Tuesday 23th November 2010
The University of Tokyo (Hongo Campus), Sanjo Conference Hall
08:40-09:00 Reception of participants
09:00-09:10 Introduction by Katsumi Fukasawa (University of Tokyo, leader of
the research project)
09:10-10:40 Febe Armanios (Middlebury College, Vermont, USA): “Negotiating
Religion and Identity: Coptic-Muslim Interchange in Ottoman Egypt”.
Commented by Asuka Tsuji (University of Tokyo)
10:40-10:50 Coffee break
10:50-12:20 Benjamin Arbel (Tel Aviv University, Israel): “Roman Catholics and
Greek Orthodox in Venetian Overseas Colonies during the Early Modern
Commented by Hiromi Saito (Shinshu University) and Yutaka Horii (Doshisha
13:30-15:00 Maria Ghazali (University of Nice, France): “The Moriscos: Life and
Tragedy of a Spanish Minority Expulsed at the Beginning of the 17th Century”.
Commented by Shiro Miyatake (Tokyo Friends School)
15:00-15:10 Coffee break
15:10-16:40 Martine Acerra (University of Nantes, France): “La présence
protestante dans la marine française avant et après la Révocation de l’édit de
Nantes. Aspects politiques et sociaux”.
Commented by Katsumi Fukasawa
16:40-16:50 Coffee break
16:50-18:20 Shunsuke Katsuta (Gifu University): “Possibilities of Religious
Reconciliation in Early Nineteenth-Century Ireland”.
Commented by Kei Nasu (International Christian University)
18:20-18 :30 Discussion and conclusion, by Katsumi Fukasawa
I. Summary of papers:
1. Febe Armanios (Middlebury College, Vermont, USA): “Negotiating Religion and Identity: Coptic-Muslim Interchange in Ottoman Egypt”.
Pilgrimage to Jerusalem constitutes one of the most important and public manifestations of Christian religious expression within the Ottoman Middle East. The execution of this practice among Egypt’s Coptic Christians in the early eighteenth century—costly and precarious as it was—reflects a moment when laymen and clergy negotiated with each other and with Muslim religious and political authorities in the course of preserving this ritual. The close ties between Coptic lay elites, known as the archons, and local Egyptian power-holders, cultivated throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, helped sustain Coptic religious practices even in the face of laws curbing their public expression.
This paper explores the process of negotiation, cooperation, and occasional discord which emerged as Copts attempted to make their annual pilgrimage from Cairo to Jerusalem. In its particular manifestation during the early eighteenth century, a time of cultural resurgence for the Copts, the pilgrimage illustrates connections to age-old Christian traditions but also exposes commonalities with the annual hajj to Mecca. The pilgrimage, as studied through Coptic and Muslim sources, shows how lay and clerical elements collaborated with each other and with Muslim authorities in order to sustain specific Coptic rites, to uphold a sense of communality, and to foster a Coptic presence in Jerusalem.
By joining in common religious practice with other Eastern Orthodox communities, moreover, the pilgrimage raised the Copts’ profile among Christians in the Ottoman world. Indeed, for Copts, this ritual culminated on Easter eve inside the most revered Christian shrine, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, where Greek, Armenian, Syrian, and Coptic Orthodox Christians gathered for the miracle of “Holy Fire.” Overall, the pilgrimage allowed Coptic clergymen to participate in ceremonies that demonstrated and enhanced their authority. The archons capitalized on their political connections and emerged as financiers and facilitators of this important tradition. Overall, this important tradition wrought blessings to pilgrims, replenished their faith, and renewed their sense of religious identity within Ottoman society.
2. Benjamin Arbel (Tel Aviv University, Israel): “Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox in Venetian Overseas Colonies during the Early Modern Period”.
Venetian overseas possessions were inhabited by Greeks, Slavs and Albanians, to mention only the main ethnic/cultural groups, who used different languages and, unlike the Venetians, were not Roman Catholics. Consequently in that part of the Venetian State, problems related to religion constituted a central factor in the relations between the ruling power, its representatives and its Catholic subjects on the one hand, and the majority of the local population on the other. This paper examines this relationship in the period running from the final demise of Byzantium (1453) until the beginning of the long war with the Ottoman empire (1645-69) that end by the Ottoman conquest of Crete.
