the participants in the Andijan uprising, but innocent people as well, thus demonstrating exactly the kind of “firmness and strength” which he suggested in the documents mentioned above; he proposed that such an approach be raised to the level of a general policy of the Empire with regard to “the Muslims favored by the Russian authority.”

---


41 “Необходимость неотложного принятия мер...” С. 202-203.

42 “Ислам в Туркестане...” С. 152.

43 Introductions to the edition: “Ислам в Туркестане...” С. 141; “Необходимость неотложного принятия мер...” С. 193 (in the first instance – with reference to the above-mentioned work by Р. Р. Литвинов).

44 “Записка С. Ю. Витте по «муслиманскому вопросу», 1900 г.” Арапов Д. Ю. (сост. и авт. вступ. ст., предис. и коммент.) Императорская Россия и мусульманский мир. Москва: Наталис, 2006. С. 242-261. The “Note” was composed in a style of strong criticism (of using force, as suggested by S. M. Dukhovskoy) with argumentative and rational warning. According to the editor’s statement, the document was prepared by experts knowledgeable in Islam and well-informed of state of affairs with “Mohammedanism” in the Russian Empire (Editor's foreword, C. 242).

45 “Записка С. Ю. Витте...,” С. 253-255.
As it relates to the cultural and legal assimilation of local Muslims, the main vector of activity suggested in the aforementioned documents was to intensify the so-called “Russian-native” education and to attempt to legitimize civil courts in the region, which already functioned in other Muslim areas of the Empire. However, the local experts with undisguised disappointment wrote that it was not possible to open such schools on a wide scale and that the number of Muslim educational institutions (disseminating “fanaticism and obscurantism,” according to concepts of that time) was much bigger than the number of the Russian-native ones.46

Thus, the Andijan events again had revived the political, missionary and partly research interest in Islam, or, using the formula of that time, in “the Mohammedan / Muslim question,” thus stimulating the number of publications and assessments by the academic researchers and politicians (I will speak about them below).

Reading the aforenamed documents and especially local publications triggered by the Andijan events leaves the impression that this burst of debates and information was incited by those colonial experts (including N. P. Ostroumov) who radically disagreed with the policies of “consistently ignoring Islam” and “non-interference into their religious affairs,” established by von Kaufman, the first Governor-General of Turkestan.47 The Andijan uprising was most likely used to invoke the artificially created “Islamic threat” in order to lobby for the idea of toughening administrative control in the “Muslim question.”

A more sober estimation, both of the uprising, and of the scale of the “Islamic threat,” in our view, was proposed by S. Yu. Vitte, whose opinion was most likely formulated by the academic researchers of the St. Petersburg School of Oriental Studies. In the “Note” signed by S. Yu. Vitte, uprisings similar to the Andijan uprising are characterized as “small outbursts of religious fanaticism”; the “Note” concludes that “it is unlikely to be correct to consider them as characterizing the attitudes of all Muslims toward the Russian authorities: uprisings owing to ignorance... happened even among the native Russian population.”48 S. Yu. Vitte also quite reasonably believed that the measures offered by S. M. Dukhovskoy could engender hostile attitudes toward Russia not only within CA, but also in the entire Muslim world.49

In fact, Vitte’s accusations of extreme views were aimed not only, and

46 “Ислам в Туркестане...” C. 154, 156, 163. Issues of the “correct education” (certainly, in Russian understanding) of the natives were discussed also by S. Yu.Vitte, a famous minister and politician, who gave a reasoned estimation of the Andijan uprising and governmental measures on the “Muslim question” (see below).
48 “Записка С. Ю. Витте...,” C. 249-250.
49 “Записка С. Ю. Витте...,” C. 254-255.
not primarily, at S. M. Dukhovskoy. His accusations directly concerned also those who were involved in the drawing up of the aforesaid document. Obviously, they were experts similar those who put together then well-known publication on Islam, “The Collection of Materials on Muslims.” The critical Report of Abdulaziz Davletshin (his Muslim name is ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Dawlat-shāh), a famous Muslim officer in imperial service, is much less known. Here the author (he was a captain then) also makes a gentle hint that the ghost of the Andijan events became the reason for the one-sided views of the authors regarding Islam and the Muslims. A. Davletshin, by the way, had openly recognized conventionalism (“routinism”) and the sluggishness of the minds of the majority of the Muslims of that time, including the stagnant forms of Muslim education in CA. However, he called for the separation of the historically developed forms of Islam from “stratifications of the latest interpreters” or from “additions and explanations of the latest interpreters.” He most categorically objected to the thesis in the “Collection” that “the Muslims are the most irreconcilable enemies of Christianity, and that Islam teaches hatred toward all other religions and prescribes the extermination of Christians whenever an opportunity occurs.” A. Davletshin reasonably stated that characterizations of this kind (without proper knowledge of the fundamental principles of Islam) would arouse mistrust and hostility towards the “natives” of CA. Meanwhile such judgments about their religion lead Muslims to have a “feeling... of deep insult, and promotes an even greater increase in historically developed discord.”

