Dr. van Bruinessen lectured at Sophia University and the University of Kyoto on the above-mentioned subject, On October 31 and November 5, respectively. Despite slight differences in emphasis, the two lectures were based on the same paper. We will summarize the two lectures here.

In his lectures, the issues of "globalization" and "localization" of Islam were discussed from three aspects, focusing on the interplay between the influence spread from the heartland of Islam and the local "power" that creates the regional diversity of Islam.

First, about "Islamization." Dr. van Bruinessen pointed out that "Islamization" is not a temporal phenomenon, but a continual process.
The Islamization of Indonesia started in Sumatra during the end of 13th Century, but foreign observers had only seen Java as superficially Islamic society until just recently. According to Snouck Hurgronje, a 19th Century European colonial official, Islam was still something "alien" to Java. Clifford Geertz, an American anthropologist working in the 1950's, also stated that even under Islam, very Hindu-like customs remained. However, a part of what is deemed in practice as pre-Islam or Hindu in Indonesia is also similar to the customs of the Middle East, especially wizardry and body charming, but such practices were brought in by the Indonesian hajis (pilgrims) who also brought back the knowledge of Islam from Mecca. In Java there was a tradition to search for and find supernatural power in a particular location. They regarded the location as a source of power, and this was applied to Islam, and the spiritual power achieved in the holy place was deemed important. So, Javanese accepted Islam as something additional to the existing religion and not as a replacement.

Although the records on conversion before the 17th Century are very few, after that there are some records about Indonesians visiting Mecca, and we know that the earlier pilgrims were supported by the palace and were given important positions such as judiciary after returning home. In succeeding generations, people who studied in Mecca continued to bring new elements of Islam into Indonesia. Hence, the hajis played the role of reformers who negated and reformed existing religious practices. Islamization in Indonesia was thus advanced by the Indonesian people themselves. There were two sides to this process; one in which all succesive generations tended to pass on Islam as they had seen it in Mecca, and one that also passed on the changes that occured to Islam in Mecca. During 17-19th century, the situation in Mecca changed tremendously. Islam in Indonesia was also affected by this wave of change.

Next, Dr. van Bruinessen mentioned the relationship between the global and local aspects of the process of Islamization . Though adat (customs) are often used as a system competing with shari'a (Islamic Law), adat exists in every Islamic society not just Indonesia. Furthermore, people do not see any conflict between adat and shari'a because some Islamic elements were also integrated into adat. However, the Dutch who feared the anti-colonialist pan-Islamism, thought of the adat heads as its latent ally and empowered them by codification and solidification of their power. An adat was an orally passed down rule that was originally not codified. It was very flexibly interpreted, case by case, until the Dutch followed the advice of Snouck Hurgronje, biz., unless the Islamic law were incorporated into adat, court verdicts ought not be based on Islamic Law. This resulted in the prioritization of adat over Islamic law. The national ideology of Pancasila (Five Principles of Nation Building) can be viewed as an adat at the national level, or a super-adat for all Indonesian people. It had been a form of localization of tradition which embraced universal civilization. Though Pancasila is considered to be an Indonesian way of interpreting Islam, many of its elements are based in Islam.

Dr. van Bruinessen also pointed out that the clash between the global Muslim civilization (shari'a) and the local religion occurred at the end of the 19th Century. This was largely due to the agitation by the returning hajis, but the then-colonial situation was also partly resonsible. Those whom we call abangan or kebatinan long thought of themselves as Javanese Muslim, but became either anti-Islam or anti-haji at the end of the 19th Century. For example, in the "legend" of the 9th century Javanese cultural hero Aji Saka. It is said that he directly passed on the teachings of Islam as he learned from his pilgrimage to Mecca, hence Javanese culture was thought to contain a purer form of Islam. This legend was reborn at around this time. This type of defensive reaction can be also seen in 19th century Javanese literature.

However, the dichotomy of santri vs. abangan was not so sharp even in the early 20th Century. It is also difficult to distinguish the difference between the santri or abangan within Sarekat Islam, the first mass organization in Indonesia. It seems that the majority were abangan. When Clifford Geertz conducted his research in East Java in the 1950s, political rivalries were at their peak. The antagonism between "santri vs. abangan" was the by-product. The establishment of the New Order put an end to this rivalry. All residents were mandated to embrace the official religion. In the early part of the Suharto era, many of the residents were nominally Muslims, but later they were reIslamized again and became more pious.

Dr. van Bruinessen also mentioned how Islamic locality and universality are distributed throughout contemporary Indonesia. During 1970-1980's, a group of "renewal" led by Nurcholish Madjid gained the attention of the press and foreign researchers. They identified themselves as modernists, who accommodated their ideoloty to that of the government, and stressed that there was no necessity for direct connection between Islam and politics. This contrasts to how Islam was closely connected with politics during the Sukarno era, whilst Islamic parties rationalized their role of encouraging religious formality, and there were even parties that were inclined to Islamize the entire nation. However, leaders such as Nurcholish Madjid held "Islam, yes. Islam party, no" as their slogan and poured their utmost efforts in heightening Islamic values and individual worshipping of their God. They did not act politically, and this helped create the "depoliticizing" trend of the New Order. In the 1980's there were even highly placed officials coming from this group.

The man who highly influenced this group was the Pakistani philosopher, Fazulur Rahman, who placed Islam in a new context while basing his knowledge under the Islamic traditions, and who attempted to interpret the Qu'ran in a new way. The "renewali" was a more cosmopolitan group in terms of its rather open orientation to foreign influences. While preaching the need for dialogue and symbiosis with Christianity, Nurcholish Madjid also preached that being a good Muslim does not necessarily mean that one must be an Arab, and constructively affirmed the right of being more locally oriented as an Indonesian, and of holding onto one's identity. The former Religious Minister, Munawir Sjadzali, had boldly pointed out that some of Qu'ran teachings did not match the Indonesian context. He tried to preach adherence of only those those Islamic laws that answered the needs of the contemporary Indonesian society, but failed in his attempt to do so.

On the other hand, a radical group that is more internationally inclined has emerged in Indonesia. This is the Dewan Dakwah group organized by the ex-Masyumi leader. Banned from political activity under the new order, they engrossed themselves in their mission to infiltrate the Indonesian Muslims to convert them to a more fundamental Islam. They have close ties with an international organization based in Ryad, through which they received Saudi funds, books, articles, and philosophy,- this Saudi-interpretation of Islam or Islamic Fundamentalism being poured into the society. Among these there are anti-Semitic ideas. The so-called "Jewish conspiracy theories" which originated in Russia and which were translated by Hitler into 20 different languages, entered the Arab world and eventually came into Indonesia. What "Jews" signified in this anti-Jewish literature was anti-national, inhomogeneous, (integrally destructive) cosmopolitanism. Though there are very few Jews in Indonesia, the Muslim radicals labelled all cosmopolitan people as being "Jew-like". Not to mention Nurcholish Madjid and his followers, communists, capitalists, as well as some Chinese were clearly deemed as being "Cosmopolitan."

A radical, Middle East-type Islamic group is emerging in today's Indonesia. The ICMI (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) was a mere "tool" for Habibie, but these radical thoughts are now being widely accepted in the Indonesian society. The ongoing power struggle signifies the probability that an Arab-oriented Muslim mihgt be able to preside over the power structure. Ten years ago, it was foolish to think whether Indonesia could become another Algeria, but now it is dangerously close to reality. Such globalism is not a result of ever increasing foreign influence but a result of a very "local" political process in Indonesia.