In most of Venice’s overseas territories, such as Crete, Cyprus the Ionian Islands and other territories located in nowadays Greece, Greek Orthodox constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. Venice, however, was Roman Catholic, and so where the Venetian settlers. A third group, numerically small but significant all the same, were the Uniates, i.e. Greek Orthodox believers who, after the Union of Florence (1439) recognized the position of the Pope as a supreme head of the Christian Church. On the other hand, in the Venetian territories in Dalmatia and Albania, particularly in the urban centres, Catholics were the majority, whereas the Orthodox Christians were not Greek, but Slavs.
The organization of religious institutions in Venetian territories did not follow a uniform model, but was rather a consequence of the circumstances in which each territory had been annexed to the Venetian empire. Thus, in some territories, such as Cyprus, Cephalonia, Zante and Kythera, there were Greek-Orthodox bishops functioning under the control of the Roman Catholic ones, whereas in other territories, such as Crete, Corfu, and the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia and Albania, there were only Roman bishops and archbishops. In the latter colonies, Orthodox priests (both Greeks and Slavs) depended for their ordination on bishops in other territories. In the former, Orthodox prelates had to recognize the supremacy of Roman Catholic ones and the authority of the papacy.
Since 1439, this colonial relationship in the religious sphere could also be defended on the ideological level as an implementation of the union of the Roman and Orthodox Churches declared in the council of Florence. This event, often described in modern historiography as a failure, proved to be a comfortable arrangement for Venice, as a Catholic state ruling over large Orthodox populations. It also served as an incentive for Orthodox believers and prelates who were ready to recognize papal supremacy in return for a more favourable attitude on the part of the ruling authorities.
The position of the Roman Church concerning non-Catholics living in territories ruled by Catholic states was of great importance in this relationship. Papal attitudes in this respect can be characterized as tolerant in the pre-Tridentine period, and increasingly intolerant in the following phase, the coincided with the Counter Reformation. Whereas Renaissance popes, such as Leo X, Clement VII and Paul III issued bulls recognizing and even enhancing the autonomy of the Greek-Orthodox Church in Venetian territories, from the mid-sixteenth century onwards, Papal attitude changed radically, adopting a policy that tended to regard as illegitimate the very existence of non-Catholic rites in the Catholic World.
Whereas at the during the second half of the sixteenth century, one can still encounter occasional expressions of pragmatism in Tridentine and papal decisions, such as the agreement to take into consideration Venetian interests in the formulation of the canon on matrimony in the Council of Trent, or the concession given by the papacy to Catholics in Venetian overseas territories, following the Gregorian reform of the calendar, to celebrate religious processions together with Orthodox believers according to the a old calendar, in the early seventeenth century the autonomy of non-Catholic rites in Venetian territories, besides several other issues, brought Venice and the papacy into open conflict. Venice’s success in withstanding this conflict assured not only a stability in inter-confessional relationships in its stato da mar, but also, further facilitated the process of Hellenization in those territories in which Greeks constituted the great majority of the population.
Venetian civil authorities repeatedly intervened in a continuous effort to prevent religious tension from threatening political and social stability in its overseas possessions. This policy became more evident from the mid-sixteenth century onwards, when Catholic prelates tried to implement the decisions of the Council of Trent in the dioceses of Venice’s overseas territories. In pursuing such a policy, Venice offers a model of the utmost religious toleration that an Italian Catholic state could afford in the age of Counter-Reformation.
3. María Ghazali (University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis, France): “The Moriscos: Life and Tragedy of a Spanish Minority Expelled at the Beginning of the 17th Century”.
The Moriscos are the Spanish Muslims converted to Christianity at the beginning of the 16th century. Between 1609 and 1614, 300,000 Moriscos were expelled by the king of Spain, Philip III, that is 4% of the all population of Spain. The expulsion was carried out in several stages. About 220,000 embarked from the Spanish ports to North Africa, France or Italy; the others left to France across the Pyrenees Mountains, but were also expelled after the assassination of Henry IV (1610). 80,000 Moriscos settled in the Tunis Regency, 120,000 in Algiers and 70,000 in Morocco. There, some Moriscos joined Barbary Corsairs, but most of them continued exercising their professions in agriculture and handcraft.