Approximately ten years later, discussion of the “Muslim question” was again revived, and this time it was associated with the name of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Council of Ministers (since 1906) P. A. Stolypin. In this case, discussions were stimulated by new challenges to the integrity of the Empire (such was the opinion in the top echelons of power) posed by “Pan-Islamism” and “Pan-Turkism.” Without looking too much into the details of the corresponding documents (published in the aforementioned collection “Imperial Russia...” and addressed to the Council of Ministers), we emphasize the following statements, which are of interest for our purposes.

---

50 Сборник материалов по мусульманству. Том 1. Санкт-Петербург, 1899; Том 2. Ташкент, 1900. The “Sbornik (Collection),” however, included rather neutral and informative articles by V. L. Vyatkin, S. Lapin, V. P. Nalivkin (Editor of Tom 2).


53 Там же. С. 236.

54 Там же. С. 236-237.

The statements here repeat in a weakened but expanded form the provisions and proposals of the above-named documents signed by General Dukhovskoy (even with direct reference to them). We note two important points, which were emphasized in the documents.

1. The documents *de facto* suggest abandoning the politics of “ignoring Islam,” given the growing threat of “Pan-Islamism,” as the compilers believed this would be to the state’s interest. According to Russian diplomats and gendarme services, this ideology came from Turkey, and partly from India.

2. P. A. Stolypin’s message on the surface calls for abandoning “missionism” and suggests a cautious and tactful attitude toward Muslims that would not touch their religious feelings. However, most of the actions and measures proposed by Stolypin’s experts (first of all, by A. H. Kharuzin) *de facto* still bear the spirit of “missionism” and are based on the idea of “accelerating cultural assimilation.”

It appears that due to P. A. Stolypin’s death as a result of a terrorist attack in Kiev (September 1911), the implementation of his Notes was not realized in full. The positive consequence of the second “raising of the Muslim question” was a revival of research in Islamic studies at a higher academic level, and the launching of projects on establishing special courses on Islamic studies as well as the foundation of a journal.

Thus, the new spate of discussions, at the turn of the century, about the “Mohammedan / Muslim question” actually began as a kind of reaction to the Andijan uprising. Turkestani experts such as V. P. Nalivkin and N. P. Ostroumov also ignited interest and discussions. The first of them, along with his personal participation in preparing the above-mentioned “Report” to General Dukhovskoy, wrote an “independent expert” note concerning the “Muslim ghazawāt” that ostensibly threatened Russia. In general, one can sense that in his approach to...
and estimation of the “Islamic threat,” V. P. Nalivkin (at least, for that time) had a dual attitude toward Islam and Muslims. On the one hand, we see interesting publications by this outstanding researcher in which one could sometimes find relatively kind treatment of certain “morals and customs” of the local population. On the other hand, we see that V. P. Nalivkin closely participated in creating the expert notes that chiefly called for the politics of force against Muslims, or indicated the danger of Muslims to Russians, and to Christians and Europeans at large. However, in his many other (later) works, when V. P. Nalivkin took the side of the socialists’ platform, he openly regreted being involved in creating the image of “the dangerous natives.” As S. Abashin reasonably noted, the example of V. P. Nalivkin’s activity and the transformations (sometimes complete about-faces) in his attitude toward Muslims and Islamic culture suggests that the position and estimations of Russian “orientalists” were going through a rather complex (sometimes psychological) metamorphosis. However, the question regarding the degree of influence of the liberal V. P. Nalivkin (and other individuals similar to him, if any) on real policy in Turkestan still remains open. In any case, here and below, our discussions concern chiefly the period before and right after the Andijan uprising, which had an enormous influence on the positions of many Russian experts of the region.

Judging by the above-mentioned documents and by the quantity of the published material concerning the Andijan uprising, it is obvious that local experts of the Turkestani colony (so-called “practical experts in Islamic studies”) intentionally approached both Šarʾīat and other Islamic sciences as alien (and at times as hostile) “rules and standards of life and religion of the natives.” Such an attitude of “mission” (and among certain experts, such as N. P. Ostroumov, a literally missionary approach), as registered in popular publications, and even in some documents of that time, could hardly add to mutual trust or to sympathy and good feelings. Specific characteristics and definitions of the autochthonous people and their way of life (such as “savagery,” “Asiatic barbarians,” “Muslim fanatics,” “foreigners,” “aborigines” and so forth) used in the documents and publications of that time had programmed an estrangement which also in no smaller degree generated mistrust and even a hostile attitude toward Islam and Muslims. And such an attitude was again “heated-up” by the Andijan uprising.


