



# UHAMBURG-UTOKYO WORKSHOP

## LANGUAGE & REALITY

**Time:** June 25 (Sat), 2016: 10:00 – 17:50  
June 26 (Sun), 2016: 09:00 – 18:30

**Venue:** Nidai Hall, Floor 2, Hobun 2 Bldg,  
Hongo Campus, UTokyo

### **Speakers:**

Benjamin Schnieder (UHamburg)  
Moritz Schulz (UHamburg)  
Richard Woodward (UHamburg)  
Takashi Iida (NihonU)  
Takashi Yagisawa (CSU Northridge)  
Masaki Ichinose (UTokyo)  
Richard Dietz (UTokyo)  
Hidenori Kurokawa (KobeU)  
Kengo Miyazono (HiroshimaU)

**Commentators:** Akiko Frischhut (AIU), Naoya Fujikawa (Tokyo Metropolitan U), Viktoria Knoll (UHamburg), Stefan Roski (UHamburg), Tomoya Sato (UC San Diego), Masahiro Yamada (CGU)

**Organiser:** Richard Dietz ([rdietz@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp](mailto:rdietz@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp))

## Where to Find Us

Our venue is **Nidai-Hall**, which is located on

**Floor 2**, in the **Faculty of Law & Letters Bldg 2 (=Hobun 2)**, Hongo Campus, UTokyo.

See building **no. 32** on this access map:

<http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/content/400020145.pdf>

For information on **how to get to Hongo**, see:

<http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/content/400020133.pdf>

## Other things

- This event is **registration-free!**
- **Tea and coffee** will be available, however, only the usual instant varieties (I'm afraid!).
- Lunches and dinners will be taken on a **Dutch-treat** basis.
- If you would like to join some **dinner(s)**, please send an email to Richard Dietz (UTokyo):

[rdietz@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp](mailto:rdietz@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp)

# Program

- **Benjamin Schnieder (UHamburg)**  
**Ground and Consequence**

What does it mean that some proposition follows from others? The standard way of spelling out the notion proceeds in modal terms:  $x$  follows from  $y$  iff necessarily, if  $y$  is true, so is  $x$ . But although this yields a useful and manageable account of consequence, it fails to capture certain aspects of our pre-theoretical understanding of consequence. In this paper, an alternative notion of logical consequence, based on the idea of grounding, is developed.

- **Moritz Schulz (UHamburg)**  
**Evidence in Peer Disagreement**

The paper is concerned with the nature of evidence provided in peer disagreements. It argues that peer disagreements challenge whether we have properly gauged the probabative force of our evidence. In a second, more tentative step, the paper attempts to draw consequences from this analysis for when a peer disagreement calls for a revision of what one believes. An analogy to when knowledge is lost through the appearance of a defeater is explored.

- **Richard Woodward (UHamburg)**  
**The Questions of Ontology**

The ontological question, Quine famously told us, is curious in its simplicity. Not only can it be asked in three words — what is there? — but it can be answered in just one: everything. But though Quine thinks that everyone will accept the truth of this answer, he thinks that ontology remains a lively discipline insofar as there remains room for disagreement about cases: thus one philosopher might disagree with another about whether or not there are such things as numbers, properties, composite objects, temporal parts, and so on. Each side will, of course, agree that there is what there is. But they disagree nonetheless, since they disagree about what there is, and thereby about to what ‘everything’ amounts. In his influential paper “The Question of Ontology”, however, Kit Fine has argued that Quine’s conception of ontological inquiry is doubly wrong, since ontological questions are not questions about what there is and neither are ontological questions properly answered by saying that there are (or are not) things of the relevant sort. Rather, Fine thinks, ontological questions are questions about what there \*really\* is and are properly answered only by saying that all of the things of

the relevant sort are real. In my talk, I aim defend a broadly Quinean picture of ontology by arguing that both Fine's criticisms of Quine, and the conception of ontological inquiry that Fine subsequently develops, are deeply problematic.