But the 1609 Moriscos tragedy originated more than a century earlier. In 1492, the Reconquista was over when the Catholic Monarchs took over Granada, the last Muslim kingdom of the Iberian Peninsula. They pledged to respect the treaty which guaranteed the Muslim population (about 150,000) the right to observe their religion, follow their judiciary and educational system, and pursue their ways and customs. Those promises were short-lived: in 1499, many were forcedly christened, mosques were turned into churches, and copies of the Koran and several manuscripts of great value were burned. These violent acts trigged the first Granada rebellion (1500-1501) which was crushed. The Catholic Monarchs seized this opportunity to invalidate the treaty, considering that their new subjects (Mudéjares) committed high treason against their holy persons. In 1501, conversion became compulsory in Granada and was extended in 1502 to the Mudéjares of Castile.
In the Crown of Aragon, the Catholic Monarchs could not impose conversion because of the Fors (royal privileges granted to the Cities and Courts that limited the power of the king), and because of the Nobility which considered the Muslims living in their dominions as their vassals. However, in 1520-22 during the Revolt of the Brotherhoods (Germanies) in the kingdom of Valencia, many Mudéjares were forcedly baptized. Emperor Charles V extended this measure in 1526 to all Mudéjares of the Crown of Aragon, and issued an edict forbidding Islam, the use of Arabic, and other customs. Meanwhile, Moriscos were allowed 40 years to comply with their new religion.
Starting 1526, there were officially no more Muslims in Spain, but many went on practicing secretly. Thus, for the next 40 years, the Spanish Inquisition prosecuted the Moriscos while major campaigns of evangelization were going on. In 1566, Philip II renewed the 1526’s edict which gave rise to a new Moriscos insurrection in Granada (1568-1570). The revolt was crushed by Don Juan de Austria. Around 80,000 Moriscos were deported inland. These events had heavy consequences: the social and economic gap between Moriscos and Christians became wider; Moriscos felt they were discriminated against and hated by Christians who accused them of preparing for a total rising and for conspiring with the enemies of Spain (Turks and Huguenots).
A century after the compulsory conversions, the evangelization and assimilation of the Moriscos were a failure: on the one hand, Christians rejected them, just as they did with the Conversos – the Statutes of Purity of Blood were in total expansion in Spain, especially since the second half of the 16th century-; on the other hand, the majority of Moriscos refused to become Christians.
Expulsion was decided by Philip II in the 1580’s, but for political and religious reasons was only implemented by Philip III. During the 16th century, the Christian states were fighting against both the Ottoman Empire and the Protestants. At the beginning of the 17th century, Philip III needed to improve his image: Spain was losing its predominance in Europe and experiencing domestic problems. In 1609, Philip III took advantage of the Twelve-Year Truce to expel the Moriscos. Officially, they would represent a danger for Spain, but actually they were punished for refusing to submit to Christian laws and for their loyalty to the faith of their ancestors. What we don’t know is how many Moriscos wanted to continue observing Islam and how many were assimilated. Nonetheless, they were all considered as belonging to the Moriscos race, thus enemies of the Christians. The stand in 1609 was the same as in 1492: those who were expelled were the descendants of Muslims who had “invaded” Visigoth Christian Spain. The Reconquista (re-conquest of land “taken” from the Christians) ended only at the beginning of the 17th century.
4. Martine Acerra (University of Nantes, France): “The Presence of Protestants in the French Navy before and after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes: Political and Social Aspects”.
The originality of the professional group which is at stake here—namely seamen—should be emphasized from the outset, at a time when the French population in the days of Louis XIV was mainly rural, with 90% of the 18 to 20 million subjects living in the countryside. « Gens de mer » ―the basis of this study―formed a small minority of 70,000 men. The proportion of Huguenots was more or less important in this group, depending on the geographical areas and the different periods. Historians agree that there were roughly 1,100,000 followers of Protestantism in 1628 ; only 800,000 remained at the beginning of the reign of Louis XIV, and a mere third of this population, i. e. 250,000 people lived on the coasts, with an unequal distribution according to the maritime provinces. Thus, as recent historical research shows, the proportion of Protestant seamen ranged between 50 to 70% of registered sailors in the regions which were most influenced by the Reformation (like the Aunis-Saintonge), whereas there were only a few limited Protestant communities in other areas (like Bordeaux in Aquitaine or Le Croisic in Brittany). To sum up, one might cautiously suggest that there were 18,000 to 20,000 Huguenot seamen.