60 See, for example, his interesting work written in co-authorship with his spouse: Наливкин В. П., Наливкина М. В. Очерк быта оседлого туземного населения Ферганы. Казань, 1886. The full bibliography of V. P. Nalivkin (including references to the unpublished works) see in the above-mentioned work by S. Abashin: Абашин С. Н. “В. П. Наливкин...”

61 Ibid.

62 Compare the groundless statements of P. P. Litvinov claiming that V. P. Nalivkin had managed to lower anti-Russian moods and feelings among the “aborigines / туземцев”: Литвинов П. П. Государство и ислам в Русском Туркестане... С. 122–123, 140–142.

63 See, for example, the above-stated A. Davletshin’s reaction to the publication of the first issue of The “Сборник материалов по мусульманству”
At the same time, the so-called “practical experts in Islamic studies” had rather casual knowledge of Islam’s canons and especially of its legal and theological origins. However, they had an excellent knowledge of the practical obedience or non-obedience of the society to these canons and could observe the local forms of practicing Islam, ceremonialism, etc. However, above all, this cohort of experts presumably remained for a long time under the influence of estrangement stemming from the attitude of “mission” implanted by universities of that time, or mostly by courses in military schools, where the same messianic ideas of Russian people having an educational mission for “wild frontiers” clearly reigned, as they did within educated society. Moreover, the presumption of the “barbarity of Mohammedans” that was also present for a long time did not help to overcome such alienation. And only the country-wide influence of liberal-populist and later of socialist ideas seriously changed the positions of Turkestani experts, including their considerations of the “Muslim question,” although they too led to the same idea of “the rapid enlightenment of the dark masses of natives.” Certainly, neither V. P. Nalivkin, nor even the missionary N. P. Ostroumov assumed the absolutely unreal task of the “Christianization” of Muslims. They spoke about education (enlightenment) and “civilization” as they understood them. Quite another matter was that they failed to deliver their understanding to local people. The governmental support and appropriate resources were required for this purpose. It is worth noticing, however, that not even the attempts of the Jadids to “educate” the people were met with enthusiasm by ordinary believers, who always looked suspiciously upon everything new.

In any event, the lengthy residence of Russian experts (such as N. P. Ostroumov) in the very midst of “Mohammedans,” and close contacts and dialogue with them, obviously added no enthusiasm, but rather strengthened the idea among many of them that it was impossible to bring the inert masses of “Mohammedans” to “civilization” (as viewed by Russian experts). The majority of those experts could not overcome alienation, whether their own, or, conditionally speaking, that of the objects of their research and of their failed experiments in cultural assimilation (assimilation was not as large-scaled as they wished then). Perhaps as a result of living in the “alien” environment a specific (most likely psychological) phenomenon emerged: many Russian experts were irritated by the “stubbornness” of the local society, which with difficulty yielded to “cultural assimilation,” did not understand “its blessing,” and remained estranged and even hostile. To judge from the aforementioned documents and publications of that time (the period before and just after the Andijan events), local experts and the administration had clear perceptions (which were very often quite true) that although the Russian people brought peace to the Turkestani inhabitants (by stopping internal wars and collisions between the khanates), the “ungrateful natives” did not give adequate appreciation, and even resorted to

---

64 Абашин С. Н. “В. П. Наливкин...” С. 95-97.
65 See, for example, the above-mentioned works by A. A. Semenov and N. P. Ostroumov.
Disappointment, in the possibility of a “peaceful mission to enlighten the natives,” perhaps, strengthened the very idea of forcing the process through, as, for example, with a cardinal reformation of the educational system. Also, it seems that another outcome was the emergence of proposals that called for more active cultural assimilation. However, the tradition of ignoring the religious life of Muslims adopted since K. P. von Kaufman’s times clearly created an obstacle to the implementation of such proposals. It appears that the Andijan uprising provided local experts and the administration with the “well justified reason” to formulate and submit to the highest authorities their own point of view on the forms of overcoming estrangement, which they experienced most severely because they lived in that milieu, while the natural inerterness and conservatism of the locals caused a continuous psychological and, probably, somewhat ethno-confessional, discomfort.

