Islamic Organizations in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Date/Time: Thursday, October 29, 19:00-21:00
Place: Meeting Room #2, 11F, 7th Building, Sophia University, Yotsuya
Reporter: Martin van Bruinessen (Professor of Literature, Utrecht University)
Title: Islamic Organizations in Post-Suharto Indonesia
Misc.: In Indonesian (with interpreter)

It is necessary to go back to the time of President Sukarno to comprehend the political map of Islamic organizations in the post-Suharto Indonesia. The general elections of 1955, the most freeand unmaniuplated elections Indonesia has had, threw up four parties of almost equal strength: the Masyumi Party, Nahdatul Ulama(NU), National Party of Indonesia (PNI), and the Communist Party of Indonesia(PKI). The two former parties are Islamic parties. The Masyumi, which roughly represents the "Modernist" wing of Indonesian Islam, had its strongest appeal in urban areas and the Outer Islands(especially Sumatra), whereas NU, which is associated with the traditional Islamic schools (pesantren) was strongest in Central and East Java and in South Kalimantan.

After the 1957-58 regional rebellion (PRRI), the Masyumi and the Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI) were outlawed. Sukarno welded a coalition of the remaining three major parties (NU, PNI, PKI) and coined the name of NASAKOM (Nationalisme, Agama, Komunisme)for this unlikely coalition. Sukarno based his position on a precarious balancing of this very unstable union of NASAKOM on the one hand and the army on the other.

The political map of Indonesian Islam was changed forever after Suharto came into power on September 30, 1965. First, the PKI which was accused of masterminding the coup was banned from politics, while Golkar, which was a mere federation of functional groups during the Sukarno era, became politicized.

The first general election was held in 1971 after Suharto came into power. Under the Political Party Act the Christian parties and the PNI were merged into the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI) while all Islamic parties were merged into the United Development Party (PPP). The most prominent former leaders of the Masyumi were not allowed to take active part in political life again. They established the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Islam Propagation Council). NU was so discouraged by the Suharto establishment that it distanced itself away from the forefront of politics. Thereby the one organisation that could conceivably mobilise masses was alienated from practical politics. Thus the political map of Indonesia was ever simplified by the '80s. Muslims became involved in more strictly religious activities and intellectual pursuits. By the end of the 1980's, the civilian political parties were very much weakend and enjoued little enthusiastic support from below.

This succesful depoliticisation made Suharto more depnden on the army, which was no longer kept in balance by a credible civilian political force. To strengthen his had vis a vis the army Suharto needed some form of civilian backing. The Association of Indonesian Muslims Intellectuasl (ICMI) was born against this background.

The ICMI is an organization that seeks proportional representation of the Muslims in Indonesia (88% of entire population) in economic and political life. The organisation was established with Suharto's explicit endorsement, and Habibie, who was one of Suharto's favourites, became its chairman. The leadership of ICMI comes from two constituences: independent Muslim intellectuals and public figures with well-established Islamic credentials (many of whom were associated with Masyumi and had earlier been marginalised under Suharto), and bureaucrats and "technologists" from Habibie's surroundings. All public servants are urged to become ICMI member.

NU President Abdulrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) was the most prominent of the Mulims who had doubts about the ICMI. He perceived it to be strongly Masyumi- and bureaucracy-dominated, and spoke of the danger of "sectarianism', suggesting that ICMI might turn out to be anti-Christian and anti-minority in general, and especially anti-Chinese.

The Dewan Dakwah, where the Masyumi leaders remained active, was much influenced by ideas emanating from Saudi Arabia, including anti-Semitism. They held against the cosmopolitan idea of thinking that all religions are equal. In the anti-Semitic publications spread by groups around the Dewan Dakwah (including the Dewan Dakwah's journal), in one sense it is really the cosmopotlian of Indonesia and the Chinese who were targetd. The most radical voice came from KISDI, the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the world of Islam.

In Jakarta's May '98 riots that led to the exit of Suharto, Chinese shops were looted and Overseas Chinese women were sexually molested. There are many speculations as to who organised these riots, and many are convinced that they were part of an attempted coup d'etat against Suharto, in whcih the Commander of Strategic Reserve Command, General Prabowo (Suharto's son-in-law) may have played a major part. Prabowo had assured himself of the support of KISDI and a significant part of the Dewan Dakwah group as well as a number of young ambitious operators from modernist Muslim circles, and he was also in a position to mobilise street mobs. Rumour has it that he had an agreement with Habibie, according to which Habibie would become president and Prabowo replace his chief rival, National Army Chief General Wiranto. Prabowo's plans misfired; he was not the only actor, and the ritoting was on a larger scale than he had planned. In the following power struggle, Prabowo lost out and Hbibie and Wiranto came on top, in a delicate and mutually suspicious coalition.

After the exit of Suharto, the political map of Indonesia is again decorated in complex colors. Various Islamic parties have been estabished, for example the Crescent and Star Party (PBB) that takes on the legacy of Masyumi, KISDI and Dewah Dakwah, the PNI-type PDI Megawati wing, and NU's Party of National Awakening (PKB). The popular Muslim leader Amien Rais, who was the chairman of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organization in Indonesia and who was the most prominent leader of the opposition on movement in Suharto's last year, had to make the choice whether he should remain the major leader of Indonesia's modernist Muslims or should find himself a broader base and cut a profile as a national leader of a coalition including non-Muslims. He opted for the latter when he estabished the National Mandate Party (PAN) instead of teaming up of more 'sectarian' Masyumi people in the Crescent and Moon Party.