The maritime environment was receptive to the Protestant influence, thanks to constant contact with the countries of the Reformation, which traditionally were economic partners of French merchants and fishermen. Besides, lack of space on the ship, long voyages and numerous dangers contributed to the support of the new religion practised on board by a few crew members or the captain. The constant fear of death and the lack of moral support led helpless seamen to follow the Protestant rite. Finally, there were remarkable, highly-skilled professionals in the ranks of “gens de mer”, which soon aroused the interest of the young Louis XIV. Because of their economic, social, military role, the contribution of seamen to the national prosperity was invaluable. The real policy of the King towards Protestant seamen is thus inseparable from its context, consisting in very small numbers of seamen, and remarkable professional skills.
Life on board is worth being studied, and one should distinguish between the merchant navy and the royal navy. In spite of a few tensions—heated debates, fights and insults—all in all, the two denominations seem to have always peacefully coexisted, during most far-away commercial voyages. Both religions were practised on board, one at the front of the ship, the other at the stern, and a kind of mutual tolerance characterized the situation. During Louis XIV’s reign, numerous attempts at limiting Protestantism led to the Edict of 1681, which officially imposed Catholicism—Protestantism did not disappear for all that, but its presence was more discreete.
In the navy, professional skills were paramount, for crews as well as for captains. Religion was not a criterion of selection. Crews and staff were thus « naturally » mixed, according to boardings and original naval dockyards, and it was impossible to determine the captain’s role in potential choices on the basis of religion.
From 1661 on, the adage « une Foi, une Loi, un Roi » (one Faith, one Law, one King) bore witness to the King’s determination as far as his absolute power and religious unity in the kingdom were concerned. Restrictions towards seamen were sometimes specific to their trades. As early as 1669, and mainly 1682, they were forbidden to leave the kingdom, or they would be sent to the galleys. In fact, the coercive measures enacted until the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, were implemented with a certain looseness, at least for some time. The demands of the war and the navy were top-priorities. Officers, ordinary ratings, seamen, carpenters were kept on their jobs, even if they did not abjure their religion (cf the case of Duquesne, for example).
Then came harder days. The free practise of the Protestant religion, officially taking place at the front of warships, had first to be more and more discreet, before being completely forbidden. At the same time, the King created the corps of chaplains in 1683, so as to impose the domination of the Catholic faith on board. The great Edict of 1689 officially determined their roles with crews.
As the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes drew near, the methods used to force Huguenots to convert, while trying to avoid their flight out of the kingdom, were of two kinds : the gentle method came down to having recourse to persuasion or economic advantages, while the harsh method consisted of surveillance, dragonnade, forced conversions, sentences. A few preferential treatments remained, especially for New Converts, so as to prompt other Huguenots to abjure their religion. But humiliations and violence flourished, particularly when local leaders zealously tried to get conversions at all cost. Military interventions became more and more numerous in pockets of resistance, in particular on the coast of Charente, which resulted in well-known consequences : occasional conversions, attempts at emigrating, avoidance strategies. Roughly 3,000 to 5,000 seamen are thought to have left the kingdom then, thus significantly tapping the naval fleet. The leniency which followed tells much about the royal policy from1686 onwards. The State chose to close its eyes. The royal legislation was often stretched.
Like other workers, who were protected by their economic value, Huguenot seamen enjoyed a preferential treatment. The cause of this situation was nothing but the haunting dread of seeing highly-talented people leave the kingdom. As far as religious practices on board were concerned, peaceful coexistence prevailed. Knit together by tough trades, seamen were aware of their efficiency as a group. They respected each other. The cohesion of the socio-professional group went far beyond religious differences.
5. Shunsuke Katsuta (Gifu University, Japan): “Possibilities of Religious Reconciliation in Early Nineteenth-Century Ireland”
My paper tries to analyse possibilities of religious reconciliation, not in the context of Ireland alone, but in the context of the whole British Isles in the early nineteenth century. At the time of the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801, it was expected that the Union would bring about not only a new constitutional relationship between the two countries but also more harmonious relationships between the religious groups in the British Isles.
Why was it necessary to improve interdenominational relationships in the newly formed UK? The biggest cause was the Irish rebellion of 1798. Because the rebellion was an attempt to construct a separate Irish republic, the government had to strengthen the connection between the two countries. Also, because Ireland had a large-scaled rebellion on its hands, reform of Irish society came to the agenda. Broadly speaking, two types of attitude existed towards the reform of Ireland. The first was to construct a new and common UK national identity, as the preceding Union of England and Scotland had successfully forged a new identity of Britishness. For this new identity, there should be no religious divide throughout the British Isles. Thus emerged the necessity of improving interdenominational relationships. The second attitude of reform was to ‘civilise’ the lesser partner of the Union, i.e., Ireland, particularly its Catholic population, and to make them ‘British’. However, this second attitude was, for the moment, a subsidiary one and came to the fore only after the failure of the first. Both attitudes were seen not only in government circles but also among the public.