Obviously, there were also other reasons for V. P. Nalivkin’s or N. P. Ostroumov’s mistrust of Muslims after the Andijan events. As judged by their publications and confidential notes, they were seriously alerted (if not frightened) by the articles of Islamist and reformers from Turkey and India that expressed their reaction to the colonial policy of Europe and partly of Russia. V. P. Nalivkin openly writes about them in the aforementioned “Note,” anxiously stating that the distribution of such journals among Russian Muslims, who were also writing anti-colonial articles, was increasing. It is our opinion, however, that the threat of an “All-Islamic ghazawāt” as seen by the Central Asian “experts in Islam” in such publications could hardly gain the expected magnitude. If we consider the real picture of the Islamic world, which was then torn apart by contradictions, the contrived “religious-sacral” enthusiasm of the articles and appeals of the Islamists could not provide sufficient reason to believe in the “unification of Muslims” and, thereby, in the increasing strength of the “Islamic threat.” It should be noted that “modernism” (of “pan-Islamists” and “pan-Turkists”) was perceived with extreme hostility even within Muslim society and especially among the traditionalists of Central Asia. Moreover, there were no reasons to believe that there was a threat of Muslims coming together under the aegis of the collapsing Turkish Empire.

As a whole, the movements of the “Young Turks”, Tatar “Islahchiler” and other similar religious organizations and communities (in one way or another influencing Turkestan), not quite rightfully referred to as “pan-Islamism” or “pan-Turkism” (or more recently “Jadidism”), never was a unified political or religious movement (it was not destined to become a unified movement after all), and remained an abstract and utopian idea. Moreover, its political potential and

---

66 See the aforementioned “Note” by V. P. Nalivkin, who obviously was affected by the outburst of indignation among the Russian inhabitants of Turkestan caused by the Andijan uprising (see note 59).

67 See his position in the “Muslim question” in his article mentioned above: Остроумов Н. “Колебания во взглядах...”
The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dākhī-Īshān Described by Contemporary Poets

significance, obviously, were strongly exaggerated, as mentioned already, by V. V. Barthold. Meanwhile, the intellectual ferment and discontent with the policy of the agonized Empire was typical not only among the “Muslim frontier regions,” but even among some political elites of St. Petersburg and Moscow. The more active and really dangerous were other (“populist,” socialist and other) movements, which murdered not one, but many city administrators, ministers and even the Emperor.

In any case, the majority of “practical experts in Islamic studies” (or “orientalists”) failed to develop a deep understanding of the fact that the Russians had clashed with a culture that was in critical condition (as was suggested by such orientalists and Islamic studies experts as V. V. Barthold, the archeologist and orientalists V. L. Vyatkin, and later I. Yu. Krachkovsky and V. P. Nalivkin), but was still “different” and “dissimilar.” The indoctrinated view that the culture of people “standing on a lower step of development” should be replaced with “higher” culture was never given up.

However, estrangement (natural and historical) was not limited to a significant portion of the Russian “experts of the region,” particularly those who were in “the midst of Mohammedans.” Starting from as early as the first stages of the Russian colonization and the “conquest of the territory,” local Muslim communities were certainly not going to accept dispassionately the fact of the seizure of their territories. Opposition to the Russians was viewed as a sacral response to “the non-believers, who attacked first” the territory of Islam, and, hence, legitimized jihad, even without its official, so to say, declaration by the imām / khalīfa. At the initial stages the region saw exactly this kind of reaction and here we can recall the movement of the ghāzīs (chiefly young madrasah students) who participated in the confrontation with the Russians in Bukhara, or the armed protests against Khudāyār-Khān before the liquidation of the Kokand Khanate (for example, the “uprising” of Āftābachī), and others. However, these movements were not a serious threat, and never reached a broad scale; indeed, they never could have become such because the ideology of Islam, and Islamic institutions had been deeply weakened as a result of the deep political and moral crisis of the khanates, which then were torn apart by internal and external wars.

69 These uprisings were described by Ahmad Dānish: Tarjimat al-aḥwāl-i amīrān-i Būkhārā-i sharīf az amīr Dāniyāl tā ’asr-i amīr ‘Abd al-Aḥad (Biography of amīrs of holy Būkhārā from amīr Dāniyāl to amīr ‘Abd al-Aḥad). Manuscript of IO AS RUz. № 2095. ff. 22a-23b; 29a-b; Семенов А. [A.] “Покоритель и устроитель Туркестанского края генерал-губернатор К. П. фон Кауфман 1-й (материалы для библиографического очерка).” Кауфманский сборник, изданный со дня смерти покорителя и устроителя Туркестанского края генерал-адъютанта К. П. фон Кауфмана I-го. Москва, 1910. С. XX, LI-LXII (the Collection cited above).
It was very unreasonable to expect that the local Muslims would extend an unconditional welcome to the colonizers. We should bear in mind that the conquest was accomplished by force (though it had some positive consequences for the local population), and moreover there was a centuries-old isolation and estrangement in the region, which could hardly be eliminated in just a few decades. Later on, however, when the policy of “non-interference” and “ignoring the religious life of Muslims” had been put in place, the majority of the local ‘ulamā‘ recognized the territory of Turkestan “as the land of concord / peace with unbelievers” (dār al-‘ahd, dār al-ṣulh), and by doing so they achieved a much greater stability (according to the former wording – “pacification”) than the local administration achieved by undertaking some questionable actions (such as making an inadequate response to the Andijan uprising.)