- **Takashi Iida (NihonU)**  
**How are Language Changes Possible?**

On one hand, a language is a system of types, which are abstract objects that do not exist in space or time. As a change occurs only in time, it follows that a language cannot change. On the other, we know well that a language is constantly changing. One way of dissolving such a contradiction has been to insist that what is called a "language change" is nothing but a replacement of one language with another.

I used to have such a picture of a language change ([1]), but this time I would like to describe an alternative picture, which is based on the concept of a token generator that I have introduced in [2]. A token generator is something which specifies in sufficient detail how to produce tokens of a given type; examples are a musical score and a complete and detailed specification of a new model of a car. I have argued in [2] that the concept of token generator makes it possible for us to construe types as concrete objects existing in space and time.

In this talk, I am going to argue that a speaker of a language may be regarded as a token generator for the types belonging to it, and hence, that a language can be construed as a system of concrete objects, which is embodied in its speaker's linguistic ability. I will defend such a view of a language and show that it gives us a natural explanation of language changes including the death of a language.

#### References

[1] Takashi Iida, "How are language changes possible?" in M. Okada (ed.), *Ontology and Phenomenology: Franco-Japanese Collaborative Lectures*. 2009. pp.75-96.

[2] Takashi Iida, "On the concept of a token generator" *Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science* 21 (2013) pp.37-55.

Both can be found at my website

<http://www.chs.nihon-u.ac.jp/philosophy/faculty/iida/pub.html>

- **Takashi Yagisawa (CSU, Northridge)**  
**Meta-Representational *Me***

What is the nature of the notion of the first person singular, *me*? I start my answer by reviewing the best theory we have of the linguistic meaning of the

word “I” (“me,” “my,” “mine”) namely, the two-dimensional indexical theory. According to this theory, the reference of “I” is always relative to a *context of utterance* and “I” refers to x relative to a given context of utterance C if and only if x is the *agent* (speaker, writer, signer, etc.) in C, and this reference is *rigid*, that is, it does not shift with shifting *circumstances of evaluation* (with respect to which the truth value of what is said--content--relative to C is determined). I propose a theory of the first person singular which explains this rigidity. The idea is that the notion *me*, which is substantial (directed to an object), has its logical origin in a non-substantial notion, namely, the notion of a certain particular way of representation. An external objective situation is represented in a certain unique way to me; call it the “*me-way*.” The same situation may be equally well represented to someone else, but not in the *me-way*. From this notion of the *me-way*, I extract the derivatively substantial notion *me*. In explaining this, I draw an analogy with the notion *now*. The rigidity of “I” is explained by means of the unchanging *me-way* of representation of the content irrespective of the circumstance of evaluation.

- **Masaki Ichinose (UTokyo)**  
**Counterfactuals, Causation and Absence**

First of all, I raise a question, ‘*What caused the extraordinary increase in deaths in Fukushima after the 2011 quakes?*’, and then suggest possible answers in the form of counterfactual conditionals. That is to say, the quake and tsunami, the severe accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (1F hereafter), or the forcible and quick evacuation caused extraordinary increase in deaths. This line of argument is based upon my understanding concerning the intrinsic and empirical connection between counterfactuals and causation. However, all of those three candidates of cause of the tragedy seem to be equally qualified to be a cause of the extraordinary increase in deaths so that it is difficult to single one causal relation out as the very causation. To this difficulty I react by introducing the notion of “degrees of manipulability” by raising my second question, ‘*Was the extraordinary increase in deaths in Fukushima after the 2011 quakes unavoidable and inevitable?*’ This question naturally leads to the problem of causation by absence or failure as well as the issue of manipulability. As a result, the forcible and quick evacuation comes up as the cause of the extraordinary deaths, as its degree of manipulability is comparatively higher. More precisely speaking, if we had immediately dispatched radioactivity experts to Fukushima to measure radiation levels and give appropriate advice about whether they should be quickly evacuated or stay for some days, then there would not have been the extraordinary increase in deaths. Thus, it is theoretically and retrospectively judged that the failure caused the tragedy. However, still there is a serious problem. *Whose failure should be picked up?* This is nothing but the problem of so-called profligate causation. I try to solve

this problem by finally introducing another degree-theoretic notion, namely, the notion of “degrees of normativity”.