Looking at the religious condition of Ireland, there is evidence to suggest that Catholics and Protestants were finding ways to live as good neighbours on a daily basis since the late eighteenth century. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that Ireland in 1800 was a divided country. While the Roman Catholics constituted about 80% of the total population, they were a decided ‘minority’ in their social and political status. The ruling elite of the country were Protestants, particularly Anglicans, who almost totally monopolised the land and the public posts, both central and local. In addition, Catholics and Protestants were not on the same legal footing, as there existed certain anti-Catholic laws. The process of Protestants’ gaining their elite status began chiefly in the seventeenth century, and their status was consolidated by the Glorious Revolution in Ireland.
There existed, in theory, three possibilities for the improvement of interdenominational relationships in Ireland. The first was to make Ireland a completely Protestant country by converting the Catholics into Protestants. The second was, conversely, to make Ireland a ‘Catholic’ country by redistributing the land and the public posts in proportion to their number vis-à-vis Protestants. Although these two measures were too drastic for the government of the day, the third option was practical, i.e., placing Catholics and Protestants on the same legal footing by removing the anti-Catholic laws. This measure, which was a prerequisite for a common UK identity, had a wide range of support from various quarters of political and intellectual circles in Britain and Ireland. In fact, the British government intended to put the measure into effect immediately after the formation of the United Kingdom.
Considering the fact that the religious divide in Ireland was created principally by politics in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, what was meant by politics had changed dramatically in the course of the eighteenth century. However, what happened in reality betrayed the government’s intension, because of King George III’s adamant refusal to place Catholics on the same legal footing as Protestants.
This failure blocked the perspective of creating a UK identity, leaving the second attitude of reform, i.e., civilising Ireland, to take precedence. The religious implication of this attitude was to make Ireland a completely Protestant country. This measure, a final settlement of the religious problem in Ireland, was beyond the scope of the government, as has been seen above. However, there were those who undertook the task, i.e. the Evangelicals.
Evangelicals appeared in Ireland in the early years of the Union. While they were essentially independent of the government, their attempt at conversion disturbed the delicate balance in the interdenominational relationships on a daily basis. As a result, Ireland after 1820 was to see a sharp resurgence of sectarian hostility, affecting all levels of society, in spite of various efforts of the government to halt it.
Does the Irish case show the limitations, as well as effects, of politics in religious matters?
II. Comments on papers:
1. Asuka Tsuji (The University of Tokyo, Japan): comment to Dr. Armanios.
Dr. Armanios’s paper on the pilgrimage ritual of the Copts in Egypt has put forth many interesting aspects that we can explore. I would like to comment on two points related to the project.
My first point concerns the agency of the minority. What I found most surprising in the presentation was Dr. Armanios’s vivid description of the Coptic archons obtaining the necessary permits for the pilgrimage. Influential Copts who were employed in the households of the ruling elite could negotiate and obtain permissions from the appropriate Muslim authorities. They managed to keep influential and sympathetic Muslim patrons on their side. The Copts were not passive victims of Islamic rule. While they were cautious about not antagonizing the Muslims, they managed to effectively reinforce their position in the religious life of the Egyptians by performing this highly public ritual—the pilgrimage. In fact, this was done so effectively that although in some cases they perturbed the Muslim populace; I believe I would not be wrong in presuming that this pilgrimage was accepted and, in fact, respected by the Muslims, because it did share similarities with the Muslim pilgrimage. We generally tend to perceive the reconciliation of opposing religions as a movement from the powerful to the oppressed—the rulers of the elite of the society showing tolerance. However, Dr. Armanios’s paper revealed that the weak could also manipulate and achieve some sort of reconciliation.
I will now proceed to my second point, which concerns the mutual influence of different religions or different churches. The Copts did not live in isolation; their pilgrimage rituals were not something unique in their cultural heritage. Indeed, as Dr. Armanios discussed, their pilgrimage shared many similarities with the Muslim hajj. Furthermore, regarding the collective religious rituals held in Jerusalem, I was very interested in the Easter ceremonies that the Greek, Armenian, and Coptic pilgrims participated in. This interchange of rituals held in Jerusalem might only be a specific case, but it is interesting to observe such mutual exchanges.