It should be noted that in the early stages of colonization the perception and recognition of Russian dominion in Turkestan and attempts at assimilation (including legal assimilation) to some measure resembled the perceptions by the Tatar world of Russian domination – i.e., as a system and law spreading exclusively religion (Christianity). Similar to what happened in the Volga region, persistent attempts at assimilation (frankly speaking, ineffective attempts) pushed local communities to resort to self-isolation and to strengthening the role of the Sharī‘at in daily life as the only way of resisting cultural assimilation, which could hardly appear as legitimate (even with requiring the Russian language in madrasahs, or unpopular Russian-native education, etc.).

As mullās among the Tatars and Bashkir (ethnoses that were for a long time targets for Christianization) became very active, it is legitimate to claim that the long-term missionary work of the Orthodox Church (which was less active than the Catholic Church) ended in a fiasco. In subsequent periods the Imperial authorities carried out a more considered policy in missionary attempts by forbidding, at least, forced proselytizing. Given these conditions, sermons (da‘wā) of Tatar and Bashkir mullāhs in the Steppe were much more successful; this is explained not only by affinity of their languages to the Turkic-speaking peoples living there, but also by the fact that people of the Steppe identified themselves (according to the rule “iqrār bi-lisān”) for a long time as Muslims. At the same time we should give credit to the Russian empire for its state policy which often regarded appeals by administrative organs in the “Muslim frontiers”

---


72 Compare: Дюдуьон С. А. “Кадимизм...” С. 59.

73 It was not by accident that it was exactly “Tatars,” who went to “Kirgiz-Kaysak Steppe” in order to “Islamize” the local peoples and gained, as several researchers think, some success: Франк А. “Татарские муллы среди казахов и киргизов...” С. 124-132. The authors of the “Notes” anxiously speak about this indicating it could possibly lead to strengthening of Islam in Turkestan in the context of confrontation with Russia.
for assimilation merely as permissible rhetoric (which could appear in articles expressing the “mission” spirit and the like). Although such a (relatively tolerant) position did not destroy mutual estrangement, it nevertheless bought relative tolerance into everyday life.

Returning to what was said before, we should note that Russian colonization of CA led to the strengthening of Islamic (and to some extent, ethnic) identity among the local people (first of all among traditionalist ʿulamā and other ordinary believers close to them), which developed as a defense reaction.74

It appears that in the steppe areas, this process was really a re-Islamization of the nomads. The compilers of the mentioned documents openly wrote about it too, expressing fears that the Russian Muslims could be adding another 5 million actively Islamized “Kirghiz / Kazakhs of the steppe” (see above). Overall though, such anxiety on the part of the Russian experts and politicians seemed to be seriously exaggerated, insofar as the Tatar mullahs had not managed to carry out really large-scaled and full-fledged Islamization of the Kazakhs and Kirghiz. Moreover, partial Islamization did not create “anti-State moods” in these tribes as expected by the Russian experts.

Appeals for “strengthening Islam and the Sharʿīat,” although in other forms, were also observed in the so-called “settled” or “semi-nomad” areas of Transoxiana, particularly after the liquidation of the Kokand Khanate (1876). This could be seen also in the production of religious works. For example, the compilation and mass copying of elementary theological compendia in the local languages explaining the basic requirements of the Sharʿīat and the required ritual norms (fard) became considerably more widespread (in comparison with the period of khanates) among the Muslim ‘ulamā in Turkestan. These compendia were designed for ordinary believers. In the rather uniform “forewords” (muqaddima) of these compositions, the motives of the authors (frequently anonymous), who complained of existing difficult conditions “for preservation of the pure faith” (mainly in association with more frequent and close contacts of some Muslims with “Russian Christians”), gained particular emphasis. The loss of pure faith, they suggested, would bring the “doomsday” (ākhirat zamān) and therefore, to prevent it, “such-and-such” an author was obliged to remind people again about the religious and moral duties of the true believer.