- **Richard Dietz (UTokyo)**  
**Confirmation and Aboutness**

Stephen Yablo (2014) argues that evidential support should be sensitive to subject matter. Like in earlier proposals in this spirit (Fred Dretske (1972), Peter Achinstein (1983, 2001)), it is suggested that the relational property of being confirmed by a given body evidence is sensitive to subject matter, while the complementary property of confirming a given hypothesis is not. I will argue that this asymmetry claim is ill-motivated, and I will explore ways of accommodating evidence regarding language use that may be interpreted as evidence for subject-sensitivity of confirmation in both directions.

- **Hidenori Kurokawa (KobeU)**  
**Incompleteness and Indefinite Extensibility (joint work with Takeshi Yamada, UTokyo)**

In this talk, we revisit Michael Dummett's well-known paper “The philosophical significance of Gödel's theorem.” In that paper, Dummett argues for the view that the notion of natural number is inherently vague. However, the argument Dummett adopted in order to argue for the view uses the same formal device as the current truth-theorists occasionally use, most of whom are self-convinced platonists and would never agree to the view that the notion of natural number is inherently vague. This naturally raises the following two questions. (i) Is Dummett successful in arguing for this view at all? (ii) If he is successful in doing it, in what way is Dummett's argument different from those of platonistic truth-theorists'? In this paper, we answer these two questions.

- **Kengo Miyazono (HiroshimaU)**  
**The Evolutionary Debunking Argument Defeats Itself**

Skeptical evolutionary debunking argument (“Skeptical EDA”) aims to undermine the justification of ethical judgments. Can this argument be used to undermine other types of judgments? I will argue that Skeptical EDA undermines not only ethical judgments but also epistemological judgments. An ethical judgment and an epistemological judgment are relevantly similar to each other in such a way that if the former is undermined by Skeptical EDA, so is the latter. This leads to an interesting consequence that Skeptical EDA, which has an epistemological premise, is self-defeating. Skeptical EDA

implies the skepticism with regard to epistemological judgments, which in turn implies the skepticism with regard to one of its own premises.

## Saturday, June 25

10:00 am – 11:30 am	Benjamin Schnieder (UHamburg) <b>Ground and Consequence</b>  Comment: Tomoya Sato (UC San Diego)
11:30 am – 01:00 pm	Lunch
01:00 pm – 02:30 pm	Richard Dietz (UTokyo) <b>Confirmation and Aboutness</b>
02:30 pm – 02:40 pm	Tea/Coffee
02:40 pm – 04:10 pm	Kengo Miyazono (UHiroshima) <b>The Evolutionary Debunking Argument Defeats Itself</b>
04:10 pm – 04:20 pm	Tea/Coffee
04:20 pm – 05:50 pm	Masaki Ichinose (UTokyo) <b>Counterfactuals, Causation, and Absence</b>  Comment: Stefan Roski (UHamburg)
07:00 pm	Dinner



## Sunday, June 26

09:00 am – 10:30 am	Moritz Schulz (UHamburg) <b>Evidence in Peer Disagreement</b>  Comment: Masahiro Yamada (CGU)
10:30 am – 10:40 am	Tea/Coffee
10:40 pm – 12:10 pm	Hidenori Kurokawa (KobeU) <b>Incompleteness and Indefinite Extensibility</b>
12:10 pm – 01:40 pm	Lunch
01:40 pm – 03:10 pm	Takashi Iida (NihonU) <b>How are Language Changes Possible?</b>  Comment: Viktoria Knoll (UHamburg)
03:10 pm – 03:20 pm	Tea/Coffee
03:20 pm – 04:50 pm	Richard Woodward (UHamburg) <b>The Questions of Ontology</b>  Comment: Akiko Frischhut (AIU)
04:50 pm – 05:00 pm	Tea/Coffee
05:00 pm – 06:30 pm	Takashi Yagisawa (CSU Northridge) <b>Meta-Representational Me</b>  Comment: Naoya Fujikawa (Tokyo MetropolitanU)
07:30 pm	Dinner