2. Hiromi Saito (Shinshu University, Japan) and Yutaka Horii (Doshisha University, Japan): comment to Dr. Arbel.
Prof. Arbel said as following: In this report, Stato da Mar of the Venetian Empire from the mid 15th (the partition of the Byzantine Empire in 1453) to the mid 17th (the loss of Crete in 1669) century is considered. In these overseas territories called Stato da Mar, the ruler was the Catholic state Venice, and its main subjects were Greek-Orthodox Christians. To maintain these territories, Venice adopted practical and tolerant attitudes toward her non Catholic subjects. Even the popes with the intolerant spirit of Counter Reformation could not remove such her traditional policy. Considering this phenomenon in a wider European perspective, it can be said that Venice was a model of the utmost religious toleration in the early Modern Times. He points out that to maintain Stato da Mar, it was necessary to have such tolerance to avoid the complaint of her subjects, and Venice operated the religious matters from the political viewpoint, not from the spiritual viewpoint. This explanation is very convincing.
But I want to ask a small question. To make up such Venetian tolerance, did not influence her long experience of commercial relationships with non Catholics (Orthodox Christians) and non Christians (Muslims and Mongolians)? For a long time, Venetians were accepted and traded in the Byzantine Empire and the Muslim Countries, and moreover in the Mongolian Khanates, all of which were situated outside of her Stato da Mar. It seems that Byzantines, Muslims and Mongolians had generally tolerance toward the merchant believers of different religions from their own. To carry out such international or intercontinental commerce, it became almost necessary to be tolerant toward the different religions, at least in the case that their believers were neither intolerant nor fanatic. Should this long experience make the Venetian basic mentality that would be an element in the formation of Venetian tolerance in her Stato da Mar? (Hiromi Saito)
The paper of Prof. Arbel treats of the Stato da Mar or the Venetian overseas colonies on which Catholic and Orthodox worlds were overlapping, therefore it presents important case study concerning the matters of multi-denominational relations. The Venetian authorities and the Catholic clergy controlled the Orthodox clergy in the overseas colonies and limited their autonomy. However, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the Roman popes took attitudes toward the Greek Orthodox clergy and believers to recognize their peculiar rights. But, in the second half of the century, the Counter Reformation popes began to take intolerant policy toward the Orthodox. Against that, Venice, for maintaining stable rule, stood in a position of guarding the rights of Orthodox which had been previously established. This practical and relatively high tolerance in the Venetian overseas colonies was contrastive with the Western European countries which experienced religious conflicts and persecutions.
The case study of the Venetian overseas colonies seems to be useful from the viewpoint of the Islamic area which can be characterized by the multi-religious coexistence. It is without saying that the frameworks of coexistence were different between each other. In the Ottoman Empire, Muslims, Christians, and Jews coexisted under the dhimmi system which had been established in the early Islamic age. On the other hand, the coexistence of Catholics and Orthodox in the Venetian territories was based on the agreement of the council of Florence and the practical reasons for ruling. However, in both sides, the maintaining of religious coexistence was closely related to the stability of social order. Moreover, considering that early modern Venice accepted Jews, Orthodox, and Muslims from outside and the overseas colonies were the points of the Levant trade, Venice does not seem to be unrelated with the Ottoman society. Therefore, it seems that the case study of Venetian overseas colonies is worth being considered also from the viewpoint of multi-religious relations in the Levantine area. (Yutaka Horii)
3. Shiro Miyatake (Tokyo Friends School): comment to Dr. Ghazali.
I have been studying the history of Jews in the Ottoman Empire, especially the Nasi family which was a famous Marrano family. So I would like to compare the Moriscos and Jews. In the Iberian Peninsula, Moriscos and Jews could maintain their lives in three ways:
1) By converting to Christianity completely. For this reason some Marranos even agreed with auto de fé.
2) By not converting to Christianity immediately, but when it became clear that it would be impossible to keep their faith, by reluctantly converting to Christianity.
3) By Taqiya: converting to Christianity only on the surface.
The 3rd way was utilized by a lot of Muslims and Jews, because it enabled them to maintain their wealth and land, and especially their own faith.
The reasons for the expulsions of Jews and Moriscos were different. Jews were expelled because they were thought to adversely influence the Marranos. Namely Jews were thought to hinder the real conversion of the Marranos. Almost all Marranos also were suspected to be crypto-Jews.