One such compendium (among the largest, with 92 sheets / 184 pages)

74 As early as the beginning of colonization (prior to the liquidation of the Kokand Khanate in 1876), the corrupt practice of the local colonial administration led to the “animosity of the local population,” and with the foundation of the Governor-Generalship (1865), many inhabitants of Kokand moved to Chinese Turkestan / Xinjiang ( Kashgar, Yarkend and others). See: Семенов А. [А.] “Покоритель и устроитель Туркестанского края…” С. X-XI. Later, when in accordance with K. P. von Kaufman’s initiative a more deliberate policy of “respect for rights of the natives and non-interference into the religious life of the Muslim population” was launched, the refugees voluntarily started coming back to the territory of Turkestan: Там же. С. LXXVI.
belongs to the pen of the renowned historian Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim ibn Mīrzā Raḥīm Tāshkandī. In the foreword, the author directly connects the “weakening of Islam and Muslims” with the liquidation of the Kokand Khanate by the Russians. In his other historical essay, he puts even greater emphasis on the negative (from the author’s point of view) consequences of the Russians’ arrival. Incidentally, in his “History,” compiled several years after the simplified theological compendium mentioned earlier (before 1886), he has a similar foreword in which he gives an apocalyptic interpretation of the “arrival of the Russians.” Most interestingly, the critical review of political and interethnic squabbling (as religiously illegitimate mutinies - fitna) of the time of khanates ends with a quite expected conclusion: the Russians were sent by Allah as punishment for continuous disorder under the khans and direct infringements of the Sharī‘at.

Meanwhile, the author served at the royal court of Khudāyār-Khān, the last khan of Kokand, and witnessed all the political and interethnic disorders (among the Turkic tribes) during the period of the khan’s rule (1865-1875). For instance, he witnessed the uprising of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Āftābī (the former adviser and the confidant of Khudāyār-Khān), which was cruelly suppressed by General Skobelev’s army. This event had seriously affected the author’s attitude and caused enmity toward the Russians. However, the author, being favored by Khudāyār-Khān, forgot to add that actually the khan himself called in the Russian army “for assistance,” as the chief rhetoric of the rebels was associated with anti-Russian slogans and waging ghazawāt against the non-believers.

Mullā ‘Ālim believes that imitating the Russians (in behavior or clothes), and even borrowing their things is a symptom of losing the faith and of the oncoming Apocalypse. At the same time, the traditionalists of that time regarded the emergence of modernist movements among the local Muslims (the same “Jadidism” in different forms), and particularly, their proposals to adopt certain things from the Russians, as “a religious split or cleavage” and as another sign of the nearing “end of the world.”

It is obvious that the fears of authors such as Mullā ‘Ālim about “losing Islam” should be viewed as a position of traditionalists (and a majority of ordinary believers, who followed them), who were afraid of the potential loss of

---

76 Ibid. ff. 1b-2a.
77 Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. *Ansāb al-salāṭīn va tawārīkh-i khawāqīn*. He is known for his phrase “mu‘min-u tarsā arávelash” (Christians and the faithful got mixed).
80 Набиев Р. Н. *Из истории Кокандского ханства...* С. 83-85. See also: Семенов А. [А.] “Покоритель и устроитель Туркестанского края...” С. LVIII-LX.
82 See the introductions to both compositions of Mullā ‘Ālim.

---
the only understandable, clear and sacral, i.e. religiously and morally legitimate instructions, and the order of life. Judging by his works (particularly his “History”), we can say that he perceived new conditions as extremely uncomfortable both morally and “ethnically,” as the new-sprung (Russian / Christian) alternative showed its political and economic superiority by managing easily enough to liquidate the Kokand Khanate, by attracting the religious and economic elite (išhāns, qādīs, mullās and bāys), and by gaining the favor of the corrupt tribal aristocracy. This superiority was perceived by traditionalists as a challenge. The only answer to this challenge, in the opinion of the author, was to avoid “blending with the Russians” (first of all, in a religious sense). In other words, here we see a direct demand from Muslims to preserve their religious identity, i.e., in fact to maintain their former confessional isolation. The general atmosphere of anticipation of the Messiah (Mahdī) became strong among the traditionalists of Russian Turkestan, as had happened in other parts of the Muslim world which, having no real power for resistance, fell under the colonization of the Europeans. Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim himself could not refrain from such feelings, and even named the “exact date” of the Mahdī’s arrival - 1304 / 1886-87 - when the pitiless Messiah would free the Muslims from the unbelievers (kāfīrlārdīn musulmānī khalās ītar). Incidentally, Dūkhī Īshān’s composition «‘Ibrat al-ghāfīlīn» is made in

83 Of course, the ethnic identity of the authors of similar writings (particularly, Mullā ‘Ālim) entails peculiarities, and does not coincide with the modern one. Nevertheless, in the beginning of his work: Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Hidāyat-i mu’mīnīn. ff. 2a-b. Mullā ‘Ālim turns to the sacral history of the Uzbeks (!), describing their “sacred genealogy,” which goes back to the Old Testament Prophets and at the same time, identifies the “best tribes” of the Uzbeks and the “worst of them”: Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Hidāyat-i mu’mīnīn. ff. 4b-17b, 77a-b.

84 Mullā Mīrzā ‘Ālim. Ansāb al-salāfīn va tawārīkh-i khwāqīn. ff. 153 a-b. Incidentally, some innovations (for instance, more comfortable houses and many “Russian things”) were gladly and readily used by many aristocrats in the Kokand Khanate (before its liquidation) and even by Khudāyār-Khan himself, for which they received great criticism from the major part of the clergy, which saw in it the signs of “departure from the faith”: Naḥīn N. H. Из истории Кокандского ханства… C. 78-80. The author of “Ansāb al-salāfīn va tawārīkh-i khwāqīn,” however, does not include his patron Khudāyār-Khan in the list of those who are “departing from the faith” (for their adherence to “things, clothes and the way of life of the non-believers”) and claims just the opposite — that with the arrival of the Russians and the signing of the enslaving agreements with General von Kaufman, the Khan started to “adhere to the Sharī’at and respect the ‘ulamā’ and mullās even more”: f.113a. Probably, such behavior (and appropriate rhetoric) could be instructed by the “ideological measures” of Khudāyār-Khan in order to mitigate the negative responses for his “contacts with the Russians and evident politeness toward them”. Khudāyār-Khan, however, having been enthroned by the Bukharan Amīr Naṣr Allāh during his third reign, lost Bukhara as a source of external guarantee for his throne against growing opposition from the Qipcāqs. As judged by correspondence with the Russians: Naḥīn N. H. Из истории Кокандского ханства… C. 78-80, he saw the Russian troops as a new guarantee for saving his throne and took extremely unpopular measures to fill up the treasury in the economically exhausted Khanate. As a result of Russian support for the unpopular khan, the local people, in the words of A. P. Khoroshkin, an outstanding expert on then-current affairs, began to “scold us (=the Russians) to our face and make our ears burn” (cited from: Naḥīn N. H. Из истории Кокандского ханства… C. 83).

the same spirit, and therefore it is possible and necessary to consider his work in
the same line of the aforementioned compendia of traditionalists, who appeal to
ordinary Muslims in an attempt to “save their faith.” The composition is written
in a fairly traditional fashion and very easy-to-understand poetic form. Here we
see that the author, with the same motives as those of Mullā Ālim, harshly
criticizes the religious aristocracy, bāys, and others “corrupted by the Russians.”

In fact, the clichés used by both authors in criticism of the religious
aristocracy and the political elite are well known from “admonitory literature,”
poetry and even historical works written before Russian colonization (for
example, Ḩāmid Dānish’s writings, or the works of Ḥakīm-khān, an eminent
historian-chronicler). After the Russian conquest (partial colonization and the
establishment of a protectorate over two khanates), criticism found “a second
breath” and much a clearer external trigger. This time the religious puritan
rhetoric among the traditionalists became amplified, and all precedents of “bad
morals and manners” were linked with the Russians (“aliens,” “non-believers”),
or with the religious aristocracy and the khans “corrupted by the Russians.”

In any case, an intensification of this sort of rhetoric during the early
days of Russian colonization can be seen as a specific reaction to the arrival of
the “foreigners,” and as an understandable and legitimate attempt at
self-preservation (of course, in a sense as it was understood by the majority of
“traditionalists” and other ordinary Muslims, who were under their influence). As
a result, this particular reaction, obviously, could only create more reasons for
open estrangement from the “disbelievers,” and this estrangement could not be
eliminated in just a few decades, as the colonial authorities and particularly the
Russian experts in the “Muslim question,” wished.

Strengthening and even restoring the functions of the Islamic institution
can be directly and indirectly attributed, surprisingly, to the colonial authorities.
First of all, internal civil strife and the khans’ mutual raids, which at the end were
leading to a decline of the majority of Muslim institutions, were eliminated. The
most affected institutions were the traditional establishments (like mosques,
maktabs and madrasahs), and their number, despite being somewhat ignored
(and possibly due to that) by the colonial administration, multiplied during
Russian colonization (particularly in provinces). The same could be said about