On the other hand, Moriscos were not thought to be real Christians. So 300,000 Moriscos were expelled in 1609.
After the expulsion, Jews emigrated to the Low Countries and the Islamic world. Some were welcomed by the Jewish communities there, but others were not so welcomed. Some Marranos were especially hated by the Jewish communities in the Ottoman Empire, because they abandoned their faith so that they might protect their own lives, wealth and business chances.
The Moriscos also were not always welcomed in the Islamic world. It was doubted whether they were truly Muslims, they could not speak Arabic, and they kept to the way of life they had led in the Iberian Peninsula. Therefore some Moriscos could not assimilate into Islamic Africa, especially in Tunez, Bizerta and Hawmat-al-Andalus (the area of Andalusia) in the present Tunisia.
I would now like to ask one question on the difference between Moriscos and Jews. Moriscos could stay in the Iberian Peninsula in the 16th century for the political, economic, and religious reasons Prof. Ghazali mentioned. It is obvious that Moriscos were much more numerous than Jews in terms of population; therefore Moriscos had greater economic and political power than Jews. It is known that a few Jews were wealthy merchants, statesmen, court physicians, etc., but those numbers seem much smaller than those of the Moriscos. In the Iberian Peninsula, what kind of professions were the Moriscos engaged in?
4. Katsumi Fukasawa (The University of Tokyo, Japan): comment to Dr. Acerra.
The paper of Dr. Acerra on the Protestant presence in the French navy reveals the double attitude of the royal power between rigorous legislation and moderate application, between proscription in principle and connivance in fact, in other words, between declared intolerance and tacit tolerance. The government of Louis XIV was obliged to take this ambiguous attitude, because it needed to have seamen and sailors as well as naval officers in order to reinforce its naval power and therefore to prevent them from escape and emigration toward Protestant enemy countries, such as Holland and England. Thus Louis XIV failed to eradicate the Huguenots by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. This is the first point I note from her paper.
Secondly, in her analysis of the maritime population, Dr. Acerra distinguished attentively naval fleet and merchant shipping. The crew of the royal navy was mixed, containing both Catholics and Protestants, according to local religious situation for recruitment of seamen, and the royal government should always accept a compromise. As for the merchant shipping, the initiative came often from merchants and shipowners who continued to employ Huguenot seamen and thus resisted the royal restriction or prohibition to protect the Protestant worship on shipboard. It is possible to recognize here an indifferent, if not autonomous, attitude of the merchant society toward the politics of royal government.
The third point I remark concerns the daily life of seamen on shipboard, in which the two denominations seem to have led a peaceful coexistence in spite of rare tensions or conflicts. The Catholic mass was celebrated at the stern (back part of a ship), while the Protestant worship was organized at the stem (front of a ship) without disturbing each other. Dr. Acerra explains this phenomenon by a natural solidarity among seamen, confronted with the same danger during the navigation, sharing the same fear of death and the same spiritual desire. So their professional solidarity was stronger than the denominational distinction.
Thus Dr. Acerra’s analysis is summarized into three dimensions, political, social and psychological or religious. And for the last dimension which is religious or spiritual in the proper sense of the term, it will be necessary to search for more sources on the lived reality of interreligious relations during the period of denominational division.
5. Kei Nasu (International Christian University): comment to Dr. Katsuta.
Modern Ireland is perhaps one of the fields where historians find themselves least comfortable with the idea of religious reconciliation, not only because of the sheer scale of conflicts and resentment experienced by different communities over time, but also because of the theoretical or conceptual question as to how one should abstract the ‘religious’ from a highly politicized state. In Ireland by the end of eighteenth century the words ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ had come to denote not just differences in Christian piety but the long-existing political and economic inequality. One wonders whether ‘religious divide’ is a right phrase to explain the problem in the first place. Is the country divided because people chose different religions? The other way around may probably be closer to the truth; we have different religions because we have a divided country. If so, what did exactly ‘religious reconciliation’ mean and how much did it matter to those who debated the Union of Ireland and Britain? It is intriguing, as Dr Katsuta highlights, that renewed and ‘sharpened’ hostility among Irish Catholics toward Protestants resurged after the establishment of the Union, which was intended by the British government as some kind of solution to the Irish problems. Any attempt at detailed studies of religious reconciliation ought to bear in mind that religious divide is not always a cause of conflicts but sometimes a result of attempts at unification.