86 Бабаджанов Б. М. “Дукчы Ишан и Андижанское восстание...” С. 257-264.
87 See, for example: Мухаммад Хакимхан [тура] ибн Махмуд [тура]. Мунтахаб ат-тавarih. Мухтаров А. (Подготовка факсимильного текста, введение и указатели). В 2
книгах. Книга вторая. Душанбе: Дониш, 1985; Muntakhab al-tawārīkh, Selected history, Vol. 2,
by Muhammad Hakīm-khān, Kawahara Yayoi and Haneda Ko’ichi (eds.). Tokyo: Research Institute
for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa. 2006.
88 See other early examples: Allworth E. “The Changing Intellectual and Literary Community.”
89 Остроумов Н. “Колебания во взглядах...” С. 146.
the qāḍī courts, which were preserved in old fashion, though with some control by colonial authorities, and which even managed to spread their influence on poorly Islamized Turkic tribes of the Ferghana valley like Qipchaqs, Qurama and the Qirghiz.⁹⁰

Later however, as a more cautious and considerate policy toward the local population continued (despite separate attempts by some experts and officials to strengthen control over the sphere of the “Muslim question,” and with relation to the Andijan uprising), the quantity of “anti-Russian works” written by the traditionalists, decreased sharply. On the contrary, we see emergence of compositions in which the authors speak of the necessity to use the achievements of the Russian people and call for more frank and open contacts with them.⁹¹ Moreover, some traditionalists started praising the “White Tsar” in their ḥuṭbas, while others still spoke against him⁹².

However, one additional point is indisputable. The Andijan uprising, with all its tragic consequences (because of its artificially inflated “threat”), remained a local event, even in terms of the Ferghana valley (Andijan and its vicinity), and no one in the colony or in the khanates gave substantial support to it. On the contrary, we see quite numerous accusations that “illiterate Ḥishān from among the common people” had broken the existing “peaceful fatwā with the White tsar.” Most importantly, as we have stated in our previous publications,⁹³ such characteristics came out of the mouths of historians and statesmen, who could not be suspected of their sympathy to the Russians. Most likely, these developments were the result of the rather sound policy initiated by K. P. von Kaufman (which also addressed, in its the widest sense, the “Mohammedan” question, as the sorest point.)

The Andijan uprising, nevertheless, triggered in many Russian experts of Turkestan and the colonial administration another surge of mistrust toward the Muslims (despite the influence of liberalism in the understanding of that time), and reignited earlier fears; for a long time it was mentioned in numerous scientific and particularly in popular publications as a clear example of the “unreliability of Muslims,” their wrong reaction to the “high mission of Russia,” etc. The responses of the majority of Muslims, on the other hand, were quite different, but by no means servile. As judged by many verses selected and presented by Erkinov here, such reaction fully corresponds to an old tradition which recommended against irritating a stronger opponent, and praised searching for compromise with him (“fatwā with the White Tsar”). The violation of a compromise was perceived as a religiously illegitimate action.

⁹⁰ Бакиров Ф. Казийские суды в Туркестане до Октябрьской революции 1917 года (unpublished article, Library of IO AS RUz, 1968).
⁹¹ See our aforementioned article: Babadjanov B. “Russian Colonial Power in Central Asia...” And certainly, the Jadids’ publications are a special case.
⁹² Erkinov A. Praying For and Against the Tsar: Prayers and Sermons in Russian Dominated Khiva and Tsarist Turkestan. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004 (ANOR 16).
⁹³ Бабаджанов Б. М. “Дукчи Ишан и Андижанское восстание...” C. 277.
And the last point. Although the plans of cultural assimilation of Russian Turkestan were not implemented on a large scale due to many reasons, the political (imperial) integration of the local elite of all levels was accomplished to a certain extent. For example, the feeling of being a part of Russia led to emergence, among the majority of the local believers, of specific way of naming themselves (for instance, the “Russian Muslims,” and then the “Soviet Muslims”\textsuperscript{94}). Moreover, during two Russian revolutions a lot of political movements and parties (both Islamic and nationalist in orientation) included in their political programs calls for a different degree of autonomy (including one with an independent army and currency), but none of them, at least from the territory of Turkestan, demanded full withdrawal from Russia (the RSFSR in that period).\textsuperscript{95}

Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov
Institute of Oriental studies, AS RUz,
Tashkent

\textsuperscript{94} In the Soviet period there was a journal “Sovet Sharq musulmonlari” (“Muslims of the Soviet East” – since 1947) with translation (since 1965) into different languages.

\textsuperscript{95} Агзамходжаев С. История туркестанской автономии... С. 18-42 and further. The inertia of the political integration with Russia appeared quite long-lasting and continued practically until the last years before the collapse of the USSR. When M. Gorbachev initiated a nationwide referendum asking whether to maintain the USSR (1989), the largest number of affirmative votes came from the southern Soviet republics. Even the former Central Asian Islamic High Council for the Affairs of Religion, Muslim Spiritual Authority (SADUM headed then by the new mufti – the deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf) called the believers to poll their votes for preservation of the State of the Soviets, adding, however, a requirement for greater freedoms for believers.